


























According to the Irish Central Statistics Office (CSO), as of 2018, 89 per cent of households 
have Internet access at home, an increase of 17 per cent since 2010 (Central Statistics 
Office, 2018). On an individual level, 82 per cent of individuals used the Internet in the three 
months prior to their interview (Central Statistics Office, 2018). These statistics are important 
in the Irish context as they provide insight into the numbers of people with access to the 
Internet within the Irish population. In the context of this research these figures also provide 
an indication of the threat posed by cybercrime as it is reasonable to assume that as the 
number of internet users increases so too does the level of crime in the online world. The 
threat posed by cybercrime is something policy makers are continuously striving to adapt to 
and overcome and the Department of Justice and Equality is no different in this regard.  This 
has also been a growth area over the last six months as enterprising criminals have 
exploited fertile new ground online during the Covid-19 pandemic.   
A commitment to developing a strong evidence base for the policy and other work of the 
Department was the objective of our 2018-2020 Data and Research Strategy and also 
formed a core part of the Department’s radical structural transformation in 2019.  
As we continue to establish new ways of working, we will seek to continuously improve our 
capability in the development of evidence based work. As part of this process, we have 
already shared three other pieces of research over the last year. The first report focused on 
the important area of victims’ interactions with the criminal justice system. The second report 
focused on the area of confidence in the criminal justice system. Our most recent publication 
was an evidence review of recidivism and policy responses carried out by Professor Ian 
O’Donnell of Institute of Criminology and Criminal Justice School of Law, University College 
Dublin.  This new publication on cybercrime by co-authors Sheelagh Brady and Caitríona 
Heinl provides a worthy addition to that growing body of research as we seek to better 
understand and respond to emerging issues in the Department’s remit.   
Many of the traditional forms of crime which the Department has always played a role in 
combatting have now moved, at least partly, online. The Department is continually trying to 




to specific cybercrime offences, much of the focus to date has been on cyber-enabled 
crimes such as combatting online child sexual abuse and exploitation and economic crime. 
We have also concentrated our efforts on meeting international standards in this sphere and 
are working towards ratification of the Council of Europe’s Convention on Cybercrime (the 
Budapest Convention). The publication of this report will assist in developing further policy 
responses, particularly in relation to newer forms of cyber dependent crimes. We also work 
with colleagues in many other government departments and state agencies in the areas of 
cybercrime and cyber security. With regard to heightening awareness and prevention of 
cybercrime, the National Cyber Security Centre and the Garda National Cybercrime Bureau 
are running a campaign as part of European Cyber Security month to alert the public to the 
risks of cybercrime and ensure that people can better protect themselves online. This 
campaign is one of the key objectives of the National Cyber Security Strategy published at 
the end of 2019. 
I very much welcome this research which will provide policy makers within this Department 
and further afield with food for thought concerning the current and emerging threats as well 
as useful models of best practice for combatting cybercrime.  I want to thank and commend 
the co-authors for their work in researching this complex and ever evolving phenomenon.  
 
Oonagh McPhillips 
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This piece of research examines the existing research literature on cybercrime including 
current and emerging threats, the Irish anti-cybercrime landscape and models of best 
practice for combatting cybercrime in order to inform both policy and practice across the 
criminal justice system in Ireland – in other words, it is not a policy report with concrete 
policy recommendations. It first explores the lack of consensus surrounding the term 
‘cybercrime’ which is largely used to encompass a range of criminal activities that use 
information and communication technologies (ICTs). Differing definitions are often used, 
depending on the purpose to which they are applied, be that research, legislative, or policy 
making. Section Two of the report examines the ever-evolving threat landscape that requires 
a constant revision of responses at national and international level. This is especially the 
case where opportunities for cybercrime are growing because of an increasing attack 
surface brought about by the growth of ICTs, new technologies and more Internet users per 
capita. This is particularly important for Ireland given that it may not only suffer the direct 
consequences of cybercrime, but because of its status as a location of choice for many 
global technology companies and other multinationals. This means that the country must 
have top-tier advanced cyber readiness capabilities and avoid the indirect consequences of 
cybercrime such as loss of confidence from outside investors. Yet, the report finds that it is 
difficult to measure both the direct and indirect consequences of cybercrime. And while 
cybercrime-related activities occur daily, they are often not reported to An Garda Síochána. 
Such under-reporting, which is discussed in more detail within the report, will likely limit the 
ability to create effective policy solutions. 
The most significant cybercrime trends and threats currently include: (1) Ransomware; (2) 
Other malware threats; (3) Data breaches and network attacks; (4) Spearphishing (targeting 
specific individuals for the purposes of distributing malware or extracting sensitive 
information); and (5) Attacks against critical infrastructure. These types of trends present 
new challenges both at home and abroad such as impacting targets indiscriminately, 
exacerbating already low levels of reporting to the authorities, and legislative challenges, 
thus calling for new policy solutions that are referenced in more detail in the report. Other 
trends that should ideally continue to be considered by law enforcement and policy-makers 
involved in the fight against cybercrime include the growing connections between cybercrime 
and malevolent state activity; IoT/future cities and smart meters; cloud security; emerging 




availability of tools and techniques as well as “Darknet” concerns; poor security cultures; the 
terrorist-cybercrime nexus, and pervasive anonymisation tools.  
The third section of the report identifies key legislation including an assessment on its 
effectiveness. The key piece of Irish legislation is the Criminal Justice (Offences relating to 
Information Systems) Act of 2017 which amends previous Acts and gives effect to EU 
Directive 2013/40/EU on attacks against information systems. However, the codification of 
cybercrime still remains scattered across many Acts. Additionally, the transposition into Irish 
law of regulatory instruments like the EU NIS Directive and GDPR means that Irish 
individuals and entities will now be accountable for not meeting compliance obligations. This 
means that preventative measures are now more likely to be introduced by organisations, 
thus driving better resilience in the wake of cybercrime - even though it may be too soon to 
gauge their effectiveness on crime prevention.  
Many countries, including Ireland, use a combination of traditional legislation (or at least not 
specifically developed to target cyber activities) and specific legislation for cyber-related 
activities. Irish policy-makers could ideally begin to address gaps that arise in relation to new 
cybercrimes where non-specific legislation is sometimes limited. Nonetheless, the report 
finds that while effective legislation is desirable, it is not always feasible to have legislation in 
place to meet the rapid pace of technological change. This means other methods (such as 
technology neutral provisions et al) could be considered to complement the more lengthy 
legislative process. Notably, there is limited research on the effectiveness of existing legal 
instruments, but analyses in the area of crime prevention more generally is better 
researched. Aspects of these learnings on traditional crime prevention and criminology could 
be transferable to the area of cybercrime.  
The report highlights the implications of the lack of resourcing for An Garda Síochána in 
relation to cybercrime investigations and prosecutions, and the final report section finds that 
there is a lack of systematic reviews of best practices, both from an academic and 
operational perspective - even though there is a growing array of research which may result 
in improved mechanisms to measure success in the near future. This section identifies 
perceived good practices in academic writings and through interviews with key stakeholders, 
which align closely for the most part. It is found that the local and contextual conditions in 
place should be assessed before importing a model into a new area, as these are likely to 
have a significant impact on any new model. Moreover, any new policy practice should 
include mechanisms for evaluating success or lack thereof. However, this requires reliable 




The report observes that any course of action should take a methodological approach to 
defining a roadmap for activities. Activities of this nature could include a whole of 
government approach, and also incorporate non-governmental stakeholders given the 
inherent complexities associated with cybercrimes. The report further notes from the 
literature that there is space for Ireland to enhance its existing, highly prized, partnerships in 
this area. Improvements could place Ireland in a good position to develop a systematic 
means of establishing best practice, and build on the rich eco-systems of universities, tech 
companies, law enforcement and other relevant stakeholders. To further enhance such 
partnerships, more formal mechanisms of collaboration could be considered.  
Lastly, in terms of awareness raising, the research shows that a shift from general 
campaigns is needed towards more precise efforts to bring about better cybersecurity and 
resilience in the wake of cybercrime, mindful also of the need to reduce the risk of creating a 
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Section 1: Introduction  
According to the Irish Central Statistics Office (CSO), as of 2018, 89 per cent of households 
have Internet access at home, an increase of 17 per cent since 2010 (Central Statistics 
Office, 2018). This is in line with the EU average where in 2018, 89 per cent of the EU-28 
Member State households had Internet access (Eurostat, 2019). According to the EU Digital 
Economy and Society Index (DESI) (2020), Finland, Sweden, the Netherlands and Denmark 
have the most active Internet users, followed by the UK, Malta, Estonia, and Ireland. Ireland, 
along with Spain, recorded the largest improvement with respect to activity levels since the 
last EU DESI index report.   
In Ireland in 2018, 82 per cent of individuals used the Internet in the three months prior to 
their interview (Central Statistics Office, 2018). The EU DESI index (2020) noted that Ireland 
recorded an eight per cent increase in percentage points in relation to regular Internet users 
since the last review of 2019. As probably expected, the percentage of individuals between 
the age of 16 and 44 years, who had recently used the Internet (within the previous three 
months) was twice the corresponding figure for persons aged 60 to 74 years - these equated 
to 97 per cent and 48 per cent respectively (Central Statistics Office, 2018). This is also 
reflected in the EU DESI index (2020), which reports that the most active Internet users are 
young individuals.  Mobile phones or smartphones appeared to be the most common 
methods of accessing the Internet, with 86 per cent of individuals reporting such use in 2018 
(Central Statistics Office, 2018). Conversely, of those who had used the Internet in the last 
three months, only 24 per cent reported doing so using a desktop computer.  
These statistics are important in the Irish context as they provide insight into the numbers of 
people with access to the Internet within the Irish population. They are also important in the 
global context given that it is forecasted that the global number of Internet users will rise to 6 
billion by 2022 and 7.6 billion by 2030 (Statistica, 2018), illustrating the wider online 
community that is now more easily accessible to the Irish population. Given the focus of this 
research report on cybercrime, these figures are also important in the context of crime, more 
specifically cybercrime, especially as noted by Conway and Brady (2018) if Braithwaite’s 
assertion to crime in the offline world holds true for cyberspace. Braithwaite asserted that as 
the population increases so too does the crime rate (per capita).  Therefore, if one were to 
apply this theory to online activity, one would expect to see that as the number of Internet 
users increases, so too does the level of crime in the online world. Kennedy (2018) in an 
article for Silicon Republic noted this increase, reporting that cybercrime in Ireland is double 




stated “economic crime, fuelled by cybercrime, is becoming more prevalent and more costly 
for Irish businesses” (Kennedy, 2018, 1). A more nuanced discussion about these 
cybercrime figures in the Irish landscape is found within Section Two below.   
Interestingly, a UK National Crime Agency (NCA) report, “The Cyber Threat to UK Business 
2016/2017”, identifies a change in the nature of cybercrime. The NCA reported then that 
“cybercrime is becoming more aggressive and confrontational” (National Crime Agency 
Website, 2017). They further note that these trends were evident across various forms of 
cybercrime, such as high-tech crimes, data breaches and sexual extortion. Furthermore, the 
European Union Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA), in its Threat 
Landscape Report 2017 noted that the “complexity of attacks and sophistication of malicious 
actions in cyberspace continue to increase” (ENISA, 2018).  
This piece of research, which is funded by the Department of Justice and Equality, is 
therefore timely given that cybercrime is a fast growing area of crime, and because we are 
becoming increasingly reliant on technology in our day-to-day lives both at home and in the 
work place which can raise the potential for exposure to cybercrimes. There are lots of 
traditional crimes which fall under the remit of the Department that can now be committed via 
the Internet or information and communications technologies (ICTs), many of which can 
have serious consequences. Nonetheless, the main focus of this report is on cyber-
dependent crime. As laid out in Section Two of the report, there is now what some describe 
as a “tectonic shift” in the cybercrime threat landscape where law enforcement and policy-
makers’ understanding of modern cybercrime must likely now include expanded attack 
surfaces that provide more opportunities for criminals where there are growing numbers of 
interconnected devices and the Internet of Things (IoT). While the discussion surrounding 
Internet access through desktop computers and smartphones has been significant to date, 
the fight against modern cybercrime is facing into a period of expanded attack surfaces and 
disruptive technologies not witnessed before.  
In line with Department of Justice and Equality requirements, this literature review examines 
cyber-dependent crime, the existing research literature on cybercrime including current and 
emerging threats, the Irish anti-cybercrime landscape and models of best practice for 
combatting cybercrime in order to inform both policy and practice across the criminal justice 
system in Ireland. The report acknowledges that cybercrime issues can be multi-faceted and 
as a result often span several government departments, competencies and portfolios. This 
review primarily examines the subject matter from the perspective of the Department of 




state security) have not been examined – although the report references instances where 
there is a nexus between state and criminal activity. Moreover, this report mainly focuses on 
cybercrimes with less focus on cybersecurity and cyber resilience measures.  
To achieve these goals, the study answers the following questions:  
 What are the current and emerging threats posed by cybercrime to Ireland and other 
developed countries? 
 What relevant legislation is in place to combat cybercrime and how effective has this 
been?  
 What are the models of best practice for responding to the threat of cybercrime 
nationally and internationally? 
 What learning can be provided to inform future policy and legislative developments 
for combatting cybercrime? 
Methodology  
A review of the literature on cybercrime was conducted for the purpose of this project. A 
systematic approach was used to assess the quality and relevance of the literature found. 
See a summary of this review in Appendix A. The use of secondary sources has both 
advantages and disadvantages. For one, published studies are often subjected to 
‘publication bias’, meaning significant and positive results are often more likely to be 
published (Dempster, 2003). Furthermore, given the topic under review, many good 
practices are never systematically reviewed, and therefore are not often included in 
academic portals.  As discussed in a later section of this report, other drawbacks of over-
reliance upon academic sources for discussions on contemporary cyber threats is often 
timeliness and relevance. By the time academic material will complete the publication cycle, 
key trends may have changed significantly given the rapidly changing nature of the cyber 
threat landscape and critical emerging technologies. Nonetheless, material from academia 
may provide analytical rigour and historical depth, thus grounding insights in a contextual 
framework. Therefore, to mitigate these issues, a broad range of secondary sources are 
included in this review. These include the use of a range of governmental open source 
material from law enforcement, intelligence and policy communities as well as non-
governmental sources such as reputable global cybersecurity vendors, consultancy 
companies, and academia or research institutes. Therefore, only documents available within 
the public domain were used. It is acknowledged that these documents have their own 




Nonetheless, the inclusion of this broad range of documents is believed to mitigate many, 
although not all, of the limitations of each of these sources.  
To further enhance robustness, ten interviews were conducted with a range of experts in the 
field of cybercrime from across academia, the private sector, as well as national and 
European law enforcement agencies. A purposive sampling method was used. Interviewees 
were selected primarily based on their expertise and experience in the area. One key area of 
expertise omitted from the sample relates to legal expertise. Efforts were made to engage 
experts for interview and review of Section Three of the report, but they were unsuccessful. 
Some legal experts were happy to speak about more traditional cyber-enabled crimes, but 
felt less competent in relation to those cybercrimes that would not come about if it were not 
for the use of ICTs (in other words, cyber-dependent crimes), which is an interesting finding 
in and of itself.  
Literature search strategy  
A systematic search strategy was used to identify research on cybercrime threats, the 
relevant legislation in this area and its effectiveness, and the models of best practice for 
responding to the threat of cybercrime nationally and internationally. A number of well-known 
databases were initially searched, such as Web of Knowledge, Scopus, ProQuest, Oxford 
Journals Online, Cambridge University Press Online Journals, Sage Journals Online, 
JSTOR Arts and Sciences, and Taylor & Francis Journals. These databases were chosen 
because they are interdisciplinary in nature, and include a broad range of peer-reviewed 
journal articles, reports and academic texts. Initially, the search strategy was designed to be 
as inclusive as possible, in an attempt to maximise the number of relevant articles. A number 
of practical issues were found in the searches. For example, in terms of academic articles on 
cybercrime legislation in Ireland the majority of articles pre-date the introduction of the 
Criminal Justice (Offences relating to Information Systems) Act 2017, which was enacted in 
Ireland to formalise arrangements in law and to comply with EU requirements on capabilities, 
cooperation and reporting. The Act amended the existing laws used to address cybercrime, 
such as the Criminal Damage Act 1991, the Bail Act 1997 and the Criminal Justice Act 2011, 
and also gave effect to certain provisions of the EU Directive 2013/40/EU on attacks against 
information systems. This means that many of the arguments presented in these sources 
are outdated.  
Secondly, as Shah, Jones and Choudrie (2019) note, while research offers 
recommendations and some best practice for frameworks to combat cybercrime, cybercrime 




found that “there is limited literature available in terms of theories of cybercrime 
management” (p.1125). The academic literature that does exist in relation to cybercrime 
largely relates to internal fraud in the banking and other public and private sectors (Shah, 
Jones and Choudrie, 2019). As a result, and as mentioned above, a range of additional 
sources is used to mitigate such limitations. These include a range of governmental open 
source material from law enforcement, intelligence and policy communities as well as non-
governmental sources such as reputable global cybersecurity vendors and consultancy 
companies. The potentially partisan nature of these publications is noted later in this report, 
and a critical view was maintained by the authors in reviewing these documents. 
Inclusion and exclusion criteria  
Extensive efforts were made to review all available information. However, given the extent of 
this area of study, coupled with the terms of reference (TOR), inclusion or exclusion criteria 
were established to ensure a more targeted approach. Such criteria was largely based on 
‘relevance’ to the topic area. Material was also selected that focused on cybercrimes 
pertaining to the Department of Justice and Equality, rather than, for example, security and 
defence. To be included, articles, reports, and all documentary sources must have a focus 
on cybercrime, and more specially, cyber-dependent crimes. Definitions relating to the 
understanding of cyber-enabled and cyber-dependent crimes are discussed below. 
Relevance was determined against the guiding questions provided in the tender document 
and measured under a three-tiered classification process of high, medium and low. Given 
that this report examines three key areas, documents are assessed against one of these 
areas. For example, if a document is highly relevant to threats, but has low relevance to 
either or both of the other two areas, it is still said to be of high relevance. To guide the 
reader, the relevance of documents is broken down across the key areas of threat 
landscape, legislation and best practices. Documents that were not deemed to be relevant to 
any of the three areas were excluded. A large number of articles and reports were excluded 
for this reason. For example, studies relating specifically to cyber-enabled crime and articles 
pre-dating the Criminal Justice (Offences relating to Information Systems) Act 2017 are 
excluded. That said, articles relating to legislation that was not amended by this 2017 




except for legislation if still applicable.1 This timeframe also represents a period in which the 
changing nature of the threat landscape has occurred, for example, the introduction of 
broadband, 24/7 connectivity and more recently, the increase in Internet-enabled devices 
and IoT. Furthermore, all documents must have been published in English. Studies that do 
not meet these criteria are excluded.  
Analytic strategy  
Each publication is entered into a table dedicated to each section of the report. The 
headings used include: (i) author; (ii) year of publication; (iii) name of publication; (iv) type of 
study; (v) evaluation type and strength; (vi) relevance to one of the three project sections; 
and (vii) additional information. This process helped in assessing the relevance to the topic. 
The key topics under review and the guiding questions provided in the tender document 
were used to identify initial themes. However, as articles and reports were further analysed, 
other themes or contrasting themes emerged. These are documented and discussed within 
the document. Both authors had regular discussions about emerging findings, trends and 
themes. This was important in ensuring the relevant links between the three sections are 
identified and discussed.  
Quality assessment 
Two approaches to quality assessment were undertaken. The first related to the work of 
each of the authors. Each author independently reviewed the others work and feedback was 
given. Once a final draft was completed, the draft was reviewed by Dr. Shane Horgan of 
Edinburgh Napier University. Dr. Horgan provided feedback and comments on areas that 
required additional work. These recommendations were taken on board and addressed in 
the final version of the report. Appendix A includes a data coding process matrix outlining the 
quality of the publications reviewed.  
Overview of the Report 
The report is structured as follows:  
                                                  
 
 
1 The research for this report was conducted in 2019, for the most part, and therefore annual reports or 




Section 1.1 considers foundational questions related to the definitions of cybercrime. 
Section 2 examines research on the current and emerging threats posed by cybercrime to 
Ireland and other developed countries. It begins by framing the discussion surrounding 
current and emerging cybercrime threats. It then examines the broad trends behind the 
pervasiveness of cybercrime, before presenting the current and emerging threats in 
European, other developed countries and Ireland. It ends by examining the factors with an 
impact on the evolving cybercrime threat landscape. 
Section 3 outlines the relevant legislation that is in place to combat cybercrime. It considers 
Irish legislation, as well as applicable international and EU instruments. This section then 
provides an assessment of the effectiveness of legislation in combatting cybercrime in terms 
of prevention, prosecutions, convictions or other measures. 
Section 4 outlines models of best practice for responding to the threat of cybercrime 
nationally and internationally.  
The report concludes with an overview in Section 5 of the most salient findings and key 
learnings to inform future policy and legislative developments for combatting cybercrime. 
1.1  Definitions of cybercrime 
This section briefly considers definitional matters relating to the precise definition - or lack 
thereof - of ‘cybercrime’. This is not an exhaustive discussion. It is an indicative piece that 
illustrates the lack of agreed definitions, but does not go so far as to suggest or analyse a 
proposed definition since this is beyond the scope of the literature review. However, this 
section acts to frame the definitional approach used in relation to this piece of research.  
There is no universally agreed definition of the term ‘cybercrime’ nor is there consensus as 
to what cybercrime actually is (Wall, 2004). It is often a term used to encompass a range of 
criminal activities that use information and communication technologies (ICTs). Other 
interchangeable terms are also often used, such as ‘virtual crime’, ‘net-crime’, ‘hi-tech crime’ 
or ‘computer crime’ (Wall, 2004). The lack of clarity can be confusing and disconcerting and 
has led to a tendency, amongst some, to label any offence that involves a computer or part 
thereof as a cybercrime (Wall, 2004). To overcome this, Wall (2004) purports that one 
should consider how the use of ICT transforms a crime, rather than the act itself. To do this, 
he suggests the use of an elimination test, in which one thinks about what would happen if 
the use of ICT were removed from the offence. From this approach, he notes that three 




are ‘traditional’ crimes in which a computer has been used” (Wall, 2004: 20, exemplified by 
the use of ICT in the commission of a crime such as fraud). The second are “hybrid 
cybercrimes – traditional crimes for which network technology has created entirely new 
global opportunities” (20), exemplified through global frauds. The third are “true cybercrimes 
which are solely the product of opportunities created by the Internet and which can only be 
perpetrated within cyberspace” (20), exemplified through spam, phishing and other forms of 
social engineering. Similarly, Grabosky (2004) also breaks cybercrime into three forms. 
These three forms are: (1) conventional crimes committed with computers, such as digital 
child pornography, piracy, or intellectual property theft, and forgery; (2) attacks on computer 
networks; and (3) conventional criminal cases such as drug trafficking, in which evidence 
exists in digital form (Grabosky, 2004).  
Although slightly different, these categorisations are important not only in the context of 
providing clarity about the role of ICT in criminality, but also in relation to response, and 
especially in the context of legislative applicability. The first of Wall’s two categories stem 
from traditional crimes, which he suggests are likely to be the subject of existing laws. Any 
legal problems enforcing such laws when applied to crimes that involve the use of ICT tend 
to relate more to legal procedures rather than substantive law, he argues. However, he 
(Wall, 2005a) notes that it is the third category - those crimes that are solely the product of 
ICT - where problems can exist in regard to responding or managing them. It is this 
perspective that will be explored further in this research.   
Others prefer two categories. Gordon & Ford (2006) argue cybercrime can be distinguished 
by how a computer or ICT is used in the commission of the offence. For example, category 
one includes crimes that involve computers or ICT as the primary factor, such as malware, in 
contrast to category two, which involves humans as the primary factor, such as online 
grooming. This distinction is somewhat similar to that made in the United Kingdom’s National 
Cyber Security Strategy (2016-2021) where the term is broken down as cyber-enabled 
crimes and cyber-dependent crimes (Hull, Eze, Speakman, 2018). This distinction is often 
said to be based on new and old crimes.  
Cyber-dependent crimes are viewed in the United Kingdom as new crimes, which could not 




commit the Actus Reus2 of the crime. While cyber-enabled crime, often said to be traditional 
crimes, are enhanced or scaled through the use of ICT (Hull, Eze, Speakman, 2018). For 
example, online fraud where fraud can be conducted without the use of ICT, but its scale 
and reach can be increased through the use of ICT. Two of the most widely published 
instances of cyber-enabled crime relate to fraud and theft (McGuire & Dowling, 2013; p 4). In 
short, cyber-dependent crimes are often viewed as cybercrimes in their purest form, while in 
contrast, cyber-enabled crimes are often referred to as traditional crimes - those that can still 
be committed without the use of ICT.  
The European Commission relies on three categories to define cybercrime. According to the 
EU Cyber Security Strategy 2013:  
“Cybercrime commonly refers to a broad range of different criminal activities where 
computers and information systems are involved either as a primary tool or as a primary 
target. Cybercrime comprises traditional offences (such as fraud, forgery, and identity 
theft), content-related offences (such as online distribution of child pornography or 
incitement to racial hatred) and offences unique to computers and information systems 
(such as attacks against information systems, denial of service and malware)” (p 3). 
In operational terms, the European law enforcement agency, Europol, understands cyber-
dependent crime in the following way:   
“[A]ny crime that can only be committed using computers, computer networks or other 
forms of information communication technology (ICT). In essence, without the Internet, 
criminals could not commit these crimes. It includes such activity as the creation and 
spread of malware, hacking to steal sensitive personal or industry data and denial of 
service attacks to cause financial and/or reputational damage” (European Cyber Crime 
Centre (EC3), 2019, p. 14).  
The 2013 EU Directive on attacks against information systems establishes minimum rules on 
the definition of criminal offences. The objectives of this Directive are to approximate the 
                                                  
 
 
2 The actus reus “consists of some act or some omission forbidden by law. The conduct of the accused 
must come within the forbidden action. The actus must be directly attributable to the accused and not to 
another person, unless the accused incited that other person or they shared a common purpose. The actus 




criminal law of the EU Member States in the area of attacks against information systems by 
establishing minimum rules concerning the definition of criminal offences (2013/40/EU (1)).  
Many nations do not adopt a statutory or case law definition of cybercrime, because 
requirements of the definition change depending on the purpose in which the definition is 
used, for example, research, legislation, policy making (UNODC, 2013). The limited use of a 
strict definition in national legislation is an issue discussed in detail in the UNODC report 
‘Comprehensive Study on Cybercrime’ 2013. The findings of this study note that nations do 
not appear to be concerned with having a strict definition. The results of their questionnaire 
showed that “out of almost 200 items of national legislation cited by countries in response to 
the Study questionnaire, fewer than five per cent used the word ‘cybercrime’ in the title or 
scope of legislative provisions. Rather, legislation more commonly referred to ‘computer 
crimes, electronic communications, information technologies, or ‘high-tech crime. 
To illustrate the status quo described by the UNODC (2013) and the ways in which the term 
differs across jurisdictions, the following matrix is included below. The National Cyber 
Security Strategies of six nations were examined to compare and contrast different 
definitions or descriptions of ‘cybercrime’. This is not an exhaustive list, but an illustration of 
the differing non-legislative definitions or descriptions used across jurisdictions. Of these six 
strategies, two (one of which is the Irish National Cyber Security Strategy 2019-2024), do not 
define or describe the term, but do address the issue of cybercrime. Therefore, in respect to 
Ireland a general definition of cybercrime as described on the Department of Justice and 
Equality website is used in the table below for the purposes of this report.  While, in respect 
to the Danish definition, this was taken from the Cyber Threat Against Denmark document 
2019. 
Table 1 
Country National non-legislative definitions or descriptions of the term 
‘cybercrime’  
Australia ‘Cybercrime’ refers to crimes directed at computers, such as illegally 
modifying electronic data or seeking a ransom to unlock a computer 
affected by malicious software. It also includes crimes where 
computers are part of an offence, such as online fraud (Australian 




Denmark Cybercrime refers to perpetrators that use cyber attacks to commit 
financially motivated crimes (Danish Government, 2019, p 6). 
Ireland Cybercrime comprises traditional offences (e.g. fraud, forgery and 
identity theft); content related offences (e.g. online distribution of child 
sexual abuse material, hate speech or incitement to commit acts of 
terrorism); and offences unique to computers and information 
systems (e.g. attacks against such systems, spread of malware, 
hacking to steal sensitive, personal or industry data and denial of 
service attacks to cause financial and/or reputational damage). 
Electronic devices are also used to sell and transfer all sorts of illicit 
goods and services, from illicit drugs to online child sexual abuse and 
exploitation materials to lists of stolen credit card numbers 
(Department of Justice, Website, 2020)  
The 
Netherlands  
The term cybercrime covers a broad range of criminal actions, from 
classic crime in digital form to new crime. This involves, for instance, 
hacking computers to transfer money to criminal bank accounts or 
turning on cameras and microphones undetected to be able to spy on 
people in their own surroundings (Dutch Government, 2018, p 35). 
New 
Zealand 
Crimes that are committed through the use of computer systems, and 
are directed at computer systems. Examples include producing 
malicious software, denial of service attacks, and phishing. Cyber-
enabled crimes [are] crimes that are assisted, facilitated or escalated 
in scale by the use of technology. Examples are cyber-enabled fraud 
and the online distribution of child exploitation material (New Zealand 
Government, 2019. p 16). 
United 
Kingdom  
Cyber-dependent crimes - crimes that can be committed only through 
the use of Information and Communications Technology (‘ICT’) 
devices, where the devices are both the tool for committing the crime, 
and the target of the crime (e.g. developing and propagating malware 
for financial gain, hacking to steal, damage, distort or destroy data 
and/or network or activity). 
Cyber-enabled crimes - traditional crimes which can be increased in 




forms of ICT (such as cyber-enabled fraud and data theft) (United 
Kingdom’s National Cyber Security Strategy, 2016, p 17). 
 
1.2  Classification of cybercrime used for the purpose 
of this report: ‘Cyber-dependent crime’ 
Given the saturation of Internet-connected technologies in everyday life, much of all crime 
exists on a technological spectrum. Wall has since abandoned this definitional work, as the 
distinctions he makes have become increasingly blurred. Furthermore, many offenders may 
engage in a range of cyber-enabled, cyber-dependent and offline offences for the purpose of 
achieving their goals. This can complicate definitions and add to the problems of assessing 
cybercrime levels (discussed later in the report). Furnell (2003) notes that it may be more 
important to make sense of the actual threat posed, the harm it causes and how to prevent 
it, than focus on situating cybercrimes into particular categories. He suggests that definitional 
work is hampered by the rapid speed of threat emergence mentioned above, as well as the 
broad range of actors.3  
In any case, for the purpose of this report, the classification of ‘cyber-dependent crime’ is 
used, and is one based on typology. More specifically, cyber-dependent crime refers to illicit 
activities such as, unauthorised access offences; illegal interception of communications, illicit 
online markets; theft of services; theft of resources; piracy; destruction or damage of data; 
website defacement; interfering with the lawful use of a computer; the production and/or 
distribution of malware; denial of service; and terrorism (Yar & Steinmetz, 2019; Grabosky, 
2017).  This approach also takes into consideration the fast pace at which technologies 
develop and change, and is cognisant that this list is subject to change and extension.  
This approach is based on two key factors, namely: 
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I. The Department of Justice and Equality has conducted considerable work in the area of 
cyber-enabled crime such as content related offences. As a result, it was agreed that 
this research report would specifically focus on cyber-dependent crimes. 
II. The extent of current and future threats facing Ireland is such that dedicated research in 
relation to cyber-dependent crime is warranted. For example, the background note for 
the consultation held in preparation for the second Irish cybersecurity strategy specifies 
“that some of these new vulnerabilities are simply new manifestations of age-old 
activities, and involve the mere theft of data or money. Others are entirely new, and 
include the remote destruction of data or critical infrastructure (CI).” (Department of 
Communications, Climate Action and Environment, 2019, p.5.).  
 
Again, this report is best viewed through a criminal justice focused lens, rather than security 
or defence, even where overlapping matters may arise. It is beyond the scope of this report 
to consider these overlaps between agency mandates when dealing with cyber-related 
matters. While this report is not exhaustive, it aims to provide an overview of the existing 
research literature on cybercrime including current and emerging threats, the Irish anti-
cybercrime landscape and models of best practice for combatting cybercrime, pertaining to 
the Department of Justice and Equality for the most part, in order to inform both policy and 







Section 2: What are the current and 
emerging threats posed by cybercrime to 
Ireland and other developed countries? 
2.1 Framing the discussions surrounding current 
and emerging cybercrime threats 
An understanding of the nature and extent of modern cybercrime risks facing Ireland will 
help to determine suitable responses and measures for their prevention and mitigation. 
This section therefore provides an overview and analysis of the current and emerging 
threats posed by cybercrime to Ireland and other developed countries, as set out in the 
reviewed literature. As the introductory section specifies, cybercrime for the purposes of 
this report is understood to comprise offences unique to computers and information 
systems. This could include, for example, attacks against such systems, spread of 
malware, hacking to steal sensitive, personal or industry data and denial of service 
attacks to cause financial and/or reputational damage.4 In other words, this section does 
not consider current and emerging cybercrime offences that comprise traditional offences 
such as fraud or content related offences (Department of Justice and Equality, 2019).  
This section first highlights a number of contextual questions surrounding modern 
cybercrime, followed by more detailed analysis on the threat landscape in Europe, 
developed countries and Ireland. It lastly highlights other considerations that can impact 
the evolving cybercrime threat landscape in Ireland. Throughout the analysis, further 
detail is provided on the following factors: (1) The prevalence of cybercrime and issues in 
assessing the levels of cybercrime; (2) The extent to which threats may vary from country 
to country and what factors create such variation; (3) Specific threats to which Ireland 
may be particularly vulnerable, and (4) Analysis of such threats to Ireland which may be 
of particular concern from a criminal justice perspective.  
While this part of the report outlines the dangers associated with contemporary and 
emerging cybercrime threats, hacking is not a new phenomenon. Nearly twenty years 
ago, academics were already writing about cybercrime as the “newest security threat in 
the world today…distinct from any other threat facing the world…” (Speer, 2000; see 
Taylor, 1999 for a more extended history). Yet, there is a present-day risk that analyses 
                                                  
 
 




and public reporting continue to perceive cybercrime activities such as malware, hacking 
and bots as a new problem that are therefore very difficult to combat because of their 
modern nature (Arthur, 2018, p.3). While the threat landscape does continue to 
constantly evolve and mature requiring a constant revision of mitigation and responses at 
national and international level, these types of perceptions can often also lead to a fearful 
narrative surrounding cyber threats, most obviously evidenced within sensationalist 
headlines. Hacking is decades old and many recent malevolent cyber incidents that are 
sometimes perceived or described as novel were either outlined in academic research as 
much as 20 years before or arise from old flaws and exploits that are still prevalent 
(Arthur, 2018, p.3). The background note (2019) for the consultation held in preparation 
for the second Irish cybersecurity strategy partly captures this sentiment, highlighting that  
“[S]ome of these…new and confounding vulnerabilities are simply new 
manifestations of age old activities, and involve the mere theft of data or money. 
Others are entirely new, and include the remote destruction of data or critical 
infrastructure (5)”. 
A general pattern of evolution often underpins these cyber-related threats and trends - 
this “Darwinian evolution” that can be ascribed to the nature of cybercriminals’ and 
defenders’ activities means that efforts to enhance cybersecurity often results in 
cybercriminals maturing their tactics, techniques and “business models” (Kaspersky Lab, 
2018, p.1). For instance, criminal cyber activities are generally conducted against broad 
categories of targets such as individuals, small organisations and medium to large 
corporations, as well as against State assets such as critical infrastructure (CI) or 
government resources (Hilliard, 2018).  As cybercriminals’ techniques and tools become 
more sophisticated, it seems that they will likely then focus their attention on more 
lucrative targets such as large organisations (even where the literature would likely need 
to explore the implications on these expected sophisticated activities against large 
organisations some of which may have greater incentives and means to protect 
themselves). Law enforcement describes this three-fold pattern as follows. First, 
criminals become more sophisticated with particular tools. Second, these tools become 
more sophisticated and easier to obtain, and third, criminal focus becomes more targeted 
and shifts towards small businesses and larger targets with higher profits than individuals 
(EC3, 2018, p.17). Moreover, as law enforcement responses displace cyber-criminal 
activity, it can sometimes lead to ratcheting up of the operational security of the actors 
themselves (Decary Hetu et al. 2017). For example, this pattern is presently evident in 
recent threat assessments surrounding criminals’ use of ransomware, which is described 
in more detail below. Understanding that this is a traditional pattern of evolution of 




together with other law enforcement authorities) could consider taking additional steps to 
implement solutions that are thus more proactive and long-sighted.     
Even though the ever-increasing complex threat landscape garners much public 
attention, currently there are two broad concurrent trends towards both simplicity as well 
as complexity, which thus exacerbate overall complexity within the threat landscape 
(Kaspersky Lab, 2018, p.1). The first tendency towards simplicity means that criminals 
may be driven by cost efficiency and thereby employ simpler efforts in development of 
tools or techniques and attack methods (Kaspersky Lab, 2018, p.2). They may, for 
instance, tend to use publicly available off-the-shelf malware (possibly tailoring it 
marginally) or rely on victim’s poor security measures (Kaspersky Lab, 2018, p2). In other 
words, there is often no need to develop new malware where older software is sufficient 
for criminal purposes. Cybersecurity companies such as Kaspersky Lab (2018, p2) 
further notes the growing ease of doing business for less skilled cybercriminals where 
malware is marketed and criminal services sold within the drastically expanding “hackers’ 
bazaar” that very often includes user support. 
On the other hand, ICTs as well as other emerging technologies such as AI and machine 
learning are maturing at great speed. There seems to be consensus across stakeholders 
that the associated risks are increasing exponentially, so much so that such complexity 
cannot be fully understood anymore (European Commission, 2017a and Kaspersky Lab, 
2019). Similarly, technological progression in tools and techniques employed by cyber 
attackers continues (Kaspersky Lab, 2018, p2). Global cybersecurity vendors flag 
increased anonymity as one of the most important developments behind this recent 
“tectonic shift” in the threat landscape. Such anonymity can be provided through the 
emergence of legitimate online tools such as Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies that 
allow untraceable payments as well as Tor-like networks allowing anonymous online 
communication and trade of both information and technologies (Kaspersky Lab, 2018, 
p1-2).  
2 . 1 . 1  A  N E E D  T O  D R A W  O N  N U M E R O U S  G O V E R N M E N T A L  A N D  N O N -
G O V E R N M E N T A L  R E S E A R C H  S O U R C E S  
Analyses in Ireland of the evolving nature of current and emerging cybercrime threats 
must be conducted against the backdrop of these types of general patterns. Moreover, 
unlike other traditional fields of security and crime, concrete analyses on ‘cyber’ require a 
consideration of material from a variety of governmental and non-governmental sources. 
There are lots of different actors and academic disciplines involved in the study of ‘cyber’, 
which means that it can sometimes be difficult to draw on a coherent body of knowledge 
that can inform policy, practice and prevention, thus justifying the need to draw on a wide 




source material from law enforcement, intelligence and policy communities as well as 
non-governmental sources such as reputable global cybersecurity vendors, consultancy 
companies and academia/research institutes. While such stakeholders may sometimes 
have different perspectives and interests, the report will outline significant divergences 
where relevant. Global cybersecurity vendors’ findings are often particularly insightful and 
timely given the industry’s global reach and cybersecurity intelligence networks with sight 
across most regions. This report purposefully draws on material from cybersecurity 
vendors of different national origins to ensure a fair and broad approach, thereby 
avoiding over-reliance on U.S. vendors. It is generally understood that several global 
cybersecurity vendors often have timely sight of threats and trends as well as capabilities 
that many government authorities will lack. There is an unwritten understanding, 
however, that some of these corporate reports may mostly highlight those areas where 
they have services or products to offer in return (BH Consulting, 2015). For example, 
industry reports on cybersecurity practices in Irish businesses might heavily emphasise 
the interest of Irish stakeholders in biometric technological solutions for poor 
cybersecurity practices. Whereas intelligence outfits seriously question our ability to 
protect such biometric information given the very serious long-term consequences of 
failing to do so properly (Heinl, 2019). Moreover, government authorities may often have 
non-technical attribution capabilities and law enforcement or intelligence insights that 
corporations specialising in technical attribution will naturally lack.  
The drawback of over-relying upon academic sources for discussions on contemporary 
cyber threats is often timeliness and relevance. By the time academic material will 
complete the publication cycle, key trends may have changed significantly given the 
rapidly changing nature of the cyber threat landscape and critical emerging technologies. 
Nonetheless, material from academia may provide analytical rigour and historical depth, 
thus grounding insights in a contextual framework. Unlike many traditional security and 
crime fields, law enforcement, intelligence authorities and policy-makers in Ireland will 
likely also have to collaborate with such non-governmental stakeholders in order to 
combat modern cybercrime effectively (see also Wall 2007 Policing Cybercrime). That 
said, there is much literature on the drawback of multi-agency public-private partnerships 
(Yar and Steinmetz 2019; Levi and Williams 2013).  
2.2 Understanding broad trends behind the 
pervasiveness of cybercrime 
The prevalence of cybercrime often correlates with opportunities for these crimes to be 
conducted that is presented by a changing and increasing attack surface brought about 




increasing individual and national dependence on digital technologies is creating an 
opportunity for more exposure to nefarious activities (European Commission, 2017a). As 
far back as 2011, academic studies found that wealthier nations with more Internet users 
per capita had higher cybercrime activity (Kigerl, 2011). This section notes that it is 
difficult to ascertain the level of cybercrimes that are indeed committed in Ireland and 
there is a need for greater transparency as to the level of risk. In Ireland’s case, the State 
now ranks seventh in the 2019 EU Digital Economy and Society Index which means that 
it is now among the leading ranks of EU Member States in terms of the uptake and use of 
digital technologies (European Commission, 2019a, p.3). This sophisticated, and 
growing, technological advancement could then mean that Ireland – like other 
technologically sophisticated countries- can be an attractive target for crime actors and 
disproportionately vulnerable to malevolent state and non-state cyber activities where 
such ranking “reflects an underpinning set of vulnerabilities” (Heinl, 2019 and Department 
of Communications, Climate Action & Environment, Draft Public Consultation, 2019, p.1). 
This hypothesis relies on a so-called ‘connectivity paradox’ which means that ‘[w]hereas 
during the Cold War it was assumed that technological supremacy would equate to 
strength and safety, in the digital era, as the most technologically sophisticated countries 
become ever more cyber-dependent, technological advancement has had the opposite 
effect, with those societies becoming disproportionately vulnerable to cyber attack’ 
(Wilton Park, 2018). Ireland, like most EU Member States, has highly developed ICT-
dependent infrastructure (Department of Communications, Climate Action & 
Environment, Draft Public Consultation, 2019, p.9). In other words, these developments 
are reflective of this “connectivity paradox” whereby the most technologically 
sophisticated countries become even more cyber dependent and their technological 
advancement means they are becoming disproportionately vulnerable to cyber attack 
(Wilton Park, 2018). Notably, however, high levels of vulnerability may not directly 
translate into high levels of criminal activity. Such levels of vulnerability, which enable 
opportunities for cybercriminals, are also contributing factors to threat variances between 
regions and lesser-developed countries vis-à-vis more developed and technologically 
advanced jurisdictions like Ireland or other EU Member States.  
Another factor for developed countries like Ireland to consider is the impact of cybercrime 
activity in Ireland and other developed countries from those countries that often account 
for more of the variation in cybercrime activity than others – in other words, this 
subsequently affects nations with less criminal activity given the ability for these activities 
to reach beyond national borders (Kigerl, 2011). High levels of unemployment in such 
countries are one of a number of reasons for such variation (Kigerl, 2011). Furthermore, 
experts find that different levels of capacity for ICT security among States can increase 




Some states may lack sufficient capacity to protect their ICT networks and a lack of 
capacity can make the citizens and CI of a State vulnerable or make it an unwitting haven 
for malicious actors (UN GGE, 2015, p.10). In other words, such havens and other states’ 
lower levels of capacity for ICT security can potentially impinge upon the safety of 
Ireland’s citizens and CI. This means that An Garda Síochána and policy-makers could 
ideally consider the development of solutions that reach beyond Irish borders to assist in 
mitigating these problems for collective security. For example, the UN GGE of 2015 
endorsed the recommendations of capacity building in the 2010 and 2013 GGE reports 
whereby the 2010 report recommended that States identify measures to support capacity 
building in less developed countries (p.10). The 2013 report called on the international 
community to work together in providing assistance to improve the security of critical ICT 
infrastructure; develop technical skills and appropriate legislation, strategies and 
regulatory frameworks to fulfil their responsibilities; and bridge the divide in the security of 
ICTs and their use (p.10). Goals to pursue sustainable cyber capacity building within 
Ireland’s national cyber security strategy for the period 2019-2024 could hopefully begin 
to address this problem in part where growing Internet penetration may result in 
emergence of safe havens that can be exploited by international criminal networks. 
Cyber capacity building efforts have been established by several countries for many 
years through bilateral capacity building initiatives as well as regional endeavours 
facilitated by nation states or international organisations such as INTERPOL and the 
Global Forum on Cyber Expertise (GFCE) as well as EU capacity building endeavours. In 
this case, Ireland could develop its own bilateral capacity building initiatives or 
leverage/complement efforts conducted at regional and international level that align with 
the State’s priorities.  
Cybercrime levels are sometimes also described in economic terms. The economic 
impact of cybercrime in Europe, for example, apparently grew “fivefold” from 2013 to 
2017 (European Commission, 2017a). Whereas the overall cost of cybercrime to the Irish 
economy was estimated to be Euro 630 million in 2014 (Harris and Singla, 2014). 
However, given that in the majority of cases, it is often difficult to trace cybercriminals and 
even more difficult to pursue successful prosecutions, there can be challenges with the 
metrics for how cybercrime levels are assessed (European Commission, Building strong 
cybersecurity, 2017).5 This can further include the measurement of both direct and 
indirect consequences of cybercrime that can be difficult to measure. This is a complex 
                                                  
 
 




challenge and measurements can vary to great degrees. For example, the UK’s Home 
Office produced a research report on this question after establishing a working group. 
The report included a summary of why the literature is difficult to reconcile and why cost 
estimates can vary significantly (Home Office, 2018). In short, if the Government of 
Ireland would like to ensure that measurements are useful, they would likely need to be 
carefully devised, revised and employed routinely, while also acknowledging their 
precarity. Nonetheless, a number of studies have developed methodologies to measure 
the cost of cybercrime (Anderson et al 2012; Rainer, 2013; Anderson et al 2019).  
While cybercrime-related activities occur prolifically on a daily basis, they are often not 
reported to law enforcement – in the case of Ireland, apparently only five per cent of 
cybercrimes are reported to An Garda Síochána (Gallagher, 2019). Law enforcement 
authorities (LEAs) are also challenged when pursuing successful prosecutions for 
reasons that include: (a) the need for better capacity to identify those responsible for 
cyber attacks; (b) the difficulty in finding useful information for cybercrime investigations 
(mostly in the form of digital traces); (c) the speed of malicious cyber activities that 
overwhelm law enforcement procedures; (d) the need for better forensic capabilities and 
the difficulties associated with different cross-border forensic procedures; and (e) 
ineffective cross-border cooperation (European Commission, 2017a). These challenges 
are described in more detail later in the report. Moreover, Ireland is an outlier in a number 
of cases within the Eurobarometer cybersecurity survey for metrics on willingness to 
report to the police. The common response to cybercrime (such as an email or social 
media account being hacked) for respondents in Ireland would be to contact their Internet 
service provider as compared to other EU member states’ respondents where the most 
common response remains going to the police. Victims’ willingness to report can be 
affected by factors that include: (1) awareness; (2) stigma; (3) seriousness; (4) 
unawareness of who to report to; (5) uncertainty as to what cybercrime actually means, 
and at what point minor disorder constitutes a criminal offence. Whereas businesses may 
also suffer from lack of awareness, but also concerns about reputational damage. 
Moreover, comparative measurements are hard to make even internationally where there 
can be definitional inconsistency or ambiguity, or where there are a variety of priorities 
across police organisations to record, even to the extent that having a system in place to 
record or label an incident as ‘cyber’-related may not be that common. This means that 
how we count, or what value we attach to cybercrime (whether money was lost or 
measure harms beyond financial) means that our estimates are at best very rough. As 
Wall (2007) points out, this is likely not only as a result of these types of factors, but also 
a result of the way people understand the police role and threshold of seriousness 
required to engage with the police. Clough (2012) includes a useful discussion on the 




EU strategy documents note that the common practice of placing many users 
(sometimes thousands of users) behind one IP address can make it technically 
challenging to investigate criminal online behaviour (European Commission, 2017a). In 
the Irish context, the ability to assess within the public domain the prevalence of 
cybercrime is difficult because of the lack of public data specific to Ireland. Many 
independent and non-governmental reports on cybercrime focus on the United States, 
the EU or the United Kingdom (BH Consulting, 2015). Even though a number of industry 
reports have been written specifically on the Irish landscape (which are referenced 
below), this is by no means close to the number of reports covering other countries and 
jurisdictions.  Furthermore, the number of cyber threats averted by security agencies and 
law enforcement in Ireland may not always be public knowledge given the perceived 
sensitivity of some of these subjects, in which case there is a risk that the general public 
does not realise the full extent of the problem (Hilliard, 2018). Moreover, while LEAs 
across the EU, including An Garda Síochána, submit data on incidents to Europol’s EC3 
for assessment on the level of cybercrime, a mere five per cent level of reporting to An 
Garda Síochána in Ireland will likely limit the ability to form a clear picture for law 
enforcement and policy purposes (as mentioned above, while cybercrime-related 
activities occur prolifically on a daily basis, they are often not reported to law enforcement 
– in the case of Ireland, apparently only five per cent of cybercrimes are reported to An 
Garda Síochána (Gallagher, 2019)). Policy and applied solutions that aim to increase the 
level of reporting in Ireland are likely needed, in addition to the reporting and compliance 
requirements stemming from the implementation of new legislation as a result of the EU 
General Data Protection Regulation and NIS Directive. Moreover, a vast majority of 
incident reports to the National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) are not reported to An 
Garda Síochána.  
It is likely that financially motivated cybercriminals may find Ireland is an attractive target 
given the presence of major global software companies, the top ten global ICT 
companies, social media companies, numerous supercomputers and a rising number of 
data centres (Department of Communications, Energy & Natural Resources, 2015-2017 
and Cahill, 2018). While multinational corporations or major global companies are often 
harder targets given their likely high level cybersecurity protections and their vast 
resources that can be applied to security, they still continue to be lucrative and attractive 
targets for criminals given the extent of personal information and data that can be 
accessed and potentially even used for other criminal purposes. The State is also host to 
a thriving international financial centre. Dublin is apparently now ranked as the third 
largest tech cluster in Europe, with expectations that the tech sector could grow even 
more with increasing interest from both international and indigenous firms (Keane, 2018). 




of risks than many other countries given the presence of many data centric international 
companies and the growing numbers of data centres together with the associated risks of 
potential reputational damage (Department of Communications, Energy & Natural 
Resources, 2015-2017, p.5). In other words, Ireland may have more to lose than other 
states facing similar levels of cyber activity, including indirect consequences of 
cybercrime such as loss of confidence from outside investors and reputation as a weak 
link in European security. Such a potential loss of confidence could be further 
exacerbated by negative reporting on the state of cybersecurity in Ireland. Recent media 
reporting on the Comptroller and Auditor General audit in 2018, which finds that the Irish 
National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) “appeared to have no strategic plan, and raised 
questions over its funding structures”, is one such example (Hilliard, 2018). Notably, the 
Department of Communications has since rebutted these allegations of deficiencies 
within press enquiries (Hilliard, 2018). Additional examples of negative perceptions about 
the state of cybersecurity in Ireland include reporting on a survey conducted ahead of the 
Dublin Info Sec 2016 cybersecurity conference where it was found that 90 per cent of 
businesses surveyed thought then that the country is not prepared for a potential attack 
on the State (O’Donovan, 2016). Prior to the publication of the current national cyber 
security strategy (2019-2024), commentators have thus noted that this second cyber 
strategy should reaffirm in late 2019 that Ireland’s status as a location of choice for many 
global technology companies means that the country must have top-tier advanced cyber 
readiness capabilities (Day, 2019). These capabilities should be along the lines of 
comparable advanced economies such as the United Kingdom, other EU Member States 
and the United States.  
Nonetheless, other surveys such as the 2019 survey by a tech consumer website 
(Comparitech) note that ‘Ireland is in the top 10 in the world when it comes to 
cybersecurity’ given that Ireland sees ‘just under 4 per cent of mobile phones infected 
with malware, as well as almost 8 per cent of computers’ (Irish Examiner, 
https://www.irishexaminer.com/breakingnews/business/irish-cybersecurity-among-the-
best-in-the-world-902629.html, February 2019). Other statistics provided in this survey 
include 0.5 per cent of Irish online users having been the subject of financial malware 
attacks. That said, representatives of the tech consumer website note that ‘[d]espite 
some countries having clear strengths and weaknesses, there is definite room for 
improvement in each and every one….[w]hether they need to strengthen their legislation 
or users need help putting better protections in place on their computers and mobiles, 
there’s still a long way to go to make our countries cyber secure’ and there is room for 
‘significant improvements’. They note that this is often on account of the constantly 
changing cybersecurity and cyber scam landscape. Other vendor reports (Specops 




highest rate of cybercrime, explained to be on account of the large number of cloud 
provider incoming attacks (PrivSec Report, https://gdpr.report/news/2020/02/25/privacy-
ireland-ranked-least-vulnerable-european-country-to-cybercrime/, February 2020). 
Whereas ‘Ireland ranks as the most cyber secure and least vulnerable European country, 
having the lowest cybercrime encounter rate in every category expert [typo:except] cloud 
provider attacks, where it experienced 0.36% incoming attacks’ (PrivSec Report, 
February 2020).  
Drawing upon findings within a 2018 PwC report, the Minister for Justice, Charlie 
Flanagan, is reported to note an increase in cybercrime incidents when explaining that 
this is a notable threat to Ireland’s attractiveness as a business location for investors and 
a concern for Ireland’s digital economy (McLaughlin, 2018). In other words, indirect 
consequences of cybercrime can easily also manifest in Ireland if left unaddressed. 
Media articles on the PwC report note that more than 60 per cent of Irish businesses 
reported cybercrime incidents in a two-year period (McLaughlin, 2018). The survey, 
which was conducted on “77 organisations from across all key sectors and industries”, 
specifically notes that 49 per cent of Irish companies surveyed experienced economic 
crime over a two-year period, and of those crimes reported, 61 per cent experienced 
cybercrime (PwC, 2018). In 2016, 45 per cent of businesses surveyed for the Dublin Info 
Sec conference confirmed that they had already been victim to cyber incidents 
(O’Donovan, 2016). A later Microsoft report on large organisations in Ireland finds that 44 
per cent of the surveyed public and private sector organisations’ employees have had 
difficulties with phishing, hacking, “cyber fraud” or other cyber attacks, with 31 per cent 
reporting problems in their personal capacity and 18 per cent in their workplace 
(Amárach Research, 2019 (commissioned by Microsoft)). Nonetheless, by way of 
contrast, the UK Cybersecurity Breaches 2019 survey (or similar surveys in other 
jurisdictions) are reports that can be consulted on comparable breaches experienced by 
businesses that are published by government departments together with research 
institutes, rather than relying too heavily on industry reports like those cited above as a 
source for this information.  
Notably, the numbers of those companies experiencing cybercrime has apparently now 
grown in Ireland - it is now double global levels of 31 per cent despite increased levels of 
awareness and more resources being allocated to address risks (PwC, 2018). 
Organisations report average losses fuelled by such cybercrime in Ireland at 
approximately Euro 810,000 and nearly 70 per cent of those surveyed confirmed that the 
same amount or more has been spent on the clean-up and subsequent investigations 
(PwC, 2018). Notably though, the PwC report authors do explain that the vast majority of 




cybersecurity programs at a higher rate than global companies searching for incidences 
of cybercrime (PwC, 2018). This means that respondents are investing in methods to 
enhance their cybersecurity, and higher levels of cybercrime are likely to be detected. 
This may also partly explain why cybercrime is reported by such surveys as higher in 
Ireland as compared to global counterparts. That said, such increases in crime are also 
explained to not only be a reflection of better detection methods, but also because more 
cybercrime is in fact being conducted (PwC, 2018). Notably, there seems to be variation 
elsewhere where for example the UK CSEW saw a 13 per cent decrease in computer 
misuse offences between 2017 and 2018 (although these statistics apparently remain 
experimental). In 2016, six out of ten businesses in Ireland were expected to be the 
victim of cybercrime throughout the following year (O’Donovan, 2016). In more recent 
years, the Irish community still expects cybercrime activity to be the most disruptive 
economic crime from 2018 to 2020 according to PwC (PwC, 2018).  
While such industry reports are insightful, they cannot possibly portray the true 
prevalence of cybercrime activities. LEAs like Europol publish strategic threat 
assessments as well as other online literature, but traditionally security agencies are 
more likely to be averse to publicly portraying their work. Law enforcement reports from 
An Garda Síochána that must be submitted to European counterparts could shed some 
further light on the actual prevalence of cybercrime in Ireland from a law enforcement 
perspective specifically, albeit recognising that under-reporting and obstacles to 
successful prosecutions may hinder the ability to establish a complete picture of the 
actual cybercrime landscape in Ireland. The authors of this report further explored 
whether the Central Statistics Office (CSO) might also have additional statistics on 
cybercrime levels. However, such statistics do not seem to be currently available given 
the lack of classification of crimes as ‘cybercrimes’.  This will be discussed further in 
Section Three in relation to the effectiveness of legislation in the context of reporting 
cybercrime. 
The traditional secretive dynamic in relation to security agencies could change going 
forward, however, where the field of cybersecurity has caused intelligence agencies in 
other jurisdictions, such as the United Kingdom, to ensure that part of their work is public 
facing, including by publishing timely and informative material for public consumption. In 
order to better prepare individuals and businesses in the wake of cyber incidents, British 
experts are now messaging at home and abroad that the “fear and mystique” often 
associated with cyber threats and the field of security are not useful for sound public 
policy, thus signalling a shift in how cybercrime is approached in the United Kingdom 




Bada and Nurse 2019) – “Fear and mystique has been the enemy of sound public policy” 
(Cieran Martin, NCSC UK).  
The Head of the United Kingdom’s National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC UK) now 
describes this agency as the most transparent public cybersecurity agency in the world 
through its release of unprecedented levels of information and its ambitions to continue 
declassifying much information in a well-managed way (Hilliard, 2018). This approach 
aims to help the general public to be better prepared by increasing their understanding of 
the real nature and prevalence of cyber threats. Similarly, EC3 at Europol publishes a 
reasonable amount of literature for public consumption, including public advisories. 
These are the types of steps that national law enforcement and policy-makers could take 
in Ireland in order to more effectively combat modern cybercrime. These are practical 
steps towards better informing the public and providing tools and advisories to increase 
their cybersecurity, rather than traditional awareness-raising activities (this report will 
address the advantages and disadvantages of awareness-raising activities in later 
sections). Nonetheless, metrics would likely be required to prove the effectiveness of 
such new steps.   
2.3 Current and emerging cybercrime threats in 
Europe, other developed countries and Ireland 
This section provides a broad overview of the dynamic nature and likelihood of 
contemporary cybercrime threats as well as possible impact on individuals, 
organisations, and governments with particular emphasis on the Irish context and 
developed EU Member States. Europol’s European Cyber Crime Centre (EC3) publishes 
an annual strategic report from an EU law enforcement perspective which provides a 
helpful working framework. Subsequently, the most significant ongoing and emerging 
cybercrime trends from law enforcement, industry and intelligence community 
perspectives include the following threats: (1) Ransomware; (2) Other malware threats; 
(3) Data breaches and network attacks; (4) Spearphishing; and (5) Attacks against critical 
infrastructure.6   
                                                  
 
 





2 . 3 . 1  R A N S O M W A R E  
Ransomware continues to be the key malware threat in both law enforcement and 
industry reporting, even though LEAs consider that it is beginning to slow (EC3, 2018, 
p.7-9). Cybersecurity vendors describe ransomware as a “cybercriminal business model” 
and “one of the most truly ‘NextGen’ threats” since technologically it is supported by a 
range of attacking tools and techniques as well as anonymisation measures such as 
cryptocurrencies and mesh networks (Tor/I2P) that have “triggered higher uses of 
ransomware” (Kaspersky Lab, Reality vs Delusion, 2018). Both law enforcement and 
industry find that ransomware will continue unabated, having become “a staple attack 
tool” and very quickly accommodating aspects of other successful malware such as 
affiliate programmes (where ransomware is developed and distributed for a cut of the 
ransom payment to cybercriminals who then spread the malware as ‘affiliates’) and crime 
as-a-service business models (when professional criminals develop advanced tools, 
“kits” and other packaged services which are then offered for sale or rent to 
other criminals who are usually less experienced) so that it is more available to all levels 
of cybercriminal (EC3, 2018, p.26). That said, Symantec finds that there was a drop in 
ransomware activity in 2018, observing that WannaCry, copycat versions and NotPetya 
are inflating inflection figures so that if these worms are removed from the statistics, there 
is a higher drop in infection figures by approximately 52 per cent (Symantec Corporation, 
Internet Security Threat Report, 2019, p.16; See also Fireeye and Crowdstrike). Notably, 
NotPetya and Wannacry are now attributed to state and state-sponsored actors, rather 
than criminals – this new trend of criminal state activity is discussed in more detail below. 
In short, there is some divergence between reports on the actual level of ransomware.    
Even though WannaCry and NotPetya are attributed to state-related activity, both 
WannaCry and NotPetya exemplify the ability of such ransomware attacks to spread 
globally at great speed where over 150 countries and 300,000 victims were 
indiscriminately affected (notably, NotPetya is increasingly described as destructive 
malware by western sources rather than original descriptors that referred to it as 
ransomware). In other words, even where the Irish state or its citizens may not be a 
primary target, such malicious activities can spread in an indiscriminate manner at great 
speed globally, thus likely affecting Irish interests too. Irish law enforcement and policy-
makers will therefore likely need to include these types of scenarios within their future 
strategic thinking whereby Ireland might not be considered an immediate target but the 
country can be affected indiscriminately. In the case of WannaCry and NotPetya, key CI 
in the EU such as health services, telecommunications, transport and manufacturing 
industries were affected. Critically, victims were impacted indiscriminately in which case 
strategic assessments that are conducted on the likelihood of a developed country like 




also take into account the potential for victims to be impacted indiscriminately as a 
consequence of these types of possible ransomware activities in future (Heinl, Peace and 
Security in Cyberspace, 2019). In terms of non-state related cybercriminal activity, 
cybercriminals have earned USD 25 million through other ransomware strains, which 
further shows a high disparity between the amount of losses to victims compared to 
actual criminal revenue where some estimates suggest a global loss of over USD 5 
billion in 2017 (although overall damages from ransomware attacks can apparently be 
difficult to quantify) (EC3, 2018, p.16). 
More recently, differences are reported between EU Member States where ransomware 
activities in some states continue to be untargeted and indiscriminate against citizens 
and businesses whereas other Member States report more customised and professional 
campaigns (EC3, 2018, p.17). This development reflects the traditional trajectory of 
maturing cybercrime activities as described earlier in this report. Similarly, a 
Eurobarometer report found that seven per cent of Irish Internet users were victims of 
ransomware in 2015 and globally consumers were the majority group of ransomware 
victims until 2017. Since then, however, the majority of infections have begun to occur in 
businesses instead - accounting for 81 per cent of all ransomware infections according to 
some industry reports (BH Consulting, 2015 and Symantec Corporation, 2019, p.16). 
Other vendors describe this as a prominent change in direction such that “Big Game 
Hunting” is rising so that a combination of targeted techniques, tactics and procedures 
are being employed together with ransomware across large organisations to reap larger 
financial rewards (Crowdstrike, 2019, p.7). This change has apparently also come about 
on account of a decline in exploit kit activity as a channel for ransomware delivery where 
the primary distribution method in 2018 was email campaigns since enterprises are 
apparently more affected by email-based attacks given that email is the main 
communication tool (Symantec Corporation, 2019, p.16). In addition, more consumers 
use mobile devices where essential data is often backed up to the cloud and most 
significant ransomware families still target Windows based computers which means that 
the likelihood of consumers’ devices becoming infected is declining (Symantec 
Corporation, 2019, p.16). Cybersecurity vendors also suggest that another factor is their 
own enhanced ability to fight ransomware through tools such as email protection, 
behavioural analysis or machine learning (Symantec Corporation, 2019, p.16 and 
Kaspersky Lab, 2018). 
2 . 3 . 2  O T H E R  M A L W A R E  T H R E A T S  
The 2018 PwC survey of Irish businesses found that half the respondents were targeted 
through malware (including ransomware) at higher rates than those seen globally (36 per 




by cybercriminals. Significant contemporary malware threats to consider include financial 
malware, mobile malware, Remote Access Trojans (RATs), and cryptomining malware.  
There are a number of factors to consider. First, although the financial sector argues that 
financial malware continues to be a significant threat, less than one quarter of EU 
Member States’ LEAs reported a significant number of cases and industry reporting 
seems to be focusing less on financial malware (EC3, 2018, p.18). The financial sector is 
arguably one of the most advanced sectors in tackling cyber threats, which may partly 
explain such statistics.  
A second growing risk is mobile malware aided by the growing use of mobile phones and 
tablets, where the global number of smartphones by the end of 2016 was already 2.1 
billion (EC3, 2018). While ransomware attacks seem to be less successful when used 
against mobile phone users, cybersecurity vendors note an important gap given that 
mobiles are now becoming highly integrated into corporate business processes and data 
flows but not into corporate cybersecurity infrastructures (Kaspersky Lab, 2018, p.4). 
Kaspersky Lab reports warn of an imminent “burst of attacks against the mobile” given 
rising geopolitical tensions, the growing popularity of mobile banking and high volumes of 
sensitive data present on these devices (Kaspersky Lab, 2018, p.4). European LEAs also 
flag mobile banking as a potential driver for further growth and development of such 
mobile malware (EC3, 2018, p.26). Notably, it does not seem to be uncommon for some 
mobile devices to arrive with malware pre-installed at some point in the supply chain 
beneath the user-controllable operating system layer (Kaspersky Lab, 2018, p.4).  
Industry reporting seems to mainly flag Africa, Asia and the United States for much of this 
mobile malware activity (EC3, 2018, p.18). Regions such as Africa and Asia are 
commonly known for very high, and growing, use of mobiles/smartphones where many 
citizens may often prefer such devices or they may be less costly than computers which 
is an especially pertinent factor in less economically or digitally developed countries 
(CSO figures provided in the introductory sections of this report point to higher usage of 
mobile Internet access in Ireland too). Whereas EU LEAs report a different trend in 
Europe whereby mobile malware has not so far been extensively reported in Europe 
(EC3, 2018, p.18). An additional explanation for such variance between regions and 
industry reporting on the prevalence of mobile malware is law enforcements’ observation 
about an ongoing lack of awareness in the general population about how to deal with 
mobile phone cyber incidents (EC3, 2018, p.18). From a criminal justice perspective, it 
seems that victims of mobile malware in Europe are more inclined to approach their 
provider rather than make police reports, and few will report to the police at all (EC3, 
2018, p.18). Questions to then consider include how such information is recorded by 




EC3 reports still expect mobile malware to be a future threat for individuals and 
organisations in Europe (EC3, 2018, p.7). This future threat may become even more 
significant in the Irish context where Irish banks are now directing their customers 
towards mobile banking and mobile banking authentication methods. Moreover, already 
low levels of reporting of cybercrime in Ireland are likely to be exacerbated by under-
reporting in relation to mobile malware incidents. 
The third set of risks to consider include RATs, although this threat seems to be in 
continuing decline. EU Member States that do report such cases note, however, their use 
against networks and companies rather than individuals for data theft, extortion, malware 
dropping, or unauthorised financial transactions (EC3, 2018, p.18). Europol’s annual 
threat assessment finds that while banking Trojans will still be a priority for the financial 
sector, sophisticated cybercriminals are directing their focus towards business process 
compromise, targeting payment systems such as the SWIFT network from within a 
bank’s internal networks (EC3, 2018, p.26).  
Cryptomining malware is regularly cited as an emerging, and soon to be pervasive, threat 
by both industry and European law enforcement. Its use is expected to increase and it 
will likely become a “regular, low risk revenue stream” for cybercriminals – often attractive 
for reasons such as anonymity and low barriers to entry (Crowdstrike, 2019, p.60; EC3, 
2018, p.9; Symantec Corporation, 2019, p.15). This is otherwise known as cryptojacking 
where cyber criminals run coinminers on victims’ devices and use their central 
processing unit power and Internet/device bandwidth to mine cryptocurrencies without 
their permission, often through legitimate websites. By the end of 2017, 0.22% of the top 
100,000 websites had cryptomining scripts, and industry reports highlighted large 
cryptomining botnets as well as cryptomining malware on SCADA systems (EC3, 2018, 
p.19). While activity is observed to decline when cryptocurrency values drop significantly, 
Symantec reports that significant levels of criminal activity sometimes still continue, 
including with a shift towards targeting businesses (Symantec Corporation, 2019, p.15). 
The value of Monero dropped by approximately 90 per cent whereas cryptojacking only 
dropped by nearly 52 per cent in 2018 for example, suggesting that some criminals still 
find their activity profitable or they are waiting until cryptocurrency values rise again 
(Symantec Corporation, 2019, p.15).  
From a criminal justice perspective, law enforcement notes that while it is not illegal in 
some cases, cryptomining is still creating additional revenue and thus motivation for 
criminals to attack legitimate websites to exploit visitors’ systems, possibly even breaking 
a victim’s system as a result (EC3, 2018, p.19). Europol reports note that there is also 
“true cryptomining malware” delivered by a malicious payload like other malware which 




Bitcoin (which needs higher processing power) (EC3, 2018, p.19). Notably, law 
enforcement apparently finds this activity easier to detect, but there were no formal law 
enforcement reports of any cases in 2018 most likely because of its nature as an 
emerging threat and questionable legality (EC3, 2018, p.19). While a noteworthy incident 
did occur in Finland where healthcare systems were severely disrupted, it also seems 
that damages to victims are broadly speaking difficult to quantify and investigate (EC3, 
2018, p.19 - Note that cryptocurrency depositories and any entity with significant 
amounts of cryptocurrencies is a likely target for cybercriminals). Again,  a gap that could 
be explored is where cryptomining may not be always be illegal but it is used by criminals 
to create additional revenue and where Europol’s EC3 raises concerns about 
questionable legality and difficulties in investigation which may also be an issue for law 
enforcement in Ireland.  
2 . 3 . 3  D A T A  B R E A C H E S  A N D  N E T W O R K  A T T A C K S  
The nature and purpose of data breaches and network attacks such as illegal acquisition, 
destruction or denial of access for financial gain are constantly growing in both scale and 
significance. Prominent cases in recent years include the British Airways and Marriott 
breaches, the breach of 87 million Facebook users’ records, and the Equifax breach 
where the sensitive information of over 100 million individuals was stolen. Although the 
breach of Bulgaria’s National Revenue Agency only included four million records (a 
relatively smaller number given recent cases), personal information of nearly 70 per cent 
of the country’s citizens was exfiltrated (BH Consulting, 2019). In the case of Ireland, 
many services provided by the State rely to some extent on ICT systems such as a wide 
range of databases with personal data of millions of citizens and business data of 
companies operating in the State (Department of Communications, Energy & Natural 
Resources, 2015-2017, p.6). Europol reports note the risk of illegal acquisition of data 
following such data breaches, where criminals often use this data to facilitate other 
criminal activity, while industry cites personal, payment and medical data as the most 
commonly compromised (EC3, 2018, p.7). Of those incidents reported to European law 
enforcement, it seems that the most common motive is illegal acquisition of data with a 
view to using it for several reasons that are dependent on the nature of the data (EC3, 
2018, p.22). Criminals may use such data to extort victims to prevent data disclosure 
(including intellectual property), or the data may be used for other fraudulent activity such 
as phishing (EC3, 2018, p.22). That said, law enforcement reports concede that the 
ultimate destination of this data is often not known (EC3, 2018, p.22). 
United States’ intelligence community assessments indicate that non-state actors like 
transnational criminals and terrorist groups will attempt to access classified information to 




(Director of National Intelligence, 2019; see also Grabosky (2017)). A recent related 
threat includes a criminal’s goals to gain access (and/or control) to internal systems and 
processes to conduct other criminal activity (EC3, 2018, p.22). For example, access to 
internal email systems to conduct Business Email Compromise (also known as CEO 
fraud) or control systems to access payment platforms like SWIFT (EC3, 2018, p.22). 
Notably, motives may range from causing malicious damage (including to critical data) to 
gaining access to infrastructure in order to sell servers on criminal markets (EC3, 2018, 
p.22). Nearly a third of such breaches involve internal actors, organised criminal gangs 
carry out approximately 50 per cent of such activities and 12 per cent is conducted by 
state sponsored actors (EC3, 2018, p.22).  
To date, the financial sector has been perceived as the most targeted sector whereas 
now it is healthcare organisations. Fifty eight per cent of victims are small businesses 
(EC3, 2018, p.22). The financial sector is arguably now one of the most advanced 
sectors at combatting malevolent cyber-related activity. Financially motivated 
cybercriminals are thus likely to focus their efforts on less cyber secure sectors. This 
currently includes the healthcare sector, which is an attractive target for cybercrime for 
two main reasons: it is a rich source of valuable data and its defences are weak given the 
poor security of healthcare data and devices as well as historically poor cybersecurity 
practices (Coventry and Branley, 2018). Other vulnerable industries that are becoming 
more attractive to criminals are smart/IoT initiatives such as future smart buildings/smart 
cities. 
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks are not always financially motivated, yet the 
financial sector and LEAs report DDoS as one of the top threats that is growing in scale 
given that it is becoming more accessible, low cost and low risk (EC3, 2018, p.7). From a 
criminal justice perspective, some argue that the increasing availability of services and 
key capabilities online is contributing to this trend, including access for unskilled 
individuals, allowing them to bring about “crippling” attacks (EC3, 2018, p.24). Similarly, 
although website defacement is low impact it is still flagged as a continuing problem, 
often aided by publicly available tools and there is a risk that such attacks may be a 
stepping stone towards becoming involved in other serious cybercrime (EC3, 2018, 
p.25).  
There are worries about a future DDoS “Internet breaking” attack at the same scale or 
higher as the Mirai botnet which was effectively DDoS attacks caused by botnets of 
compromised Internet of Things (IoT) devices (EC3, 2018, p.24). Given the very high 
levels of attention on these Mirai attacks, it is likely that financially motivated criminals will 
not want to risk similar law enforcement and intelligence attention (EC3, 2018, p.24). A 




occur was already known. On many occasions, the possibility of such cyber risks are 
already foreseen and written about by academia, the intelligence community, LEAs or the 
private sector, but little is done to prevent their occurrence in the meantime – 2016 ‘finally 
saw the emergence of a threat which had been predicted’ since 2014 whereby DDoS 
attacks originate from botnets of compromised Internet of Things (IoT) devices (EC3, 
2018, p.24).7  
2 . 3 . 4  P R E F E R E N C E S  F O R  S P E A R P H I S H I N G  
Although spearphishing is not a new tool, law enforcement and industry both note the 
risk of criminals’ current preference for consistently successful methods of infection, 
including email based spam, phishing and targeted spearphishing, as compared to a 
decline in the use of exploit kits (Symantec Corporation, 2019, p.17; EC3, 2018, p.20). 
The 2018 survey of Irish businesses also finds that phishing was the most prominent 
technique for targeted cyber attacks, followed by malware, and notably more Irish 
businesses are being targeted through phishing than global numbers – two thirds of Irish 
respondents were targeted compared to 33 per cent globally (PwC, 2018). Again, the 
current unreliable nature of measuring cybercrime more generally suggests that caution 
should be exercised in taking these numbers to mean that Ireland is under greater threat, 
particularly as the evidence is sometimes derived from actors who may have their own 
interests. 
While phishing is occurring on a very large scale, both law enforcement and industry find 
that few attempts are in fact successful (EC3, 2018, p.55). Industry flags an expected 
increase in spearphishing occurring via social media, particularly because of the recent 
leaks of data from social media platforms like Facebook, Instagram, LinkedIn and Twitter 
where such data is now available on the market (Kaspersky Lab, Security Bulletin, 2019, 
p.9; EC3, 2018, p.8). This is an example of an area where concrete awareness raising 
efforts and tools for the public to pre-empt the potential fallout from such spearphising via 
social media could help to reduce future cybercrime using these channels, noting the 
                                                  
 
 
7 Note small scale DDoS for hire services called booting which are predominantly used by young 
gamers, but whose traffic can have significant disruptive effects on a more localised scale. These 
services are simple to use and operate via subscription models.  The National Crime Agency in the UK 
has trialled the use of targeted advertising to deter young people getting involved, which Cambridge has 
produced some evidence about. This threat while on a lesser scale is worth noting based on its potential 





limitations associated with awareness-raising endeavours that are discussed later in this 
report.   
2 . 3 . 5  A T T A C K S  A G A I N S T  C R I T I C A L  I N F R A S T R U C T U R E  
The former Irish national cybersecurity strategy for the period 2015-2017 recognises the 
growing awareness of risks posed to CI by cyber operations (Department of 
Communications, Energy & Natural Resources, 2015-2017, p.7). More recently, the draft 
consultation document for the second cyber strategy specifies that the increasing 
centrality of network connected devices to the operations of business and CI means the 
consequences of cyber-enabled attacks are far more serious than in the past 
(Department of Communications, Climate Action & Environment, Draft Public 
Consultation, 2019, p.1). While destructive attacks on CI are generally related to state or 
politically motivated activities, there are two developments related to CI that have a 
connection with cybercrime. First, given that there are often high concerns about 
maintaining CI availability, their systems might not be updated/patched and they are then 
vulnerable to malware or ransomware, which is a cause for concern where ransomware 
strains can impact targets indiscriminately. There has, for example, been proof of 
concept work on ransomware for water filtration plants (Arthur, 2018, p.216).  
Second, the United States’ intelligence community expects that cybercriminals’ actions 
could increasingly disrupt U.S. CI in the healthcare, financial, government and 
emergency services sectors as well as threatening its allies’ CI (Director of National 
Intelligence, 2019, p.6 & 18). While not an official military ally of the United States, 
Ireland works closely with its like-minded American counterparts on numerous security 
and crime-related matters, and hosts numerous American corporations in the State. 
Moreover, the United States is a similarly developed and digitally advanced country. 
Therefore, such threat predictions in relation to expected cybercriminal activity on CI 
should ideally be taken into account in Irish strategic threat assessments by law 
enforcement and decision-makers on expected cybercrime activity in the future.  
2.4 Other factors with an impact on the evolving 
cybercrime threat landscape 
This section highlights other developments that can have significant impact on the 
current and expected cybercrime threat landscape, which should ideally be considered 
by law enforcement and policy-makers involved in the fight against cybercrime. These 
developments include the following non-exhaustive list:  
1. The growing connections between cybercrime and malevolent state activity;  
2. IoT/future cities and smart meters;  




4. Emerging technologies;  
5. Third party vendor risks and supply chain attacks;  
6. Wide public and commercial availability of tools and techniques as well as 
“Darknet” concerns; 
7. Poor security cultures; 
8. Terrorist-cybercrime nexus; and  
9. Pervasive anonymisation tools. 
2 . 4 . 1  T H E  G R O W I N G  C O N N E C T I O N S  B E T W E E N  C Y B E R C R I M E  A N D  
M A L E V O L E N T  S T A T E  A C T I V I T Y  
LEAs are becoming increasingly concerned about the rising volume of public reporting 
that now attributes global cyber attacks to nation states (EC3, 2018, p.7). From a criminal 
justice perspective, this means it is becoming more difficult for law enforcement to be 
clear at the outset of investigations whether they pertain to criminal/non-state or state-
sponsored/state activity. Where state actors are involved, it is likely that subsequent 
investigations will fall outside the remit of law enforcement, and instead fall under 
national security authorities’ responsibility (EC3, 2018, p.21). 
Criminals and state actors are increasingly using similar cyber tools and techniques 
(EC3, 2018, p.28). In recent times, states are becoming more inclined to resort to 
malevolent peacetime activities, including the perpetration of cybercrimes, by using cyber 
tools and techniques to pursue their political and security ambitions. This means that not 
only are some states using similar tools as criminals in order to avoid detection and 
obfuscate their activities, but it also means that state capabilities and techniques can 
potentially be re-used by criminals when they are released into the wild (or 
leaked/stolen). This is an area where many states, and by extension the Irish State, 
should work to create mechanisms that address the risks associated with security agency 
collection of zero-day exploits where it is hoped to reduce cybercrime. For example, 
WannaCry and NotPetya exemplified the dangers of leaked or stolen tools from U.S. 
security agencies that reduced collective cybersecurity (see also: Schneier 2017 on the 
risks of prioritisation of individual nation-state surveillance and other offensive capabilities 
over collective security which poses a serious threat to everyone). There is thus a 
question whether regulation or programmes such as vulnerability disclosure programmes 
are required to address these challenges. 
Furthermore, the Irish Department of Communications’ consultation document for the 
second cyber strategy notes that traditional simplistic typologies of groups of actors such 
as individuals, criminals and state actors may no longer be as relevant given that some 
criminal gangs are operating under contract to certain states or lone actors are being 
organised to act collectively by governments (Department of Communications, Climate 




It is not expected that cybercriminals will conduct future attacks of a similar scale to 
WannaCry or NotPetya (both of which have since been attributed to state actors) 
because such crime groups generally prefer to avoid high levels of law enforcement and 
intelligence service attention. Instead, a connection with nation states is expected if such 
future attacks are to occur (EC3, 2018, p.28). This situation is, however, becoming even 
more complex where states are increasingly engaging with criminal actors to support 
their own end goals. There are rising cases of states engaging in cybercrime activities for 
reasons such as raising financial resources to fund other state activities. Recent 
examples of this phenomenon include the Lazarus group’s cybercrime activities that are 
associated with North Korea. The group leveraged U.S. National Security Agency 
exploits that were leaked by the allegedly Russian Shadow Brokers group (EC3, 2018, 
p.16). These activities include the Sony Pictures hack, the attack on the international 
SWIFT banking system targeting the Bangladesh central bank and the Wannacry 
ransomware that indiscriminately targeted millions of systems globally (Director of 
National Intelligence, 2019, p.6; Arthur, 2018, p.32).  
Cyber-enabled state sponsored theft of intellectual property (IP) is another potential threat 
for countries like Ireland to consider, especially where there are relatively high levels of 
R&D and innovation within the State and the country has a reputation as an innovative 
technology hub. Ireland has especially high levels of foreign direct investment (FDI), which 
comprises many major American corporations. In particular, the State is host to a 
significant number of U.S. technology sector corporations. Moreover, Ireland is respected 
globally for entrepreneurship and a strong culture of innovation. This could mean there is 
an additional risk that other parts of the economy, including small to medium enterprises 
and universities, become attractive and vulnerable targets for cyber-enabled IP theft 
conducted by nefarious state and non-state actors for criminal and other purposes. The 
security and development of resilience in these sectors and organisations is essential to 
the security of the State and its economy. The threat posed has prompted Scottish 
authorities to develop a resilience strategy for each sector to create more solutions tailored 
to the individual needs of each (Scottish Government. Cyber Resilience. Website). 
From a criminal justice perspective, countries like the United States have begun to 
increasingly use criminal indictments for these types of cases that involve state actors or 
state proxies (including for espionage and election interference). This highlights the 
increasing move towards criminal justice solutions as a deterrent for the perpetration of 
cybercrimes by state actors. The United States has partly dealt with states’ cyber-
enabled IP theft as a criminal justice matter, notably issuing indictments for five Chinese 
PLA officers in a landmark case. From a criminal justice perspective, however, there is 




in fact have a deterrent effect on such sovereign states engaged in such state-sponsored 
cybercrime activity, especially where it does not currently apply extraterritorially 
(Blinderman and Din, 2017). On the one hand, it is unlikely that such officers would be 
prosecuted, while on the other hand these proceedings can make life difficult for officers 
and their families. Nonetheless, other jurisdictions like Ireland should now likely also 
consider the applicability and effectiveness of their own domestic legal framework for 
state-sponsored cybercrime in order to examine how such actors could be held 
accountable, and whether this is an avenue they wish to take.  
Lastly, there are growing tendencies of organised crime groups to employ techniques 
that are traditionally only associated with states such as the use of APTs. There are as a 
result some definitional debates arising in relation to APTs.  
2 . 4 . 2  I O T / F U T U R E  C I T I E S  A N D  S M A R T  M E T E R S  
Security analysts have worried for many years – and continue to worry - that the ever-
increasing introduction of the Internet of Things (IoT) is heightening vulnerability to 
attack. There is a majority view that vendors are connecting devices cheaply without high 
levels of baked-in security and security-by-design considerations (Arthur, 2018, p.215; 
European Commission, 2017a; IDC and TXT, 2014). In fact, some analyses find that 
security levels have worsened since 2003 in some devices such as wifi routers (BH 
Consulting, 2019). BH Consulting (2019) cites the findings of ‘”The Cyber Independent 
Testing Lab” which examined binary hardening features in IoT firmware. It analysed 
1,294 products (4,956 versions and 3,333,411 binaries) from 22 vendors between 2003 
and 2019. The five-person team concluded security hygiene often worsened over time 
and found that there were “no positive trends”….this means the average home Wi-Fi 
router’s security has deteriorated since 2003.’ Others find that security cameras are the 
most likely IoT devices to be targeted. With the growing attention on developing so-called 
smart cities, this risk is expected to worsen with industry warning that IoT botnets should 
not be underestimated as they keep growing stronger (Symantec Corporation, 2018; 
Kaspersky Lab, 2019). Smart meters are also considered to be a significant new cyber 
vulnerability whereby modern economies will likely collapse without electricity, or they 
may be exploited to exert more powerful DDoS attacks and theft of information. 
2 . 4 . 3  C L O U D  S E C U R I T Y  
Cloud security presents several security challenges such as misconfiguration issues, 
vulnerabilities in hardware chips and poorly secured cloud databases. Symantec finds 
one key lesson drawn from recent incidents is the level of poor configuration enabling 




Additional work has been developed by Wall and others interrogating the ways in which 
these technologies transform or enhance threats. 
2 . 4 . 4  R I S I N G  V U L N E R A B I L I T Y  A N D  C R I M I N A L  M I S U S E  O F  
E M E R G I N G  O R  D I S R U P T I V E  T E C H N O L O G I E S  
Emerging technologies such as blockchain, AI/machine learning, quantum and 5G 
networks will not only continue to increase the potential attack surface for cybercriminals, 
but they will also present another opportunity for criminals to leverage these technologies 
for their own malevolent purposes. There are already examples of criminal use of 
machine learning to improve the effectiveness of phishing (Kaspersky Lab, 2019). 
Notably, quantum computing advances may mean sensitive information encrypted with 
today’s algorithms will be at “greatly increased risk of decryption”, thus challenging 
current methods of protecting data and transactions (Director of National Intelligence, 
2019, p.16). LEA reports often note that crime groups are constantly evolving their 
modus operandi and often creatively adopt key technologies at better speed than law 
enforcement and cumbersome government agencies which must often out of necessity 
operate in a more bureaucratic manner. Note, however, that academics view this thinking 
as still an abstract concept.  
In the case of machine learning/AI systems, current concerns surround their inability to 
explain decisions that are generated so that outputs cannot be predicted (unlike current 
systems that are reliant on code and rules). This means that if such systems are 
deployed in homes, smartphones, and autonomous vehicles, it is not yet clear how 
susceptible they are to unexpected inputs (such as from cybercriminals) and what 
outputs that could produce (Arthur, 2018, p.220-221; Symantec Corporation, 2018). 
Cybercriminals will likely also use such AI/machine learning systems and techniques to 
support their criminal activities. This could include, for example, using automated 
systems powered by AI to probe networks and systems searching for undiscovered 
vulnerabilities to be exploited (Symantec Corporation, 2018). Alternatively, social 
engineering and phishing could be facilitated through sophisticated video/audio/emails 
(Symantec Corporation, 2018). These are examples of the types of areas where those 
officials tasked with combatting cybercrime must equally turn their attention.   
2 . 4 . 5  T H I R D  P A R T Y  V E N D O R  R I S K S  A N D  S U P P L Y  C H A I N  
A T T A C K S  A R E  E X P E C T E D  T O  G R O W  I N  F R E Q U E N C Y  A N D  I M P A C T  
The software supply chain is an increasingly attractive target where attackers implant 
malware into legitimate software packages during production at the vendor or at a third 
party supplier (hardware supply chain infections are a future possibility) (Symantec 
Corporation, 2018). In this case, supply chain attacks exploit third party services and 




hijacking software updates or injecting malicious code into legitimate software (Symantec 
Corporation, 2019, p.17). This means developers continue to be exploited (Symantec 
Corporation, Internet Security Threat Report, 2019, p.17). 
Supply chain attacks are thus likely to continue, and industry considers third party 
vendors to be a particularly concerning vector of attack, especially on foot of several well-
publicised exploitations such as the British Airways and Marriott breaches. There is 
already concern that these devices rely on software provided by relatively small numbers 
of vendors which only adds further risk because an identified vulnerability can be used to 
rapidly compromise the data or systems of millions of people, globally (Department of 
Communications, Climate Action & Environment, Draft Public Consultation, 2019). 
Consequently, organisations are now analysing (or should analyse) the number and 
security of their third party vendors and suppliers, particularly where this is now perceived 
to be a good vector for maliciously targeting a whole industry (or even a whole country). It 
seems that these vectors are less useful for targeted attacks though because the risk of 
detection is higher (Kaspersky Lab, 2019, p.11).  
2 . 4 . 6  W I D E  P U B L I C  A N D  C O M M E R C I A L  A V A I L A B I L I T Y  O F  T O O L S  
A N D  T E C H N I Q U E S  A S  W E L L  A S  “ D A R K N E T ”  C O N C E R N S   
Industry, law enforcement and intelligence communities emphasise their ongoing 
concerns about the growing availability and use of publicly and commercially available 
cyber tools, exacerbated by the leaking and release of states’ tools and techniques. This 
situation is increasing the volume of unattributed cyber activity globally as well as the 
ability to successfully attribute responsibility to non-state criminals or state actors 
(Director of National Intelligence, 2019, p.7; Kaspersky Lab, 2019, p.7). According to 
some firms, the entry barrier for criminals has never been so low, with many effective 
tools, re-engineered leaked exploits (in other words, exploits that have been leaked or 
stolen can then be re-engineered by criminals for their own nefarious purposes) and 
frameworks publicly available for use or customisation (Kaspersky Lab, 2019, p.7).  
This situation further underpins the trend described above towards simplification of 
development and attack methods employed by cybercriminals. This is described by 
various industry reports as “living off the land” tradecraft whereby criminals are 
increasingly using legitimate and off-the-shelf tools or techniques – in fact, some groups 
are only using publicly available tools (Crowdstrike, 2019, p.12; Symantec Corporation, 
2019, p.17). Even “script kiddies” can obtain access to more advanced malware and 




increasingly used for mass infection campaigns (Kaspersky Lab, 2018, p.2).8 The 
prevalence of cybercrime is only exacerbated by the release of such malware or tools 
into the wild since they remain active for other groups’ use. 
Illicit online criminal markets on the “surface web” and the so-called Darknet/dark web 
are further facilitating criminals who sell such illicit cybercrime toolkits to engage in 
criminal activity or to avoid surface net traceability (note that cryptocurrencies also enable 
such exchanges on the Darknet.) (European Commission, 2017a). Given that criminal 
activities in cyberspace are increasingly facilitated by these black markets, their 
existence is harming the information security environment and a better understanding of 
how these markets operate can help to lay the groundwork for options to minimise their 
harmful influence (Ablon, Libicki and Golay, 2014). Compromised personal, medical and 
financial data, which is often key for undertaking cyber-dependent crime, is also available 
on the Darknet (EC3, 2018, p.49).9 For example, AlphaBay, which has now been shut 
down, had listings for malware and computer hacking tools. Although some of the largest 
such markets were shut down by coordinated international law enforcement efforts in 
2017, criminals have since migrated to other markets or platforms like encrypted 
communication apps (EC3, 2018, p.8 & 46).10 By way of example, the online service 
provided through webstresser.org which allowed users to hire others to launch 
sophisticated DDoS attacks was recently taken down through an international operation 
led by Dutch police and the United Kingdom’s National Crime Agency – the site was 
apparently responsible for over four million cyber incidents, including many on Irish-
based websites and coordinated attacks on Irish government websites in 2016 
(Gallagher, 2019). Cyber criminals operating at the “high end of high risk” do not 
frequently use the dark web, operating instead with established criminal communities 
outside the Darknet (EC3, 2018, p.48). It is expected that smaller markets which cater to 
different nationalities and language groups will grow as well as use of encrypted 
communications apps, thus hindering coordinated international law enforcement 
detection (EC3, 2018, p.50). 
                                                  
 
 
8 Script kiddies are individuals using existing computer scripts or codes to hack into computers, or may 
lack the expertise to write their own. 
9 See Hutchings and colleagues for more information on this point and how they are developing 
methods to study it: https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/246727 
https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/276060.  




Nevertheless, even though law enforcement noted the significant growth in the volume of 
tools and services related to cyber-dependent crime on Darknet markets in 2017, these 
recent high profile take downs of major markets means that it may now be more difficult 
to clarify these numbers and more research is needed (EC3, 2018, p.48).11  
2 . 4 . 7  T H E  ‘ H U M A N  F A C T O R ’  A N D  ‘ S E C U R I T Y  C U L T U R E ’  
A common message found traditionally throughout the literature is that the continuing 
inertia in relation to security and updates means that most software failures or data 
breaches are not always inevitable. Variance in cybercrime levels can be a reflection of 
poorly protected victims and a lack of security culture, especially where criminals 
specifically target such groups and countries with insufficient cyber resilience. 
Cybercriminals will use simplistic methods, including targeting victims with poor 
cybersecurity protections. A 2019 report commissioned by Microsoft on large 
organisations in Ireland finds that employees are still the weak link in the security system, 
with poor habits and cyber hygiene that potentially put their organisations at risk (O’Brien, 
2019). The report explains that a lack of security training, poor password management, 
the use of personal devices with work-related data and legacy technology and devices 
are examples of security risks facing public and private sector organisations, including 
potential violations of the EU General Data Protection Regulation.12  
This 2019 report partly shows that little has changed in terms of poor security practices 
among Irish people since a 2015 Eurobarometer survey then found similarly poor cyber 
hygiene practices such as poor password management (Amárach Research, 
Commissioned by Microsoft, 2019). Identified emerging security risks include the 
increasing tendency for the “boundaries between home and work lives and devices” to 
blur (Amárach Research, Commissioned by Microsoft, 2019). According to this report, 
people rather than software or hardware, are the weakest link when combatting cyber-
related threats (Amárach Research, Commissioned by Microsoft, 2019, p.13). 
                                                  
 
 
11 Some academics note the benefits to these technologies and that they are not solely connected with 
criminal activity – they serve important functions in journalism for example. Equally, these systems have 
had to evolve complex mechanisms for developing trust in suppliers and market places – which have 
helped improve the quality of products consumers receive. It is these trust mechanisms that might be 




12 Note the distinction between the organisational contexts where policies can be enforced and or 




This is one of the reasons why cybersecurity agencies like the NCSC in the United 
Kingdom are working to publicly communicate the risks and their likelihood so that there 
is a better level of security awareness and basic protections on an individual and entity 
level, thus enabling individuals to be better empowered to act on the information they are 
given in ways that they could not previously (Hilliard, 2018). Those responsible for the 
fight against cybercrime in Ireland should ideally begin to consider similar good practices.  
2 . 4 . 8  T E R R O R I S T - C Y B E R C R I M E  N E X U S  
It is currently expected that terrorists could obtain and disclose compromising or 
personally identifiable information through cyber activities and they may use this 
information to coerce, extort, or to inspire and enable physical attacks. There are also 
expectations that terrorist groups could cause some lower-end disruptive effects such as 
website defacement or execute DoS against poorly protected networks (Director of 
National Intelligence, 2019. P.6). Whereas Europol’s threat assessment observes that 
Islamic State (IS) sympathisers have shown their willingness to buy offensive cyber tools 
and services from the digital underground, their own internal capability, tools and 
techniques appear to remain limited (EC3, 2019, p.10). It seems that such groups 
continue to rent botnets for DDoS attacks rather than develop their own malicious cyber 
capabilities, even though IS sympathisers apparently stay informed of latest technological 
developments and the crime-as-a-service business model provides other opportunities 
(EC3, 2019, p.52). Sympathisers have already carried out a small number of 
defacements and low level hacks, including of a Swedish radio station (EC3, 2019, p.52). 
Terror-related groups may also pursue ways to secure support and funding through the 
use of online networks, enabled through new tools such as cryptocurrency.   
2 . 4 . 9  P E R V A S I V E  A N O N Y M I S A T I O N  T O O L S  B E C O M I N G  
A V A I L A B L E  T O  C R I M I N A L S  
Increased anonymity is enabling more cybercriminal activity - triggering, for example, 
recent waves of ransomware attacks (European Commission, 2017a). Such anonymity is 
now available for reasons that include the rise of Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies 
allowing untraceable payments, as well as Tor-like networks (‘Tor’ is short for ‘The Onion 
Router’ which is an open source privacy network that permits users to browse the web 
anonymously) and encryption technologies enabling criminals’ communication and trade 
(Kaspersky Lab, 2018, p.1-2). 
While these developments are challenging for law enforcement efforts, academic sources 
argue that there is insufficient evidence to show the true extent of the problem (Walden, 
2018). These sources counter-argue the literature that states the use of encryption 




and law enforcement from what previously prevailed. This is therefore a gap which 
requires further analysis in the Irish context. This is particularly the case since there is 
much debate over calls for banning public use of encryption or for back doors to be 




Section 3: Legislative good practices: What 
relevant legislation is in place to combat 
cybercrime and how effective has this 
been? 
3.1 Introduction 
Appropriate and up-to-date legislation is required to fully respond to the threats posed by 
modern cybercrime activity, as identified in the previous section. In the recent past, 
extensive legislation has been lacking in Ireland, but positive advances have since been 
achieved. This section identifies the relevant legislation in place to combat cybercrime in 
Ireland, including a brief assessment on its effectiveness. It initially outlines applicable 
legislation to cybercrime in the Irish context in a largely descriptive manner, including 
relevant EU and international instruments. This section then examines how effective such 
legislation has so far been in combatting cybercrime in terms of prevention, prosecutions, 
convictions or other measures. 
3.2 Irish legislation relevant to cybercrime 
Ireland’s first National Cyber Security Strategy (2015-2017), which was published in 
2015, set out how the Irish government would ensure the security of the country's 
computer networks and associated infrastructure. It was updated in 2019. Best practices 
identified in the 2019-2024 strategy will be discussed in more detail in the next section. 
Key measures related to legislation within that first strategy (2015-2017) included 
introducing primary legislation to formalise arrangements in law and to comply with EU 
requirements on capabilities, cooperation and reporting. In this context, the key piece of 
legislation relevant to cybercrime in Ireland is the Criminal Justice (Offences relating to 
Information Systems) Act of 2017. This Act amended the Criminal Damage Act 1991, the 
Bail Act 1997 and the Criminal Justice Act 2011, whilst also giving effect to certain 
provisions of the EU Directive 2013/40/EU on attacks against information systems. The 
Criminal Justice (Offences relating to Information Systems) Act 2017 also supplements 
the offence of “unlawful use of a computer” under the Criminal Justice (Theft and Fraud 
Offences) Act 2001 - an act not specifically designed to address online crime (Slevin & 
O’Reilly, 2017). Prior to the enactment of the Criminal Justice (Offences relating to 
Information Systems) Act 2017, computer crime related offences were handled by the 
Criminal Damage Act 1991, and Section 9 of the Criminal Justice (Theft and Fraud) 




not initially designed to encompass computer crime, but the inclusion of same was part of 
a later draft of the Act.  
The Criminal Justice (Offences relating to Information Systems) Act 2017 alleviates the 
ambiguity of previous legislation, whilst also creating new offences for digital acts.  
Key provisions of the Criminal Justice (Offences relating to Information Systems) Act 
2017 are laid out in detail in Table 2 below.  
Table 2  
Section 2 A person who, without lawful authority or reasonable excuse, 
intentionally accesses an information system by infringing a security 
measure shall be guilty of an offence. 
Section 3  A person who, without lawful authority, intentionally hinders or 
interrupts the functioning of an information system by— 
(a) inputting data on the system, 
(b) transmitting, damaging, deleting, altering or suppressing, 
or causing the deterioration of, data on the system, or 
(c) rendering data on the system inaccessible, shall be guilty 
of an offence. 
 
Section 4 A person who, without lawful authority, intentionally deletes, 
damages, alters or suppresses, or renders inaccessible, or causes 
the deterioration of, data on an information system shall be guilty of 
an offence. 
 
Section 5 A person who, without lawful authority, intentionally intercepts any 
transmission (other than a public transmission) of data to, from or 
within an information system (including any electromagnetic emission 
from such an information system carrying such data), shall be guilty 
of an offence. 
Section 6  A person who, without lawful authority, intentionally produces, sells, 
procures for use, imports, distributes, or otherwise makes available, 
for the purpose of the commission of an offence under section 2 , 3 , 
4 or 5 — 
(a) any computer programme that is primarily designed or 
adapted for use in connection with the commission of such 




(b) any device, computer password, unencryption key or 
code, or access code, or similar data, by which an 
information system is capable of being accessed, shall be 
guilty of an offence. 
 
Section 10  [a] person may be tried in the State for a relevant offence in relation 
to an act, to which this subsection applies by virtue of subsection (2), 
committed, whether in whole or in part— 
(a) by the person in the State in relation to an information system 
outside the State, 
(b) by the person outside the State in relation to an information 
system in the State, or 
(c) by the person outside the State in relation to an information 
system outside the State if— 
(i) that person is a person to whom this subparagraph applies by 
virtue of subsection (3), and 
(ii) the act is an offence under the law of the place where the act 
was committed. 
(2) Subsection (1) applies to an act which, if it had been committed 
by a person in the State in relation to an information system in the 
State, would constitute a relevant offence. 
(3) Subsection (1)(c)(i) applies to each of the following persons: 
(a) an Irish citizen; 
(b) a person ordinarily resident in the State; 
(c) a body corporate established under the law of the State; 
(d) a company formed and registered under the Companies Act 
2014; 




An interesting aspect of the Criminal Justice (Offences relating to Information Systems) 
Act is that the above sections have certain “extra-territorial effect”. This means that they 
can be applied not only to a person carrying out such activities within Ireland, but also to 
a person located outside Ireland who is accessing data/damaging digital property within 
Ireland, provided that such activities are an offence in that jurisdiction.  This authority is 




systems outside the State. Those persons who can be prosecuted under this section is 
set out in subsection 3 of the Act described below.    
Although this is a comprehensive Act, which provides much needed updates to 
legislation in this area, the Act should not be viewed in isolation. The Criminal Justice Act 
2011 is also relevant, because it provides An Garda Síochána with more extensive 
powers to investigate and prosecute complex cases, often referred to as white collar 
crime/fraud cases, which includes cybercrime. Section 15 of the 2011 Act states that “for 
the purposes of the investigation of a relevant offence, a member of the Garda Síochána 
may apply to a judge of the District Court for an order under this section in relation to— 
(a) the making available by a person of any particular documents or documents of a 
particular description, or 
(b) the provision by a person of particular information by answering questions or 
making a statement containing the information, or both”. 
These additional powers are important in investigating cybercrime, since cybercrime is 
considered to be a complex crime and falls, in general, under this Act.  
While the 2017 Act is welcomed, it does have its limitations. For one, scholars argue that 
the Act does not provide for the offence of Phishing. Phishing is not a specific offence in 
Ireland, per se (Harnett & Timon, 2018). However, such activities may be an offence 
under other legislation, depending on the specifics of the case. A representative from An 
Garda Síochána noted that such cases could be dealt with as a form of deception 
(Representative from An Garda Síochána, Interview, January 2020). Alternatively, 
activities related to identity theft or identity fraud that involve actions conducive to 
phishing may be covered under Section 6 of the Criminal Justice (Theft and Fraud 
Offences) Act 2001, which make it an offence of “making a gain or causing a loss by 
deception”. It is worth noting that identity theft and identify fraud can be viewed as an 
aggravating factor when it comes to sentencing in relation to denial of service attacks and 
infection of IT systems offences, under Section 8 of the Criminal Justice (Offences 
relating to Information Systems) Act 2017. Section 25, 26 and 27 of the Criminal Justice 
(Theft and Fraud Offences) Act 2001 also provide for specific forgery offences, which 
may be appropriate in the area of cybercrime too, depending on the specifics of the case. 
The 2013 EU Directive on attacks against information systems further notes that setting 
up effective measures against identity theft and other identity related offences is another 





As noted by a representative of An Garda Síochána, while the 2017 Act is welcomed, the 
codification of cybercrime still remains scattered across many Acts (Interview, 2020). For 
example, the Offences against the State (Amendment) Act 1998 is pertinent in this 
cybercrime area. Section 8 states that it “shall be an offence for a person to collect, 
record or possess information which is of such a nature that it is likely to be useful in the 
commission by members of any unlawful organisation of serious offences generally or 
any particular kind of serious offence”. Harnett & Timon (2018) suggest that any of the 
offences under the Criminal Justice (Offences relating to Information Systems) Act 2017 
would constitute a serious offence for the purpose of Section 8 – in other words, 
cybercriminal activities against the State.  
Despite the limitations of the Criminal Justice (Offences relating to Information Systems) 
Act 2017, it is positive that Ireland now has a dedicated law relating to cybercrime and 
that the powers of investigation for An Garda Síochána have been enhanced under the 
Criminal Justice Act 2011. However, given the fast pace and changing nature of 
cybercrime, legislation is likely to become outdated quickly, if not updated in a timely 
manner (Slevin & O’Reilly, 2017). The 2017 Act does not seem to provide for this 
inevitability, through for example technology neutral provisions, which may need to be 
addressed in future. 
A good example is provided in the threat section above (Section 2) where from a criminal 
justice perspective, law enforcement notes that while ‘cryptomining’ is not illegal in some 
cases, it is still creating additional revenue and thus motivation for criminals to attack 
legitimate websites to exploit visitors’ systems, possibly even breaking a victim’s system 
as a result (EC3, 2018, p.19). Europol reports note that there is also “true cryptomining 
malware” delivered by a malicious payload like other malware which also uses the 
infected machines processing power to mine cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin (which 
needs higher processing power) (EC3, 2018, p.19). Notably, law enforcement apparently 
finds this activity easier to detect, but there were no formal law enforcement reports of 
any cases in 2018 most likely because of its nature as an emerging threat and 
questionable legality (EC3, 2018, p.19). While a noteworthy incident did occur in Finland 
where healthcare systems were severely disrupted, it also seems that damages to 
victims are broadly speaking difficult to quantify and investigate (EC3, 2018, p.19 - Note 
that cryptocurrency depositories and any entity with significant amounts of 
cryptocurrencies is a likely target for cybercriminals). Again, this is a gap which must be 
addressed in the near future by legislators and law enforcement in Ireland.  
Professor Wall, Professor of Criminology at the Centre for Criminal Justice Studies in the 
School of Law, University of Leeds also gave an example of how law enforcement can 




enforcement need to be more imaginative in how they apply existing legislation. Using 
the example of ‘crypto jacking’ to illustrate his point, Professor Wall stated that some 
countries do not have specific legislation to prosecute such cases, but one may be able 
to use old legislation relating to illegal abstraction of electricity, if available to prosecute 
such cases (D. Wall, interview, December 2019).   
While the existence of effective legislation is desirable, it is not always feasible to have 
legislation in place to meet the changing face of cybercrimes. A representative from the 
UK’s National Crime Agency noted that it is difficult or impossible to keep pace legislatively 
with the pace of technological change (National Crime Agency, interview, December 
2019). A representative from Europol echoed this and tried to provide some insights into 
why this is case. He noted that the lengthy process involved in legislative change is often 
for good reason. Legislation will be around for a long time, so it needs to be well thought 
out and debated. In order to prevent the need for regular legislative review and updates of 
the instruments, they should further be developed as technology-neutral as possible. 
Europol try to inform this process at the EU level, while not creating legislation, they are 
often consulted by the European Commission, the Council of the European Union and the 
European Parliament in relation to proposed legislation that might impact Europol’s work 
and the work of the law enforcement authorities combating cybercrimes within the Member 
States. Europol, in coordination with EU law enforcement partners and sometimes private 
sector partners, gives their opinion, informed by the casework, on the potential impact of 
the proposed legislation from the ground. An example relates to E-privacy Regulation 
where Europol identified potential problems with early drafts from an investigative but also 
broader cybersecurity perspective. Providing input at this early stage can help to address 
or remove the potential for issues that may hamper investigations after implementation 
(Europol representative, interview, December 2019). It is also worth noting that Europol 
works with law enforcement partners and the private sector to establish suitable agreement 
and agreed practices in the context of their Advisory Groups and  through non-binding, 
strategic  memorandums of understanding (MOUs) in order to inform and try to improve 
consistency prior to the implementation of legislation (Europol representative, interview, 
December 2019). 
The fast pace of change, should also not be viewed as a reason to rush legislative 
change either. As noted by a representative from Europol, legislative change is a lengthy 
process for good reason. Changes, although perceived to be in the best interest may 
have negative impacts. For example, in Scotland the police had intended to roll out 41 
‘cyber-kiosks’ or laptop-sized machines which would allow them to bypass encryption to 
quickly read personal data from digital devices such as mobile phones or laptops (The 




Parliament’s Justice Sub-Committee on Policing asked the police to stop the deployment 
of the cyber-kiosks until greater clarity was achieved as to the legal framework 
underpinning their use. It was noted that during the trials “police in Edinburgh and Stirling 
searched the mobile phones of suspects, witnesses and victims without undertaking the 
required governance, scrutiny and impact assessments [and that] members of the public 
whose phones were seized and searched were not made aware that their phones were 
to be searched using cyber kiosks as part of a trial, the implications of this, and were not 
provided with the option of giving their consent” (The Scottish Parliament website, 2019). 
The sub-committee stated that it “fully supports Police Scotland’s ambition to transform to 
effectively tackle digital crime. However, prior to the introduction of any new technology 
to be used for policing purposes, an assessment of both the benefits and the risks should 
have been carried out” (The Scottish Parliament website, 2019). Concerns were also 
noted that the technology was used without consideration of human rights, equality, data 
protection and that there had been no public information campaign (The Scottish 
Parliament website, 2019). Many of these issues will be discussed further in the next 
section, but suffice to say, there should be no short cuts for legislative change, especially 
when such changes have the potential to breach other rights, such as the right to privacy.  
More recently, the Law Enforcement Directive (LED), a piece of EU legislation, parallel to 
the EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), came into effect from May 2018 
through transposition at national level. LED deals with the processing of personal data by 
data controllers for law enforcement purposes, which falls outside the scope of the 
GDPR.13 This also illustrates that law enforcement are not above reproach when it 
comes to the processing of personal data. As an EU Directive, it too requires 
transposition into Irish law to take effect and this transposition has been achieved 
through the Data Protection Act 2018, primarily through Part 5 – Processing of Personal 
Data for Law Enforcement Purposes. The Data Protection Commission is set out under 
Part 5 of the Act as the independent supervisory authority for the LED (Data Protection 
Commission website). This coupled with the GDPR illustrates the EU’s commitment to 
protecting personal data. Now that the EU GDPR is fully in effect, with a package of 
financial penalties for organisations who do not comply, Irish organisations now face 
severe consequences for data loss or breach, due to a simple human error, a failure of 
process or falling victim to a cybercriminal (Amárach Research, 2019). 







Statutory Instrument No. 360 of 2018 signed the EU Directive on security of network and 
information Systems (NIS Directive, 2016) into Irish law on 18 September 2018. It 
represents a “significant change in how countries in the EU approach cybersecurity, and 
involves a shift in approach towards a more formal type of regulatory relationship in 
certain key industries (NCSC Website, 2020). The Irish National Cyber Security Centre 
(NCSC) explains that the responsibilities that the NIS Directive places on the State and 
on businesses are wide ranging. More detail is provided on these changes in a section of 
the report below.  
Given the global nature of the Internet and the need for international law enforcement 
cooperation to combat cybercrime effectively, Irish legislation should ideally continue to 
consider global legislative initiatives, and good practices. As a Member State of the EU, 
Ireland also has a number of compliance obligations like those instruments described 
above. Moreover, the EU has adopted a rather comprehensive approach to cyber-related 
matters, with much non-obligatory good practice available to EU Member States which is 
discussed in Section 4 of this report. The following section provides an overview of the 
most pertinent legislative initiatives. 
3.3 International and EU instruments relevant to the 
Irish legislative landscape 
The Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime (CETS No. 185) of 2001, often 
referred to as the Budapest Convention was brought into force in November 2011. It is 
considered to be the legal framework of reference for combatting cybercrime, including 
attacks against information systems (Directive 2013/40/EU). The Convention was the first 
international treaty on crimes committed via the Internet and other computer networks, 
dealing particularly with infringements of copyright, computer-related fraud, child 
pornography and violations of network security. It contains a series of powers and 
procedures, such as the right to search computer networks and interception. Its main 
objective, set out in the preamble, is to pursue “a common criminal policy aimed at the 
protection of society against cybercrime, especially by adopting appropriate legislation 
and fostering international co-operation” (CETS No. 185, 2001, 2).  
A noteworthy aspect of the Convention is that it extends its influence far outside of 
Europe. As of 5 February 2019, 62 countries are parties to the Convention, which 
includes 26 EU Member States - Ireland and Sweden excluded (European Commission 
website, Press Corner page, 2019). However, even though it is an international treaty, 
many non-EU states have expressed concern that it is broadly speaking a European or 
Western instrument with reservations for a number of reasons, including their lack of 




Europe with EU bodies. Nonetheless, the Convention continues to provide a global legal 
framework for combatting cybercrime, including attacks against information systems.  In 
this respect, the Convention is important in that it defines a number of different types of 
crimes that can be committed online. This provides a common frame of reference for its 
members. The message in the preamble of the Convention signifies keys aspects of what 
has now become known as best practice in this area. It recognises the inherent benefits 
of the following; 
 Fostering co-operation with the other States parties to this Convention;  
 The need to pursue a common criminal policy aimed at the protection of society 
against cybercrime, inter alia, by adopting appropriate legislation  
 Fostering international co-operation; 
 Recognising the need for co-operation between States and private industry in 
combating cybercrime and the need to protect legitimate interests in the use and 
development of information technologies; 
 Believing that an effective fight against cybercrime requires increased, rapid and 
well-functioning international co-operation in criminal matters (CETS No. 185, 
2001).  
The Convention resulted from recognition by signatories that it was necessary “to pursue, 
as a matter of priority, a common criminal policy aimed at the protection of society 
against cybercrime, inter alia, by adopting appropriate legislation and fostering 
international co-operation”. The 2013 EU Directive on attacks against information 
systems builds on the Convention, and the EU Cybersecurity Strategy of 2017 specifies 
that the EU continues to see the value of the Budapest Convention. The 2017 strategy 
explains that due to the borderless nature of the Internet, the framework for international 
cooperation provided by the Council of Europe Budapest Convention on Cybercrime 
offers the opportunity amongst a diverse group of countries to use an optimal legal 
standard for the different national legislation addressing cybercrime (European 
Commission, Building strong cybersecurity in the EU, 2017).  
A possible addition of a protocol to the Convention has been under exploration which 
could also provide a useful opportunity to address the issue of cross-border access to 
electronic evidence in an international context (Terms of Reference for the preparation of 
a draft 2nd Additional Protocol to the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime, T-CY 
(2017)3, and JOIN/2017/0450 final). Rather than the creation of new international legal 




national legislation and pursue cooperation within this existing international framework. 
However, in late 2019, contrary to EU thinking, Russia submitted a proposal for the 
creation of a new international legal instrument for cybercrime issues by way of a 
cybercrime treaty proposal to the Third Committee of the United Nations on ‘countering 
the use of information and communications technologies for criminal purposes’ (UN 
General Assembly, A/74/401).   
The Budapest Convention also recognises the need for cooperation between states and 
private industry in combatting cybercrime.  It further promotes the need for better 
international police and judicial cooperation in the area of cybercrime, reinforced through 
the creation of a 24/7 network. The EU Directive similarly requires every signatory to: 
“designate a point of contact available on a twenty-four hour, seven-days-week basis, in 
order to ensure the provision of immediate assistance for the purpose of investigations or 
proceedings concerning criminal offences related to computer systems and data, or for 
the collection of evidence in electronic form of a criminal offence” (Directive 2013/40/EU, 
20). However, An Garda Síochána, while acknowledging the positive aspects of having a 
24/7 point of contact, also highlighted that this can place a considerable demand on 
small units, which can be challenging (Representatives from An Garda Síochána, 
interview, January 2020). 
Article 13 of the 2013 EU Directive on attacks against information systems similarly 
requires that Member States ensure that they have an operational national point of 
contact for the purposes of exchanging information relating to offences referred to in 
Articles 3 to 8, and that they make use of the existing network of operational points of 
contact available 24 hours a day and seven days a week. Member States shall also 
ensure that they have procedures in place so that for urgent requests for assistance, the 
competent authority can indicate, within eight hours of receipt, at least whether the 
request will be answered, and the form and estimated time of such an answer 
(2013/40/EU Article 13). The Directive also aims to strengthen the importance of 
networks such as this Council of Europe network as well as the then G8 network. It calls 
for those points of contact to be in a position to deliver effective assistance thus, for 
example, facilitating the exchange of relevant information available and the provision of 
technical advice or legal information for the purpose of investigations or proceedings 
concerning criminal offences relating to information systems and associated data 
involving the requesting Member State (2013/40/EU (22)). In order to ensure the smooth 
operation of the networks, each contact point should have the capacity to communicate 
with the point of contact of another Member State on an expedited basis with the support, 




While Ireland became a signatory to the Convention in February 2002, as of 5 February 
2019, the Irish government has yet to ratify the Convention (European Commission, 
2019b). The EU Directive on attacks against information systems, which is a key 
instrument of the EU and builds on the Budapest Convention, provides that all EU 
Member States should complete ratification of the Convention as a priority (2013/40/EU 
(15)). While the majority of the Budapest Convention is already integrated within Irish 
legislation, at the time of writing a new cybercrime Bill is due to address the remainder of 
the provisions of the Convention – the Convention is also due to be formally ratified in the 
near future (Stanton D. T.D., 2019). Representatives from An Garda Síochána noted one 
specific limitation arising from the lack of ratification which presents an ongoing challenge 
relates to the lack of legal underpinning to enforce organisations to retain logs that might 
be required for investigations (Interview, January 2020).   
Such EU and international endeavours are relevant to Irish efforts to combat cybercrime 
for a number of reasons. The safety and security of information systems in the EU is 
considered to be essential for the development of the internal market as well as a 
competitive and innovative economy which means that “ensuring an appropriate level of 
protection of information systems should form part of an effective comprehensive 
framework of prevention measures accompanying criminal law responses to cybercrime” 
(Directive 2013/40/EU (2)). Furthermore, it is commonly argued that significant 
differences in EU Member States’ laws and criminal procedures in the area of attacks 
against information systems may hamper the fight against organised crime and terrorism, 
and hinder effective police and judicial cooperation in this area (Directive 2013/40/EU 
(27)). The “transnational and borderless nature of modern information systems means 
that attacks against such systems have a cross-border dimension, thus underlining the 
urgent need for further action to approximate criminal law in this area” (2013/40/EU (27)). 
Academics similarly note that domestic legislation alone is not enough, and cross-border 
harmonisation of such legislation is important (Picotti & Salvadori, 2008). This can help to 
reduce and prevent cybercrime havens and it is why transposing the EU NIS Directive is 
seen to be good practice for example. Given the cross-border dimension of cybercrime, 
(as a representative from Europol noted) cybercrime is truly an international crime. 
ENISA (2013) provides some good practice recommendations in this area in relation to 
specific offences. For example, ENISA (2013) note that it is good practice to have 
coherence in relation to the “interpretation of unlawfulness of access attempts: especially 
in the absence of security measures” (9). It is recommended that it is good practice to 
have prosecution guidelines to assist both in interpretation and application of the law. 
The UK have such guidelines within the Crown Prosecution Services, while Portugal 




Graux and Robinson, 2013). De Myynck, Graux and Robinson (2013) further note that 
“collection and dissemination of such guidance at the EU level could also help to ensure 
homogenous application of the law” across Europe (10). Similar guidelines were 
suggested in relation to illegal interception (De Myynck, Graux and Robinson, 2013). In 
relation to the possession of tools for committing offences, ENISA (2013) makes the 
following recommendation for good practice, “implementing legislation should be clear 
and explicit, and include clear carve-outs of the applicability of the provision for the 
normal activities of CERTs, academic institutions, researchers, network operators and 
security service professionals, and any actions undertaken at the lawful request of 
businesses, governments and end users” (14). 
Nonetheless, the EU Directive has its limitations such as limited definitions for the 
treatment and storage of investigation data which can result in a lack of consistency on the 
standards of storage between jurisdictions. In turn, this can result in the inadmissibility of 
evidence in investigations.  
Moreover, while harmonisation of legislation is considered to be essential to effectively 
combat cross-border cybercrime, successful international cooperation relies on a range of 
additional factors. These include, but are not limited to, international relations with other 
countries, the hierarchy of standing of particular offences in different jurisdictions and the 
willingness or capacity of the police in other states to invest resources in investigations 
(Yar, 2013). These issues related to the hierarchy of standing of cases and the investment 
of resources were also highlighted as challenges by a number of interviewees 
(Representatives from Europol, An Garda Síochána and the NCA, interviews, December 
2019 and January 2020), especially when dealing with law enforcement and government 
organisations outside the EU.  
Christou (2016) argues that the EU should do more to support cybersecurity capacity and 
resilience of developing states, and to engage in more rigorous diplomatic efforts to 
secure cooperation of states reluctant to engage with cybercrime treaties or conventions. 
The United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC) are particularly active in this 
area. It has developed the Global Programme on Cybercrime to assist UN Member 
States in their struggle against cyber-related crimes through capacity building and 
technical assistance. The main aims of the programme is to “increase efficiency and 
effectiveness in the investigation, prosecution and adjudication of cybercrime, especially 
online child sexual exploitation and abuse, within a strong human-rights framework; [to 
develop] efficient and effective long-term whole-of-government response to cybercrime, 
including national coordination, data collection and effective legal frameworks, leading to 
a sustainable response and greater deterrence; [and to] strengthened national and 




sector with increased public knowledge of cybercrime risks” (UNODC Website, 2020a). 
Moreover, the programme is designed in a manner to respond flexibly to identify needs in 
developing countries by supporting UN Member States to prevent and combat 
cybercrime in a holistic manner. The Irish National Cyber Security Strategy (2019-2024) 
also envisages Ireland having a role in helping improve capacity in developing states with 
respect to cybercrime. It notes that “[w]e will reinforce Ireland’s diplomatic commitment to 
cyber security, including by stationing cyber attachés in key diplomatic missions and by 
engaging in sustainable capacity building in third countries” (Department of 
Communications, Climate Action and Environment, 2019, p.44). It notes that Ireland will 
support international cooperation to combat cybercrime and promote formal and informal 
cooperation in cyberspace, including by engaging in sustainable capacity building in third 
countries” (Department of Communications, Climate Action and Environment, 2019, 
p.44).  
Significant progress has thus been made at EU level in the field of cybercrime and wider 
cyber-related questions. While there is now a host of different policy documents and 
legislative initiatives related to cybersecurity and cybercrime, the NIS Directive and 
Directive 2013/40/EU on attacks against information systems form the EU’s core policy 
response so far (European Commission, 2016). An overview of additional key EU 
documents that specifically pertain to cybercrime are outlined in chronological order 
within Box 1 below, followed by further detail on each of the instruments (Heinl, 2019c). 
 Box 1: Overview of key EU documents that specifically pertain to cybercrime14 
Council Framework Decision 2005/222/JHA on attacks against information systems, 24 
February 2005: This Framework Decision is now replaced by the 2013 Directive on attacks 
against information systems which is discussed in greater detail below.  
 
2008 Report on the Implementation of the 2003 European Security Strategy: This report 
first mentioned cyber as a potential challenge with an external dimension (most likely because 
of the incidents in Estonia (2007) and Georgia (2008), allegedly instigated by Russia.  
The EU Internal Security Strategy in Action: Five steps towards a more secure Europe, 
22 November 2010: Identified cybersecurity as one of five strategic objectives for the period 
2010 to 2014.   
Cybersecurity Strategy of the European Union: An Open, Safe and Secure Cyberspace, 
7 February 2013: One of the five strategic priorities listed within the first EU Cybersecurity 
                                                  
 
 




Strategy include combatting cybercrime. These priorities include: (1) Building cyber resilience; 
(2) Drastically reducing cybercrime; (3) Developing cyber defence policy and capabilities; (4) 
Developing the industrial and technological resources for cybersecurity; and (5) Establishing a 
coherent international cyberspace policy for the EU and promoting core EU values. 
Directive 2013/40/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council on attacks against 
information systems and replacing Council Framework Decision 2005/222/JHA, 12 
August 2013: More detail provided below.  
 
The European Agenda on Security, 28 April 2015: Prioritises terrorism, organised crime and 
cybercrime as interlinked areas with a strong cross-border dimension where EU action can 
make a difference. 
 
Strengthening Europe’s Cyber Resilience System and Fostering a Competitive and 
Innovative Cybersecurity Industry, 5 July 2016: This policy document outlines the need to 
enhance cooperation for better preparedness and to deal with cyber incidents. It calls for 
existing cooperation mechanisms to be strengthened to increase EU resilience and 
preparedness, including for a possible pan-European cybersecurity crisis. In particular, it notes 
that these cooperation mechanisms should be comprehensive, spanning the life cycle of an 
incident from prevention to prosecution. It explains that effective cooperation among Member 
States and practical implementation of security requirements for critical operators will also 
demand robust technical solutions from the cybersecurity industry. The document further 
specifies that knowledge and expertise on cybersecurity is available at EU level but in an 
unstructured and dispersed way currently. Thus, in order to support NIS cooperation 
mechanisms, information should be pooled in an ‘information hub’ to make it easily available 
on request to all Member States. This ‘hub’ would become a central resource allowing the EU 
institutions and Member States to exchange information as appropriate. Easier access to better 
structured information on cybersecurity risks and potential remedies should help Member 
States to increase their capacities and align their practices, and thereby enhance overall 
resilience to attacks. The document includes a number of additional recommendations and 
suggestions for responses and measures that could be implemented.  
 
Directive 2016/1148 of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning measures 
for a high common level of security of network and information systems across the 
Union (“NIS Directive”), 6 July 2016: More detail is provided in the report below.  
 
Regulation (EU) 2016/794 on Europol, 11 May 2016: More detail is provided in the report 
below. 
Joint Framework on countering hybrid threats: a European Union response, 6 April 2016: 
This Joint Framework recognises that the range of measures applied as part of a hybrid 
campaign may be very wide, including cyber attacks on critical information systems. 
 
Cybersecurity package, “Resilience, Deterrence and Defence: Building strong 





3 . 3 . 1  D I R E C T I V E  2 0 1 3 / 4 0 / E U  O F  T H E  E U R O P E A N  P A R L I A M E N T  
A N D  O F  T H E  C O U N C I L  O N  A T T A C K S  A G A I N S T  I N F O R M A T I O N  
S Y S T E M S  A N D  R E P L A C I N G  C O U N C I L  F R A M E W O R K  D E C I S I O N  
2 0 0 5 / 2 2 2 / J H A ,  1 2  A U G U S T  2 0 1 3  
In accordance with Article 3 of the Protocol on the position of the United Kingdom and 
Ireland in respect of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice annexed to the Lisbon 
Treaty (TEU and TFEU), Ireland notified its intent to take part in the application of the EU 
Directive on attacks against information systems (Directive 2013/40/EU (31)). EU 
Member States were thus expected to transpose the Directive into national law by 2015 
by bringing into force the laws, regulations and administrative provisions needed to 
comply with the Directive (2013/40/EU (16)).  
The 2013 Directive establishes minimum rules on the definition of criminal offences and 
provides operational measures for cooperation among authorities. It aims to facilitate 
cross-border cooperation and harmonisation of measures across EU Member States. 
The objectives of this Directive are to approximate the criminal law of the Member States 
in the area of attacks against information systems by establishing minimum rules 
concerning the definition of criminal offences and the relevant sanctions and to improve 
cooperation between competent authorities, including the police and other specialised 
law enforcement services of the Member States, as well as the competent specialised 
Union agencies and bodies, such as Eurojust, Europol and its European Cyber Crime 
Centre, and the European Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA) 
(2013/40/EU (1)). 
The Directive’s preamble explains that there is evidence of a tendency towards 
increasingly dangerous and recurrent large-scale attacks conducted against information 
systems which can often be critical to Member States or to particular functions in the 
public or private sector. This tendency is accompanied by the development of 
increasingly sophisticated methods, such as the creation and use of so-called ‘botnets’, 
which involves several stages of a criminal act, where each stage alone could pose a 
serious risk to public interests. This Directive aims, inter alia, to introduce criminal 
penalties for the creation of botnets, namely, the act of establishing remote control over a 
significant number of computers by infecting them with malicious software through 
targeted cyber attacks. Once created, the infected network of computers that constitute 
the botnet can be activated without the computer users’ knowledge in order to launch a 
large-scale cyber attack, which usually has the capacity to cause serious damage, as 
referred to in this Directive. Member States may determine what constitutes serious 
damage according to their national law and practice, such as disrupting system services 
of significant public importance, or causing major financial cost or loss of personal data or 




The Directive provides that common definitions are necessary in the area of cybercrime 
to ensure a consistent approach in the EU Member States to the application of the 
Directive (2013/40/EU (7)). Moreover, it recognises the need to achieve a common 
approach to the constituent elements of criminal offences by introducing common 
offences of illegal access to an information system, illegal system interference, illegal 
data interference, and illegal interception (2013/40/EU (8)). A detailed outline of each of 
these common offences is laid out in Articles 3, 4, 5, and 6.  
The Directive further indicates that Member States should provide for penalties in respect 
of attacks against information systems. Those penalties should be effective, 
proportionate and dissuasive and should include imprisonment and/or fines (2013/40/EU 
(10)). It provides for criminal penalties at least for cases which are not minor. Member 
States may determine what constitutes a minor case according to their national law and 
practice. A case may be considered minor, for example, where the damage caused by 
the offence and/or the risk to public or private interests, such as to the integrity of a 
computer system or to computer data, or to the integrity, rights or other interests of a 
person, is insignificant or is of such a nature that the imposition of a criminal penalty 
within the legal threshold or the imposition of criminal liability is not necessary 
(2013/40/EU (11)).  
The Directive further notes that more severe penalties should be provided for where an 
attack against an information system is committed by a criminal organisation as defined 
in Council Framework Decision 2008/841/JHA where such a cyber attack is conducted 
on a large scale, which affects a significant number of information systems, including 
where it is intended to create a botnet or where a cyber attack causes serious damage, 
including where it is conducted through a botnet. It is also appropriate to provide for more 
severe penalties where an attack is conducted against a CI of the Member States or of 
the Union (2013/40/EU (13)).   
The Directive is lauded by the 2017 EU Cyber Strategy as a progressive step towards 
improving the criminal law response to cyber attacks. According to the 2017 Strategy, 
this Directive has led to substantive progress in criminalising cyber attacks at a 
comparable level across the Member States, which facilitates the cross-border 
cooperation of law enforcement authorities investigating these types of offences. 
However, there is still scope for the Directive to reach its full potential if Member States 
were to implement all of its provisions fully (COM(2017)474). The Commission will 
continue to provide support to the Member States in their implementation of the 2013 
Directive and at the time of the 2017 Strategy’s publication saw no need to propose 




3 . 3 . 2   D I R E C T I V E  2 0 1 6 / 1 1 4 8  O F  T H E  E U R O P E A N  P A R L I A M E N T  
A N D  O F  T H E  C O U N C I L  C O N C E R N I N G  M E A S U R E S  F O R  A  H I G H  
C O M M O N  L E V E L  O F  S E C U R I T Y  O F  N E T W O R K  A N D  I N F O R M A T I O N  
S Y S T E M S  A C R O S S  T H E  U N I O N  ( “ N I S  D I R E C T I V E ” ) ,  6  J U L Y  2 0 1 6  
The aim of the NIS Directive is to enhance cybersecurity across the EU by laying down 
measures with a view to achieving a high common level of security of network and 
information systems within the Union so as to improve the functioning of the internal 
market. The NIS directive was published on 6 July 2016. EU Member States were due to 
transpose the Directive into national law by 9 May 2018 and identify Operators of 
Essential Services (OES) by 9 November 2018. The Directive provides legal measures to 
boost the overall level of cybersecurity in the EU. It suggests that  
[B]uilding upon the significant progress within the European Forum of Member 
States in fostering discussions and exchanges on good policy practices, including 
the development of principles for European cyber-crisis cooperation, a Cooperation 
Group, composed of representatives of Member States, the Commission, and the 
European Union Agency for Network and Information Security (‘ENISA’), should be 
established to support and facilitate strategic cooperation between the Member 
States regarding the security of network and information systems. For that group to 
be effective and inclusive, it is essential that all Member States have minimum 
capabilities and a strategy ensuring a high level of security of network and 
information systems in their territory. In addition, security and notification 
requirements should apply to operators of essential services and to digital service 
providers to promote a culture of risk management and ensure that the most serious 
incidents are reported (Directive (EU) 2016/1148, 194/1-194/2).  
There are number of elements worth noting in the NIS Directive specifically. For example, 
Chapter II, Article 7, which relates to National strategy on the security of network and 
information systems. This articles states that  
Each Member State shall adopt a national strategy on the security of network and 
information systems defining the strategic objectives and appropriate policy and 
regulatory measures with a view to achieving and maintaining a high level of 
security of network and information systems (Directive (EU) 2016/1148, 194/15).  
Similar to the 24/7 point of contact in respect to the Budapest Convention, Article 8 of the 
Directive relates to the appointment of national competent authorities and single points of 
contact. Article 9 relates to the establishment of computer security incident response 
teams (CSIRTs). It states that “Each Member State shall designate one or more CSIRTs” 
(Directive (EU) 2016/1148, 194/17). Article 12 relates to the establishment of a CSIRT 




cooperation, more specifically to the establishment of an EU Cooperation Group to help 
“and facilitate strategic cooperation and the exchange of information among Member 
States and to develop trust and confidence” (Directive (EU) 2016/1148, 194/17). Similar 
to the Budapest Convention Article 13 provides for international cooperation. 
Chapter IV relates to security of the network and information systems of operators of 
essential services. It sets out requirements Member States should ensure are in place in 
relation to such services. These include security requirements and incident notification 
(Article 14) as well as implementation and enforcement (Article 15). Chapter V sets out 
similar requirements in relation to Digital Service Providers (DSPs), requirements relating 
to security requirements and incident notification (Article 16), implementation and 
enforcement (Article 17) and jurisdiction and territoriality (Article 18).  
The Directive was signed into Irish law on 18 September 2018 by way of Statutory 
Instrument No. 360 of 2018, mentioned above. The Irish NCSC explains that the 
responsibilities that the Directive places on the State and on businesses are wide 
ranging, but, among other things: 
 Involve the application of a set of binding security obligations to a wide range of 
critical infrastructure operators, i.e. OES. These include energy, healthcare, 
financial services, transport, drinking water supply and digital infrastructure and 
telecommunications. 
 Require the State to apply and police a new regulatory regime on so called DSPs. 
These include cloud computing providers, search engines providers and 
providers of online market places. 
 Critically, and in a similar manner to that for data protection, the State has 
responsibility for dealing with the security of services provided by multinational 
companies across the EU that have their European headquarters located in 
Ireland. The majority of these multinational companies are from the United 
States. 
 
The NCSC further explains that in relation to OES, in order to realise the Directive and its 
objectives, Member States’ must identify the OES within its jurisdiction, ensure that such 
entities have security measures in place and that they report significant incidents. 
Security Guidelines are now published by NCSC to assist OES in meeting their network 
and information system security and incident reporting obligations under the Directive 
(transposed into Irish legislation under Regulations 17 and 18 of S.I. 360 of 2018: 
European Union (Measures For A High Common Level Of Security Of Network And 
Information Systems)). They represent a sample approach that can be adopted by OES 
to manage the risks posed to the security of the network and information systems used in 
their operations, and to minimise the impact of incidents affecting those systems. They 




adapt these to meet their needs, and to evolve their sector specific response along with 
technological advances and business requirements. Draft Security Measures were 
published for public consultation in January 2019 and the final version can be found on 
the NCSC website.15 
In relation to DSPs, companies providing digital services specified in Annex III of the 
Directive are categorised as Digital Service Providers and are to meet requirements set 
by the European Commission through the EU legal mechanism known as implementing 
acts. Incident reporting forms are available for both OES and DSPs on the NCSC 
website. The strategy on strengthening Europe’s cyber resilience system highlights that a 
key part of national capabilities required by the NIS Directive are CSIRTs responsible for 
rapid reaction to cyber threats and cyber incidents. They will form the CSIRTs Network to 
promote effective operational cooperation on specific cybersecurity incidents and sharing 
information about risks.  
3 . 3 . 3   R E G U L A T I O N  ( E U )  2 0 1 6 / 7 9 4  O N  E U R O P O L ,  1 1  M A Y  2 0 1 6  
Regulation (EU) 2016/794 on the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement 
Cooperation (Europol) replaces and repeals Council Decisions 2009/371/JHA, 
2009/934/JHA, 2009/935/JHA, 2009/936/JHA and 2009/968/JHA. The ‘Stockholm 
programme — An open and secure Europe serving and protecting citizens’ calls for 
Europol to evolve and become a hub for information exchange between the law 
enforcement authorities of the Member States, a service provider and a platform for law 
enforcement services. On the basis of an assessment of Europol's functioning, it has 
previously been recognised that further enhancement of its operational effectiveness is 
needed to meet that objective (Regulation (EU) 2016/794 (3)).  
Article 8 of the Regulation specifies that attacks against information systems affecting 
Union bodies or two or more Member States are a growing menace in the Union, in 
particular in view of their speed and impact and the difficulty in identifying their sources. 
When considering requests by Europol to initiate an investigation into a serious attack of 
suspected criminal origin against information systems affecting Union bodies or two or 
more Member States, Member States should respond to Europol without delay, taking 
into account the fact that the rapidity of the response is a key factor in successfully 
tackling computer crime (Regulation (EU) 2016/794 Article 8). Article 30 provides that in 
order to ensure operational effectiveness, Europol should be able to exchange all 







relevant information, with the exception of personal data, with other Union bodies, 
authorities of third countries and international organisations, to the extent necessary for 
the performance of its tasks. Since companies, firms, business associations, non-
governmental organisations and other private parties hold expertise and information of 
direct relevance to the prevention and combatting of serious crime and terrorism, the 
Regulation provides that Europol should also be able to exchange such information with 
private parties. To prevent and combat cybercrime, as related to network and information 
security incidents, Europol should, pursuant to the NIS Directive, cooperate and 
exchange information, with the exception of personal data, with national authorities 
competent for the security of network and information systems.  
In short, the NIS Directive is the first EU-wide cybersecurity law. The EU 2017 Cyber 
Strategy explains that the NIS Directive is designed to build resilience by improving 
national cybersecurity capabilities; fostering better cooperation between the Member 
States; and requiring undertakings in important economic sectors to adopt effective risk 
management practices and to report serious incidents to the national authorities. These 
obligations also apply to three types of providers of key Internet services: cloud 
computing, search engines and online marketplaces, as described above. It aims for a 
stronger and more systematic approach and a better information flow. Full 
implementation of the Directive is considered essential to EU cyber resilience by 
increasing harmonisation across the EU, especially in relation to OES. 
As part of the 2017 Cybersecurity package, the Commission was also due to issue a 
Communication to support their efforts by providing best practice from the Member 
States relevant to the implementation of the Directive and guidance on how the Directive 
should be operating in practice. The 2017 strategy notes that an area where the Directive 
will need to be supplemented is information flow. For example, it recognises that the 
Directive only covers key strategic sectors – but logically a similar approach by all 
stakeholders hit by cyberattacks would be necessary to have a systematic assessment of 
vulnerabilities and entry points for cyber attackers.  
3 . 3 . 4   C Y B E R S E C U R I T Y  P A C K A G E  “ R E S I L I E N C E ,  D E T E R R E N C E  
A N D  D E F E N C E :  B U I L D I N G  S T R O N G  C Y B E R S E C U R I T Y  F O R  T H E  E U ” ,  
1 3  S E P T E M B E R  2 0 1 7 ,  J O I N / 2 0 1 7 / 0 4 5 0  F I N A L  
The 2017 EU Cybersecurity strategy builds on the review of the 2013 EU Cybersecurity 
Strategy. The Strategy addresses concepts of deterrence – explaining that effective 
deterrence means putting in place a framework of measures that are both credible and 
dissuasive for would-be cyber criminals and attackers. As long as the perpetrators of 
cyber attacks – both non-state and state – have nothing to fear besides failure, they will 




response focusing on detection, traceability and prosecution of cyber criminals is central 
to building effective deterrence.  
However, it is worth noting that the extensive research on deterrence and the 
effectiveness of criminal sanctions, one of the most researched areas of criminology, has 
shown that the extent to which punitive policies can meaningfully address or impact crime 
rates is limited (although some deterrent effect is not disputed). The question is rather 
what kind of punitive measures, and how to establish the certainty of punishment? These 
are difficult questions to answer in the context of cybercrime, especially cyber-dependent 
offending, as research in this area is in its infancy, due to factors such as, among others, 
limited prosecutions, or limited access to offenders. Care should thus be taken in 
pursuing any increased punitive measures without an investment in research in this area. 
It is essential that states explore or invest in research on cyber-dependent offenders’ 
movement in and out of offending and what were the conditions that led them to offend to 
begin with before implementing increased punitive measures. Policing alone will never be 
enough. Greater consideration of prevention measures that are oriented towards 
addressing the underlying causes of offending to begin with – and not at ‘controlling’ 
through deterrence is required where this latter approach may be a costly and ineffective 
venture.  
3 . 3 . 5  A D D I T I O N A L  L E G I S L A T I V E  I N I T I A T I V E S  
Beyond EU measures among Member States, a number of countries are considering 
agreements that can surmount the difficulties associated with the Mutual Legal 
Assistance Treaties that many stakeholders argue are broken so that more efficient 
channels of data sharing with law enforcement authorities can be facilitated while being 
mindful of privacy and data protection standards. The passage of the Clarifying Lawful 
Overseas Use of Data Act or CLOUD Act by U.S. Congress in 2018 has apparently 
opened diplomatic avenues that could facilitate such a transition. Moreover, a number of 
third countries such as India are exploring data sharing agreements with the United 
States along the same lines as the U.S.-UK bilateral agreement following the CLOUD 
Act. 
While deliberations on a UN framework for responsible state behaviour in cyberspace are 
ongoing, the 2015 UN GGE consensus report notes that States should consider how 
best to cooperate to exchange information, assist each other, prosecute terrorist and 
criminal use of ICTs and implement other cooperative measures to address such threats 
as well as consider whether new measures may need to be developed in this respect (7-
8). The experts further find that States should take appropriate measures to protect their 




creation of a global culture of cybersecurity and the protection of critical information 
infrastructures (8).  
While there is clearly much legislative progress at EU and national level in Ireland, the 
existence of legislation, policies and strategies alone is rarely enough. They are 
redundant if they are not effective. The next section will therefore examine how effective 
these legislative measures are in the context of combatting cybercrime in terms of 
prevention, prosecution, convictions or other measures. 
3.4 Effectiveness of legislation in combatting 
cybercrime in terms of prevention, prosecutions, 
convictions or other measures 
Cybercrime presents numerous challenges for traditional criminal law and the criminal 
justice system in general (Calderoni, 2010). A number of these challenges are 
highlighted below. They include (1) obstacles associated with unclear definitions; (2) the 
impact of complex cybercrime on effective detection, investigation and prosecution of 
cybercrimes by law enforcement; and (3) jurisdiction challenges.  
The first challenge, which is already highlighted at the beginning of this report, is the lack 
of clear and consistent definitions. In respect to legislation, many of the definitions of 
cybercrime are not conducive to legal interpretation and legislators do not always do a 
good job at defining terms (Shinder, 2002; See also Clough 2012 for an expanded and 
internationally situated discussion on this.). Sometimes legislators do not even define key 
terms, as evident in the Criminal Damage Act 1991, leaving the court to interpret such 
terms (Chawki, 2005). Many of the terms used within the Criminal Damage Act 1991, 
such as ‘operate’ and ‘computer’ were not defined, leading Murray (1995) to argue that 
the Act may be unconstitutionally vague. This issue has been somewhat alleviated by the 
Criminal Justice (Offences relating to Information Systems) Act 2017 as well as the 2013 
EU Directive on attacks against information systems which aims to harmonise definitional 
understanding across EU Member States to aid cross-border cooperation. However, 
there are some terms within the Criminal Justice (Offences relating to Information 
Systems) 2017 Act that remain undefined. For example, the offence of hacking requires 
the ingredient of ‘reasonable excuse’, yet ‘reasonable excuse’ is not defined in this 
legislation (Harnett & Timon, 2018). While this may be positive if courts take a broad 
view, equally it can be significantly limiting if narrow interpretations are taken. By working 
to more deeply address such legislative vagueness in the Irish legal system, some of the 




A second challenge relates to the nature of cybercrimes given that they are often 
complex and can be unfamiliar to those within the criminal justice field.  Holt & Bossler 
(2015), albeit in the context of sex offenders and content-offences, questioned the extent 
to which forms of offending fit into the services of organisations such as probation and 
social workers. Similar questions are likely to be relevant in respect to cyber-dependent 
crime. This can directly impact the ability to effectively implement legislation and criminal 
justice related responses. Two key elements are required to respond to this challenge. 
The first relates directly to legislation. Law enforcement require extensive powers to 
investigate and prosecute complex cases, and legislation needs to provide for this, 
including by aligning with data protection and privacy rights. In the Irish context, the 
Criminal Justice Act 2011 provides for these powers, as mentioned above. However, 
such powers are only effective if properly resourced as highlighted by McIntyre (2015).  
The issue of resourcing with An Garda Síochána specifically relating to cybercrime was 
highlighted in the Future of Policing in Ireland report (2018). It stated “the capacity and 
expertise of the existing Garda National Cyber Crime Bureau should be substantially 
expanded as a matter of urgency, and personnel appointments in that field should be fast 
tracked” (27). It further notes that “An Garda Síochána should further develop its 
cybercrime and cyber security capabilities, including digital forensics. These should be 
centrally led, but with response capacity at appropriate geographical locations” (Future of 
Policing in Ireland report, 2018, 80).  
Investigation and prosecution of cybercrimes require well-trained and knowledgeable 
personnel in the investigation phase, during prosecution, and in courts, coupled with 
effective legislation. Without significant additional resources provided to An Garda 
Síochána, an organisation often reported as having limited resources, the ability to take 
advantage and exercise these additional powers is often limited (Slevin & O’Reilly, 2017).   
A third challenge worth highlighting relates to staff and skills retention and upskilling, as 
highlighted by Whelan and Harkin (2019) and Harkin et al (2018). They identified the 
challenge for the police to retain staff. They noted that when the police train officers in 
digital forensics and cybercrime investigation, they tend to experience significant 
challenges in keeping them in the police, given the opportunities in the private sector. 
Standardised courses like Certified Information Security Professional (CISP) and other 
accreditations are expensive and costly to the state, and the police cannot afford to 
provide such training and then have officers leave. Yet, they find it difficult, if not 
impossible, to match conditions, pay and opportunities in the private sector.  
Whelan and Harkin (2019) and Harkin et al (2018) identified the possibility of bridging this 




Interestingly, this was also identified as a good practice worth exploring with respect to 
An Garda Síochána. A representative from An Garda Síochána noted the use of special 
police officers in the UK who have specific IT skills, and who can be called in as and 
when they are required (Interview, 2020). Another option may be to work with private 
sector professionals to back fill the skills gap, but this too is not without its problems. For 
example, potential clashes between occupational cultures, such as being profit driven, 
management styles, or levels of innovation to privacy issues, and many more. However, 
such challenges illustrate that the nature of the work in this area fundamentally 
challenges the notion of routine police work and police occupational culture.  
The reference to digital forensics by the Commission is worth further noting. The volatility 
of digital evidence is a great challenge in relation to prosecution. Retrieving and ensuring 
integrity of the evidence requires expertise. Furthermore, the nature of electronic data 
“requires sophisticated forensic techniques to ensure its retrieval, preservation and 
validity for use in a criminal trial” (Clough, 2015; 8). As a result, the necessary resources 
of people, technology and training need to be commensurate with the evolution and 
advancement of criminality in this area, coupled with regular legislative updates to ensure 
countries have the necessary authority and skill set to respond to the ever-evolving range 
of cybercrimes that emerge and to bring evidence to court (Clough, 2011).  This rapid 
pace of change within this sector presents challenges. The use of the cyber-kiosks in 
Scotland, as discussed above, was implemented as a direct response to this challenge 
and the process of digital evidence, more generally. As a result, it would be prudent to 
ensure such developments are made mindful of human rights, transparency, coupled 
with public consultation and deliberative democracy.  
As noted by Brenner & Clarke (2005), cybercrimes often occur in a fraction of a second, 
and spread with astonishing speed, never mind the fast pace of technological 
development. Both factors makes it difficult to police and prosecute. As a result, and as 
mentioned above, this is highly likely to require investment of considerable resources for 
An Garda Síochána, prosecutors and the courts to ensure they have the capacity 
necessary to bring cases effectively through the criminal justice system.  
In addition, given that better cooperation between law enforcement bodies and judicial 
authorities across the EU is considered necessary to effectively combat cybercrime, the 
2013 EU Directive on attacks against information systems notes that even more 
adequate training is needed for authorities to enhance their understanding of cybercrime 
and its impact, and to foster cooperation and the exchange of best practices (2013/40/EU 
(28)). In particular, such training should be aimed at raising awareness about the different 
national legal systems, the possible legal and technical challenges of criminal 




(2013/40/EU (28)). Representatives from An Garda Síochána noted that positive 
progress was being made in this regard in Ireland. They noted that considerable 
improvements were noticeable in how the courts in Ireland now deal with cybercrime 
cases (Interview, 2020). It was stated that court staff had received training and improved 
their expertise in this area. They also reported that An Garda Síochána and the Director 
of Public Prosecution office now work closer together to better understand this area. This 
has been helped by participating in joint training. Coupled with the improved learning of 
each other’s activities, requirements and needs, such opportunities were highlighted as 
important for building positive relationships between both organisations (Representatives 
from An Garda Síochána, interview, January 2020).  
The 2013 EU Directive on attacks against information systems also provides that the 
cybercrime investigative capabilities of Member States' law enforcement authorities need 
to be improved too, as well as the understanding of cyber-enabled crimes and 
investigative options by prosecutors and the judiciary. Eurojust and Europol contribute to 
this objective and to enhanced coordination, in close cooperation with specialised 
advisory groups within EC3 and with the networks of chiefs of cybercrime units and of 
prosecutors specialised in cybercrime. The Commission has been due to dedicate EUR 
10.5 million funding to fight cybercrime, primarily under its Internal Security Fund-Police 
Programme. Training is an important element and a number of useful materials have 
been developed by the European Cybercrime Training and Education Group. These 
should now be widely rolled out for law enforcement professionals with the support of the 
European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Training (CEPOL). 
A fourth challenge relates to jurisdiction. Jurisdiction in the area of cybercrime is 
described by some experts as having two distinct components, virtual and geographical, 
both of which present challenges to the effectiveness of legislation. That said, neither are 
mutually exclusive, given that virtual environments are still embedded in physical 
infrastructure. Firstly, the virtual nature of many of the environments in which cybercrimes 
often occur, can result in a direct clash between the “main operational criteria of the 
criminal justice systems, namely sovereignty and the territoriality principle” (Calderoni, 
2010, 3). This requires countries to establish jurisdiction over virtual environments, which 
often requires specific legislation. The second component, geographical, poses similar 
problems, given the cross-border dimension of much of this crime. This makes some 
traditional legislation ineffective. As Clough (2015) notes “criminal law is traditionally 
regarded as local in nature, being restricted to the territorial jurisdiction in which the 
offence occurred. Modern computer networks have challenged that paradigm” (p. 8).  




impediment caused by the lack of harmonisation of legislation, at least in respect to the 
geographical dimension (Clough, 2015).  
In the Irish context, the Criminal Justice (Offences relating to Information Systems) Act 
2017, aims to reduce this challenge by ensuring that the legislation provides for “extra-
territorial effect” for the sections mentioned above. This means that they can be applied 
not only to a person carrying out such activities within Ireland, but also to a person 
located outside Ireland who is accessing data/damaging digital property within Ireland, 
provided that they have been convicted or acquitted abroad in respect to the same 
offence and meet the Act’s requirements. Clough (2011) notes how important it is that a 
country’s jurisdiction over cybercrime is as wide as possible, to ensure no country or 
region becomes a ‘safe haven’ for such activities. However, inconsistency in definitions 
across jurisdictions can make prosecution outside national boundaries difficult (Chawki, 
2005). This is one reason why the EU seeks to harmonise law in this area. The 2013 EU 
Directive on attacks against information systems does not govern conditions for 
exercising jurisdiction over any of the offences referred to in the Directive, such as a 
report by the victim in the place where the offence was committed, a denunciation from 
the State of the place where the offence was committed, or the non-prosecution of the 
offender in the place where the offence was committed (2013/40/EU (20)). That said, the 
Directive does recommend that in the EU the coordination of prosecution of cases of 
attacks against information systems should be facilitated by the adequate implementation 
and application of Council Framework Decision 2009/948/JHA of 30 November 2009 on 
prevention and settlement of conflict of jurisdiction in criminal proceedings (2013/40/EU 
(27)).16  
These factors all present significant challenges for the criminal justice system, from law 
enforcement to the courts, whilst also impacting the effectiveness of legislation. The next 
piece will examine a number of other challenges as they pertain specifically to 
prevention, prosecution, convictions and other measures.   
3 . 4 . 1   P R E V E N T I O N  
Reliance on criminal sanctions should only be one approach to combatting cybercrime. 
While the best form of defence is often prevention, it is often easier said than done. 
Furthermore, such a focus is important given the limited amount of research available 
                                                  
 
 
16 Beyond the EU, the operability of legislation can be contingent on the willingness of nation states to 




with regard to the effectiveness of legal instruments, due to the fact that research in this 
area is in its infancy. That said, research in the area of crime prevention more generally 
is better researched, the learnings of which may be transferable to the area of 
cybercrime. A recent publication by Brewer et al (2019), considers how longstanding, 
traditional crime prevention techniques can be reimagined and applied for an increasingly 
digital world, and it explores how criminology can apply to the digital realm.  
Prevention measures are often achieved through education, training and awareness 
raising rather than through legislation in order to enhance individual and overall 
cybersecurity and resilience. This is the case in Ireland at present as there is little in the 
way of legislation that mandates prevention measures in this area.  The UK Government 
has taken a more proactive approach, starting with Internet companies. The government 
introduced an Online Harms white paper, which extended responsibilities for companies 
whose services are used for illegal activity (HM Government, 2019). The white paper 
recommends that Internet companies that allow “users to share or discover user-
generated content or interact with each other”  should be held responsible for illegal, 
harmful, or otherwise disreputable content appearing on their platforms (HM 
Government, 2019, p11). The white paper states that an independent regulator will 
create ‘codes of practice’ detailing how companies should best deal with each of those 
harms. Those who do not comply, will face fines. These fines will be similar to GDPR 
fines, in that they will be in proportion to their revenues. The paper also goes as far as 
suggesting that the companies may be taken offline, at least in the UK and their 
executives might be prosecuted in civil or criminal court (HM Government, 2019). While 
this does not directly relate to cyber-dependent crimes, it does demonstrate that 
increased responsibility is being expected of Internet companies.  
In a slightly similar vein, the transposition into Irish law of both the NIS Directive and 
GDPR means that Irish individuals and entities will now be held accountable under Irish 
legislation for not meeting their compliance obligations. The introduction of such 
legislative measures may now mean that preventative measures are now more likely to 
be introduced by organisations, thus driving better resilience in the wake of cybercrimes. 
It may be too soon to gauge the effectiveness of these new legislative initiatives on 
prevention.  
There is, however, no specific criminal offence in Ireland for failing to implement 
cybersecurity measures within an organisation or as an individual, at this time. However,   
Section 71 of the Data Protection Act 2018 places a legal obligation on data controllers to 




[T}hat the data shall be processed in a manner that ensures appropriate security of 
the data, including, by the implementation of appropriate technical or organisational 
measures, protection against—(i) unauthorised or unlawful processing, and (ii) 
accidental loss, destruction or damage (64).  
This places a legal imperative on data controllers to prevent data breaches. This should 
thus help to enhance cyber resilience by reducing cybercriminals’ success rate while also 
acting as a deterrent to their future activities because their chances of success may be 
lessened or detection may be higher. While the measures and guidelines that have been 
introduced as a result of the NIS Directive primarily apply to OES and DSP, the 2017 EU 
cybersecurity strategy in recognising that the NIS Directive only covers key strategic 
sectors, considers that logically a similar approach by all stakeholders hit by cyberattacks 
would be necessary to have a systematic assessment of vulnerabilities and entry points 
for cyber attackers. 
The 2013 EU Directive similarly specifies that  
[I]n order to fight cybercrime effectively, it is necessary to increase the resilience of 
information systems by taking appropriate measures to protect them more 
effectively against cyber attacks. Member States should take the necessary 
measures to protect their critical infrastructure from cyber attacks, as part of which 
they should consider the protection of their information systems and associated 
data. Ensuring an adequate level of protection and security of information systems 
by legal persons, for example in connection with the provision of publicly available 
electronic communications services in accordance with existing Union legislation on 
privacy and electronic communication and data protection, forms an essential part of 
a comprehensive approach to effectively counteracting cybercrime. Appropriate 
levels of protection should be provided against reasonably identifiable threats and 
vulnerabilities in accordance with the state of the art for specific sectors and the 
specific data processing situations. The cost and burden of such protection should 
be proportionate to the likely damage a cyber attack would cause to those affected. 
Member States are encouraged to provide for relevant measures incurring liabilities 
in the context of their national law in cases where a legal person has clearly not 
provided an appropriate level of protection against cyber attacks (2013/40/EU (26)).  
3 . 4 . 2   P R O S E C U T I O N   
Several challenges have impacted prosecutions in Ireland. The first offence of hacking 
was successfully prosecuted in July 2013, under the provisions of the Criminal Damage 
Act, 1991. This prosecution was the result of a combined investigation between the 




pertained to the hacking of a political party’s website during the run up to an election.  
There are a number of investigations into denial of service attacks on high profile targets, 
but as of October 2018 these had yet to result in prosecutions.  Furthermore, as of 
October 2018, there has been few if any prosecutions under the Criminal Justice 
(Offences relating to Information Systems) Act 2017 (Harnett & Timon, 2018). The 
representatives from An Garda Síochána highlighted that the lack of convictions under 
the (Offences relating to Information Systems) Act 2017 to date, makes it difficult to 
assess the suitability of the Act (Interview, 2020). Media reports find that those few 
prosecutions which have been successful have been through criminal damage legislation 
(Gallagher, 2019). A number of these challenges in relation to successful prosecution of 
cybercrime are described in more detail below. They include the following: (1) Legislation 
(2) Reporting of cybercrime; and (3) Crime Statistics.  
3 . 4 . 2 . 1  A N A L Y S I S  O N  T H E  I M P O R T A N C E  O F  L E G I S L A T I O N  
Proper legislation is the cornerstone for the investigation and prosecution of cybercrime. 
However, similar to Ireland, many countries use a combination of old legislation (or at 
least not specifically developed to target cyber activities) and specific legislation. This 
approach offers both advantages and disadvantages but is somewhat understandable, 
given that it can take significant periods of time to update national criminal law to 
prosecute new forms of cybercrime.  
This process often involves three phases, which include adjustment to national law, 
identification of gaps in the penal code, and drafting of new legislation (ITU, 2012). 
Existing laws often provide sufficient jurisdiction for traditional crimes perpetrated using 
new cyber tools, reducing the impetus for change. Furthermore, given that this law is 
often familiar territory for both law enforcement and the prosecution, they may find it 
more comfortable to navigate. However, if there is an absence of specific legislation 
relevant to new cybercrimes, criminals can exploit traditional legislation to conduct their 
activities with impunity – for example where crimes that are IoT dependent and new, non-
specific legislation is often limited (Chawki, 2005). Irish policy-makers should ideally 
continue to focus their attention on addressing such gaps that arise in relation to new 
cybercrimes where non-specific legislation is sometimes limited.  
This is exemplified in the Irish context with the Criminal Damage Act, 1991, which it 
should be noted was the first piece of Irish legislation that dealt with crimes against 
computers. It addresses hacking and does so as an act of vandalism. However, this is 
quite a narrow view and fails to account for the more complex collection of activities that 
illicit hacking often involves (Manning, 2016). Furthermore, other crimes involving new 
technologies would have, mostly likely, fallen outside of the scope of this Act; those now 




2017. Maner highlighted the need for specific legislation as early as 1996, arguing that 
cyber technology is "uniquely malleable", "uniquely complex", "uniquely fast" and 
"uniquely cheap" and thus required special and separate consideration. In this case, 
legislators in Ireland should ideally analyse which new technologies and cybercrimes are 
not currently addressed by existing non-specific or specific legislation, and how 
legislation can be implemented in a technology-neutral manner where necessary.   
Specific legislation often has its problems too. For example, each of the offences set out 
in the Criminal Justice (Offences relating to Information Systems) Act 2017 include the 
element that the offence was committed without ‘lawful authority’. Therefore, to achieve a 
prosecution it must be proven that such authority or lawful permission was not given. Like 
any crime where the actus reus must be proven, if this cannot be proven, it can be 
difficult to prosecute. This is one of the reasons to explain why law enforcement tend to 
emphasise the high importance of preventative measures and the development of 
innovative means to prevent this type of cybercrime.   
The 2013 Directive on attacks against information systems explains that it does not 
impose criminal liability where the objective criteria of the offences laid down in this 
Directive are met but the acts are committed without criminal intent, for instance where a 
person does not know that access was unauthorised or in the case of mandated testing 
or protection of information systems, such as where a person is assigned by a company 
or vendor to test the strength of its security system. Legislation should ensure that it 
facilitates this type of work and that of security researchers to enhance the security of 
information systems and networks. The Ministry of Justice in the UK provides a good 
resource and guidance around vulnerability disclosures, in their Vulnerability Disclosure 
Policy. Something of this nature may be helpful in an Irish context, but there are different 
interpretations on how this should be best achieved. Brown, Edwards and Marsden 
(2009) highlight that vendors and major organisations like Google and Microsoft take the 
view that it is best practice for those who identify software vulnerabilities in their systems 
to immediately report them directly to these organisations, so that corrective action can 
be taken. Others argue, however, that they should first be reported to CSIRTs. 
In the context of the 2013 Directive, contractual obligations or agreements to restrict 
access to information systems by way of a user policy or terms of service, as well as 
labour disputes as regards the access to and use of information systems of an employer 
for private purposes, should not incur criminal liability where the access under such 
circumstances would be deemed unauthorised and thus would constitute the sole basis 
for criminal proceedings. This Directive is without prejudice to the right of access to 
information as laid down in national and Union law, while at the same time it may not 




In addition, the 2013 Directive specifies that given the different ways in which attacks can 
be conducted, and given the rapid developments in hardware and software, it refers to 
tools that can be used in order to commit the offences laid down in this Directive 
(2013/40/EU (16)).  Such tools could include malicious software, including those able to 
create botnets, used to commit cyber attacks. Even where such a tool is suitable or 
particularly suitable for carrying out one of the offences laid down in this Directive, it is 
possible that it was produced for a legitimate purpose. Motivated by the need to avoid 
criminalisation where such tools are produced and put on the market for legitimate 
purposes, such as to test the reliability of information technology products or the security 
of information systems, a direct intent requirement that those tools be used to commit 
one or more of the offences laid down in this Directive must be also fulfilled. 
The 2017 EU Cyber strategy explains that effective investigation and prosecution of 
cyber-enabled crime is a key deterrent to cyber attacks. It finds, however, that today's 
procedural framework is not fit for purpose where, for instance, the speed of cyber 
attacks can overwhelm our procedures, as well as creating particular needs for swift 
cooperation across borders. To this end, as announced under the European Agenda on 
Security, the Commission published draft legislation to facilitate cross-border access to 
electronic evidence on 17 April 2018 (Jeppesen & Nojiem, 2018). In February 2019, the 
European Commission proposed to start international negotiations on cross-border 
access to electronic evidence, necessary to track down dangerous criminals and 
terrorists (European Commission, website – following European Council Conclusions 
from October 2018).17 If agreement is reached, an amendment to the Budapest 
Convention would be required (European Commission, 2019b). In parallel, the 
Commission is implementing practical measures to improve cross-border access to 
electronic evidence for criminal investigations, including funding for training on cross-
border cooperation, the development of an electronic platform to exchange information 
within the EU, and the standardisation of judicial cooperation forms used between 
Member States.  
Establishing intent and challenges in evidence sharing make it very difficult to attribute 
blame to offenders, which in turn impacts the ability to prosecute and convict individuals. 
As Brenner (2012) notes “the elimination of physical constraints and the alteration or 








elimination of identity combine to erode the efficacy of the traditional law enforcement 
model, which nation-states use to enforce their criminal laws” (139). 
Another obstacle to effective prosecution, which is specified within the 2017 EU Cyber 
Strategy, is the different forensic procedures for the gathering of digital evidence in 
cybercrime investigations across Member States. Representatives from An Garda 
Síochána noted such challenges, and also highlighted that the borderless nature of 
cybercrime and the use of cloud storage can make it difficult to access data, even if 
companies reside within the nation, but hold their data elsewhere. This was also 
experienced by the representative from the corporate consultancy firm, who noted the 
challenges that the jurisdiction and cloud storage can have on investigations. Such 
issues have also been highlighted in the research of Koops & Goodwin (2014), who 
noted that the cloud reinforces challenges in relation to gathering digital evidence for 
criminal investigations. They, like the representatives of An Garda Síochána noted that 
mutual legal assistance can be inadequate in this area. As a result, their research looked 
at “legality of cross-border access to data under international law under the core 
principles of territorial integrity and non-interference” (abstract). They suggest that the 
widely accepted interpretation of international law is that accessing data stored on a 
foreign server without the prior consent of that state is a breach of territorial integrity of 
that state. Furthermore, they note that it is not a defence to state that the location of data 
was unclear or unknown. As a result, Koops & Goodwin (2014) argue that substantial 
work is required to develop shared basis of common understanding in this area, an 
observation also made by the representative from a corporate consultancy firm 
(Interview, February, 2020).  
Koops & Goodwin (2014) note that framing cyberspace as a more abstract ‘space’, rather 
than as a physical ‘place’ that is controlled like territory, may be helpful. They suggest 
that this might look like “a new international or widely shared multilateral legal instrument 
that allows narrowly defined and strongly safeguarded forms of cross-border cyber-
investigations” (abstract). Given that this is likely to take time, they also offered a shorter 
term alternative, whereby “some states — early adopters — could start creating and 
enhancing the legitimacy of unilateral actions that are narrowly defined, transparently 
conducted, and strongly safeguarded, by advancing an alternative account of sovereignty 
in cyberspace” (abstract). Interestingly, they identified the principle of open skies as a 
possible example and suggested that states might consider a new, and similar, principle 
of ‘open cyberspace’ in the context of cross-border access to data. This is a highly 
contestable approach, which is far from certain and much work needs to be conducted on 




3 . 4 . 2 . 1  R E P O R T I N G  O F  C Y B E R C R I M E  
Another aspect that negatively impacts the effectiveness of legislation in this area, relates 
to reporting. Manning (2016), amongst others, notes that cybercrime is under-reported 
and under-recorded. If cases are not reported, then prosecutions are unlikely, if at all 
possible. Kabay (2001) noted, as far back as 2001, but still relevant today, that   
[E]ven if attacks are detected, it seems that few are reported in a way that allows 
systematic data collection.  This belief is based in part on the unquantified 
experience of information security professionals who have conducted interviews of 
their clients; it turns out that only about ten percent of the attacks against computer 
systems revealed in such interviews were ever reported to any kind of authority or to 
the public”(3).    
Such a lack of reporting is still an issue of concern in the Irish context, and one 
highlighted in the Future of Policing in Ireland report. It notes that cybercrimes often go 
unreported, and that the crime statistics in Ireland do not reflect the rapid development of 
Internet crimes. The result being that there is no full picture on the degree or extent of the 
problem. Representatives from An Garda Síochána also confirmed this issue, noting that 
cybercrimes may be underreported to a greater degree than other crimes (Interview, 
2020). This is in line with the findings of McGuire & Dowling (2013), who note a similar 
pattern in the UK. However, this is hard to prove without research. It was highlighted that 
reporting cybercrime to the GNCCB is largely based on knowledge of the work of the 
unit, or a personal contact with a member of the unit (Representatives from An Garda 
Síochána, interview, January 2020). It was suggested that reporting at the local or district 
level is less common.  
Representatives from An Garda Síochána purported that if more people reported such 
crimes, there would be a knock-on effect whereby more cases would be investigated; 
more learning would be achieved from reviewing increased cases; more cases would 
likely go towards prosecution; more convictions would be achieved; more public attention 
would be received, which would serve to influence further reporting and greater 
awareness, and the circle would begin again (Representatives from An Garda Síochána, 
interview, January 2020). It was explained, however, that this would require greater 
resources, but the benefits would outweigh the costs, as it would ideally help reduce 
cases due to greater awareness. One of the first key steps to overcome this challenge 
does however relate to improving citizens awareness that they have been a victim of 
crime in the first place (Representatives from An Garda Síochána, interview, January 
2020). They also noted that SMEs do not often understand that a crime has occurred 




It should be noted that this is not unique to Ireland. The National Crime Agency in the UK 
have identified underreporting as a ‘serious problem’, noting that it negatively impacts 
prosecution. Moreover, Hull, Eze and Speakman’s (2018) research supports the need for 
increased awareness to improve reporting, noting that they found that the issue of 
underreporting can be influenced by businesses’ lack of awareness of the attack or due 
to a fear of reputational damage if they report. McGuire & Dowling (2013) also found 
similar patterns in relation to individuals, finding that underreporting was also due, in part, 
to individuals not understanding the nature of cybercrime.  Another but related issue in 
this regard, emerged from the British government’s paper titled ‘A Call to Action: The 
Cyber Aware Perception Gap. This was produced in conjunction with BritainThinks and 
Cyber Aware. The report summarised key research and identified “a large and growing 
gap between the nature of the threat, and public perceptions” (HM Government, 2018, p 
5). They found that both the public and SMEs vastly underestimate the risk of 
cybercrime, whilst also feeling powerless to protect themselves against it.   The 
representatives from An Garda Síochána noted that SMEs do not report such crimes 
because their main priority is to keep their businesses up and running when such crimes 
occur. Furthermore, those that do, often only do so because they want to comply with 
internal or regulatory reporting requirements (Representatives of An Garda Síochána, 
interview, January 2020). 
In the Irish context, organisations are encouraged by the NCSC and An Garda Síochána 
to report both cybercrime incidents and cybersecurity issues. The NCSC recommends 
that those who think they have been victim of a cybercrime should report it to An Garda 
Síochána. This can be done by reporting said crime to a local Garda Station or to the 
GNCCB. Interestingly, representatives from the financial institutions noted that reporting 
can be difficult, and burdensome. A more streamlined, easier process would be likely to 
improve reporting, which in turn would improve national statistics, which in turn would 
provide more insights and information about patterns and trends (Representatives from 
the financial sector, interview, January 2020). An Garda Síochána echoed this, and 
identified the Action Fraud Online Reporting Platform in the UK, which is available to 
businesses for reporting cybercrimes. It was noted that if a similar platform were to be 
implemented in Ireland, reporting would likely increase as the system of reporting would 
be streamlined and made easier (Representatives from An Garda Síochána, interview, 
January 2020).  Australia has a similar model, called the Australian Cybercrime Online 
Reporting Network (ACORN). This is a national online facility that receives cybercrime 
reports from members of the public. It also acts as a repository for information for 
Australian law enforcement agencies and provides crime prevention advice to the public, 
which is believed to have been effective in improving law enforcement response to 




To centralise the reporting of cybersecurity related issues, the Government established a 
CSIRT. However, the CSIRT currently provides “incident response services to 
Government bodies and Critical National Infrastructure providers across Ireland”, rather 
than to individuals and non-designated CI such as other businesses.  The importance of 
extending domain CSIRTs was highlighted by the representative from the Banking & 
Payments Federation Ireland (BPFI), who said it may be worth considering the 
development of a Financial Services CSIRT, and even going as far as embedding 
representatives from the financial sector in the NCSC (Representative from BPFI, 
interview, January 2020).  
CSIRT-IE also acts as a national point of contact for international partners who wish to 
inform Irish-based entities of cybersecurity matters which may affect them” (National 
Cyber Security Centre, 2019). The scope of CSIRT-IE’s activities covers prevention, 
detection, response and mitigation services to Government departments and core state 
agencies. Its responsibilities include:  
 Monitoring incidents at a national level; 
 Providing early warning, alerts, announcements and dissemination of 
information to relevant stakeholders about risks and incidents; 
 Responding to incidents; 
 Providing dynamic risk and incident analysis and situational awareness; 
 Participating in the CSIRTs network. 
 Prosecution (National Cyber Security Centre, 2019). 
Reporting cybersecurity incidents and cybercrimes when they occur or are detected, 
means that CSIRTs can provide warnings and alerts to other potential victims and in 
some way help to prevent further victimisation. Greater insights can also help link crimes 
and in so doing help direct investigations towards prosecution. The identification and 
reporting of threats and risks posed by cyber attacks and the related vulnerability of 
information systems is a pertinent element of effective prevention of, and response to, 
cyber attacks and to improving the security of information systems (2013/40/EU (12)). 
Providing incentives to report security gaps could add to that effect. Member States 
should endeavour to provide possibilities for the legal detection and reporting of security 
gaps (2013/40/EU (12)). Consideration of introducing a formal bug bounty programme, 
whereby individuals are compensated and recognised for reporting bugs, especially 
those related to security exploits and vulnerabilities, could be made, either within 




to develop this. However, this too should be well thought through in respect to what is 
legally possible. For example, the Ministry of Justice in the UK cannot offer a paid bug 
bounty programme. However, they do try to show “appreciation to security researchers 
who take the time and effort to investigate and report security vulnerabilities to us 
according to this policy wherever we can” (Gov.UK, 2020). 
 
3 . 4 . 2 . 3  C R I M E  S T A T I S T I C S  
There is, in addition, a need to collect comparable data on the offences laid down in the 
2013 EU Directive (24). Relevant data should be made available to the competent 
specialised Union agencies and bodies, such as Europol and ENISA, in line with their 
tasks and information needs, in order to gain a more complete picture of the problem of 
cybercrime and network and information security at Union level and thereby to contribute 
to formulating a more effective response. Member States should submit information on 
the modus operandi of the offenders to Europol and EC3 for the purpose of conducting 
threat assessments and strategic analyses of cybercrime in accordance with Council 
Decision 2009/371/JHA of 6 April 2009 establishing Europol.  
An Garda Síochána provide input to Europol’s annual Internet Organised Crime Threat 
Assessment (IOCTA) report (Representative from An Garda Síochána, Interview January 
2020). Providing information can facilitate a better understanding of present and future 
threats and thus contribute to more appropriate and targeted decision-making on 
combating and preventing attacks against information systems. Article 14 of the 2013 EU 
Directive does in fact require Member States to have a system in place for the recording, 
production and provision of statistical data on offences referred to in the Directive, 
including data on the existing number of offences, and the number of persons prosecuted 
for and convicted of these offences. Member States shall transmit the data collected 
pursuant to this Article to the Commission.  
However, it was highlighted by the Representative from the Central Statistics Office that it 
can be very difficult to harmonise data across jurisdictions and to meet the reporting 
requirements in relation to EU Directives and other bodies, because no one organisation 
can really supply all the figures. For example, the data is usually held by organisations 
from both the private and public sector, and there is often no compulsion or legal 
obligation on the private sector to supply it. It was noted that this is not only a problem for 
Ireland. In short, there does not currently seem to be a complete picture on the level of 




Despite these challenges, it is the role of the European Commission to ensure that a 
consolidated review of the statistical reports is published and submitted to the competent 
specialised Union agencies and bodies. For similar reasons, there could be value in 
publishing the data that is collected and recorded at national level in Ireland by An Garda 
Síochána in order to drive the development of better solutions based on informed 
statistics (if other government entities possess additional data on cybercrimes, this might 
also need to be considered in this instance). Over the past number of years, the UK has 
worked considerably hard to introduce questions that measure cybercrime rates on the 
Crime Survey for England and Wales. These have been trialled and are running for a 
couple of years now. This process is one that the Irish government - if including the 
collection of this data is within its priorities - could learn from and simplify the process. 
Crime surveys have now long replaced police recorded crime as being the most accurate 
measure of crime rates given that they provide insights into unreported crimes (Lohr, 
2019). It should be noted that is dependent, of course, on a good quality survey. Applying 
a similar approach may be a step in the right direction. The Scottish Household survey 
under its digital section has introduced questions on cybersecurity behaviours to 
establish the prevalence of these behaviours across the population. The UK’s NCSC has 
also commissioned work of this nature. The introduction of questions like these into 
nationally representative services could go a long way towards informing the 
development of efficient and effective cybersecurity in Ireland.  
In more recent times, Europol’s EC3 reports explain that, from a law enforcement 
perspective, the most pertinent steps that OES and DSP are obliged to take because of 
the NIS Directive is the obligation to notify the relevant CSIRT of any security incident 
having a significant impact on service continuity without undue delay. Whether or not this 
means that more complaints will reach law enforcement remains to be seen (EC3, 2018). 
Moreover, there is a chance that with tighter controls on data and less data available, this 
will make what data can be obtained by criminals even more valuable (EC3, 2018). With 
the EU GDPR coming into effect in May 2018, the reporting of data breaches is now also 
a legal requirement across the EU, bringing with it significant fines.   
Such statistical data should ideally assist better future analyses of the effectiveness of 
legislative initiatives such as those outlined at national level in Ireland and beyond by 
providing metrics that examine, for example, whether the introduction of penalties for 
criminals has led to sufficient deterrence of cybercrime, or obligations to enhance 
cybersecurity and resilience have in fact led to a reduction in cybercrime activities.   
The way in which cybercrime statistics are arrived at in Ireland is useful to examine. 
Official figures are based on those reported to An Garda Síochána, and subsequently 




public authorities, so it provides the official figures. Its role is to impartially collect, 
analyse and make available statistics about Ireland’s people, society and economy. In 
relation to crime statistics, much of the information originates from an extract of data from 
An Garda Síochána’s PULSE data. This is provided to the CSO on a quarterly basis 
(Representative from the CSO, Interview December 2019). The data provided within this 
extract is a subset of what is available on PUSLE. The information provided has three 
key variables: incident type; date reported; and the station where the crime is reported or 
has taken place. The incident type is the classification of the incident by An Garda 
Síochána.  The CSO have no input into this. However, it was highlighted by the CSO 
Representative that it is evident that those within AGS who are now creating these 
categorisations are looking internationally, to ensure their classifications align with 
international best practices (Interview, December 2019). This is welcomed by the CSO, 
as they plan to move to the International Crime classification system in the medium to 
long term. Currently, the CSO use the Irish model. 
Once the incidents are received from AGS they are mapped against their own criminal 
classification systems. The incident type does not specifically link to a specific piece of 
legislation, albeit on occasion, the data provided may contain information on charges or 
summons, which in turn often contain information on offence code or offence description 
if charged (Representative from the CSO, Interview December 2019). Therefore, in the 
majority of cases, it is currently not be possible to answer questions relating to breaches 
of specific legislation. It is worth noting that the categorisation of fraud has recently 
changed, with additional sub-types added, which has impacted the recording of 
cybercrime cases. A number of new incidents types were added, including for example, 
assessing interference in IT systems (Representative from the CSO, Interview December 
2019). That said, the CSO never provide a breakdown of fraud offences because it is 
difficult to provide an objective breakdown, as the information needed is not often there 
to drill down to that level of specificity. Furthermore, they are also not in a position to 
provide statistics in relation to all technology related cybercrime affecting businesses 
here or the number of convictions in respect of same, as the CSO do not compile or 
publish any statistics using the description ‘cybercrime’ at present. A question of this 
nature was asked in PQ 26508/17. The response noted that the relevant categories of 
recorded crime are not disaggregated along these lines and therefore the information in 
question is not displayed in the official CSO crime statistics publications. It was also 
noted that AGS were also not in a position to provide specific information in respect to 
cyber-enabled and cyber-dependent crime, because as mentioned above, incidents are 
recorded on a Pulse basis on the type or category of crime committed, not on the offence 




that some cybercrimes were recorded, at least at that time, on PULSE under the general 
heading of 'Criminal Damage' using the sub-heading 'Unauthorised Accessing of Data'.  
Other challenges that negatively impact the reporting and recording of cybercrime 
incidents will be further discussed in the next section. It is evident that the legislation in 
Ireland, while improved, is not sufficient in of itself to tackle cybercrime because it is only 
one tool in the toolkit, which includes several non-legislative measures to combat 
cybercrime. Given that legislation alone is not sufficient to responding to the threats 
posed by cybercrime, the next section will consider additional non-legislative models of 




Section 4: What are the models of best 
practice for responding to the threat of 
cybercrime nationally and internationally?  
4.1 Non-Legislative Models of Best or Good Practice 
Reliance alone on the deterrent effect of criminal legislation is not a sufficient response to 
cybercrime. Effective and appropriate policies and practices are needed to help in 
safeguarding against risk and related harms. Similar to traditional crime prevention, such 
responses can be broken down into three categories: (1) Raising Awareness; (2) Target 
Hardening; and (3) Situational Prevention. This section of the report is structured around 
these three categories. The section then ends with a discussion on finding a balance 
between tackling cybercrime, while protecting human rights.  
4 . 1 . 1  M E A S U R I N G  S U C C E S S  
There is evident dissent about the nature of best or good practice in the area of 
cybercrime. Generally speaking, best or good practice is a method or technique that is 
widely accepted as superior to other alternatives because the results it produces are 
more impactful in a positive sense to those achieved by other methods. In so doing, the 
best or good practice becomes the standard way of doing things. In more scientific 
environments, best or good practices are determined based on rigorous evaluation. 
However, such standard practices are not widespread in this area of cybercrime. As 
noted by Professor David Wall, University of Leeds, there is a problem with finding 
agreement as to what constitutes good practice in this field (Prof. Wall, interview 
December 2020).  He notes some key factors that influence this situation, namely a lack 
of awareness of what and how things might work; the lack of funding to experiment, 
review and evaluate existing practices; and the lack of willingness of some organisations 
to make themselves and their practices open to external scrutiny because of a desire to 
be seen to be on top of things. A representative from Europol echoed this lack of 
systemised best practices (Europol representative, interview, December, 2019). 
Notwithstanding, he purported that Europol continuously tries to develop and test 
practices and build on those that are found to be effective. This is conducted through a 
constant process of review (Europol representative, interview, December 2020).  Europol 
strives to build on effective actions and develop their practices as they pertain to their 
support for EU Member States and requirements. The example provided here of 
Europol’s processes to identify and build upon known good practices could be further 
examined and possibly implemented at national level by Irish law enforcement and 




Despite little formal agreement of what constitutes good practice in this field, this section 
of the report reviews a range of activities at the individual, organisational, national and 
international level that academics and/or practitioners often consider to be good practice. 
This is based both on a literature review and through interviews conducted for the 
purpose of this report. Few of the models mentioned in this report have been rigorously 
assessed with regard to success and therefore it can be difficult to determine which 
models are successful without using an arbitrary assessment. Unfortunately it is beyond 
the scope of this review to evaluate the merits of categorisation for good practice given to 
the examples discussed, but the report does try to present the negative as well as 
positive aspects of these activities. In addition, it is worth noting that local and contextual 
contingencies usually need to be considered when evaluating a model, as these factors 
often play an influential role. As a result, importing a model from one area to another 
directly is rarely effective, without proper consideration of these underlying and potentially 
influencing factors. 
PWC (2019) in the Global Technology Risk Management Study questions what ‘good’ 
looks like, which is echoed in academia, in this area, where there is a gap in the research 
as to what works. However, Brewer et al (2019) in their recent publication, Cybercrime 
Prevention Theory and Applications, try to address this question. This is an important 
contribution to the field given that the sociological/criminological study of cybercrime is 
still quite small. Much of the research dedicated to cybersecurity has related to the purely 
technical and there are few, if any, studies that focus on offenders and recidivism. 
Moreover, studies of punishment and penology more generally has yet to get to grips 
with cyber-dependent offending, but undoubtedly has something to offer. Increased 
research in this area may be timely.  
The lack of ability to measure success, or the absence of evaluation mechanisms with 
strategies is noted by ENISA. The agency now recommends as good practice, that 
nations include mechanisms on evaluation in their strategies, and adjust them to ensure 
continuous improvement. ENISA has also published an evaluation framework in 2014. 
The UK national cybersecurity strategy for the period out to 2021, for example, includes 
references to metrics and the Scottish Cyber-resilience strategy also contains useful 
performance indicators and outcomes against which progress can be measured.  
That said, reviews of organisations, bodies, or companies often take place, whether they 
are conducted internally or externally. This can be illustrated in the Irish context by the 
Comptroller and Auditor General (C&AG) review of the NCSC. However, while such 
reviews are important, they are often not measuring success at the granular level that is 




overall outcome achieved. This is a further limitation in assessing what works well and 
what does not.  
Another significant factor for why there is limited evaluation at the required level of 
granularity, therefore making success hard to measure, is the lack of reliable and 
consistent statistics in this area, as discussed in the previous section. It is difficult to 
conduct effective research if the data is not available. In addition, there is often a lack of 
consistency in methodologies used when research is actually conducted, which makes it 
difficult to compare findings across studies, which further impacts the ability to measure 
the prevalence of cybercrime effectively (McIntyre, 2015).  
That said, some have tried to provide structured mechanisms to measure success in 
relation to crime more generally. For example, the report titled ‘Improving the Criminal 
Justice System – lessons from local change projects’ jointly published in the UK by the 
Prosecution Service Inspectorate, the Inspectorate of Constabulary, Inspectorate of 
Probation and the National Audit Office. This report “draws out good practice lessons 
from three such projects. In order to provide a degree of focus, all of the projects cover 
the ‘front-end’ of the CJS – that is to say, crime reduction or, where a crime has been 
committed, the process from arrest to sentencing in court. The projects were chosen 
because they had achieved some combination of: cost reductions; improvements in 
efficiency and overall performance; and a better service for witnesses and victims of 
crime” (UK Government Publication, 2011, p 6). To determine these good practices, they 
used a standardised framework of management principles drawn from the UK’s National 
Audit Office December 2011 Guide to Initiating Successful Projects and more general 
guidance on project delivery, which ensure consistency across evaluations. Such an 
approach could potentially be applied specifically to cybercrime. 
Currently, An Garda Síochána and other interviewees reported a range of different 
methods used to measure success. For example, developing mechanisms to record 
figures such as the increase in incidents, the number of people impacted, and speed of 
time with which incidents were dealt with and contained. However, for the most part, the 
measurements have more to do with performance and recording, rather than directly 
focused on crime prevention (Interviews, December 2019 and January 2020).  
4.2 Raising Awareness 
Raising awareness of crime is important in the prevention of it. If people understand what 
constitutes a crime, they can take action to prevent them falling victim to such a crime. 




awareness campaigns and increased education, training and upskilling. Good practice 
models in these areas are discussed below.  
4 . 2 . 1  A W A R E N E S S  C A M P A I G N S  
The NIS Directive specifically highlights the need for campaigns relating to awareness of 
cybercrime, across a number of areas. The Directive notes ENISA’s key role in respect to 
awareness-raising and training, while also recommending that awareness raising should 
be a key element of national strategies. It further highlights that EU Cooperation Groups 
should exchange information on awareness raising to share others’ best practice. 
Europol’s annual cybercrime threat assessment (EC3, 2018) similarly echoes the 
benefits of such initiatives. In the European context, examples of awareness raising 
activities include Safer Internet Day, International Youth Day, and European Cyber 
Security Month (ENISA, 2016). Many of these initiatives also take place in Ireland. 
Furthermore, the National Cyber Security Strategy includes a measure relating 
specifically to Public Awareness (Government of Ireland, 2019). 
ENISA (2016) highlights the importance of awareness raising specifically as it relates to 
security threats and vulnerabilities, and their impact on society. This is relevant in relation 
to fighting cybercrime, as increased information and knowledge should help inform both 
individuals and businesses on how to behave and protect themselves against online 
risks. However, a central challenge with this perspective, if viewed in isolation is that it 
assumes simply knowing more will change people’s behaviour, which fails to account for 
the other pressures, pleasures and demands people may prioritise (e.g. streaming a 
show illegally, saving passwords in plain text files, using the same password for 
everything). There are limits to what people will do in the name of security. Essentially, 
more knowledge and awareness may not necessarily mean a safer population.   
That said, there is a significant logic to believing such approaches work. For example, 
Chatterjee, Kar, Dwivedi and Kizgin (2019) research in India found that awareness of 
cybercrimes positively influences the use of technology to prevent cybercrime. Sarre, Lau 
& Chang (2018) found similar results, noting that education in this area with those who 
are most vulnerable is deemed effective. However, it is worth noting that this research 
related to campaigns targeted at specific groups of people. In contrast, the current 
approach in many of the aforementioned activities appear to use a one size fits all model, 
believing the same message fits everyone. As mentioned above, this approach fails to 
take into account that people think differently about these things, and interpret these 
messages in different ways. Bada and Sasse (2014) argue that campaigns need to 
resonate with target groups, and that the intended message needs to resonate locally, 
socially and culturally. This will require greater investment in understanding the current 




with messages that meet their needs. However, a more targeted approach will ensure 
there is less wasted money on generic campaigns and messages directly targeted at the 
‘general public’. The lack of impact of general campaigns may be evident in the Irish 
context, as, representatives from financial institutions note that despite the increase in 
campaigns, people seem more willing to respond to requests for personal information by 
email, phone, or messaging services (Representatives from Financial Institutions, 
interviews, January 2019). This might suggest similar patterns to the research that 
generic campaigns are not working as intended, but this would require further analysis to 
properly assess. 
Nonetheless,  the benefits of providing training to help develop awareness of cybercrime 
issues is highlighted in the research of Singh et al (2013) and Chen et al (2015). This is 
similar to research in the context of behavioural change, where it has been found that 
effectively influencing individuals and changing behaviour requires more than simple 
dictating what they should and should not do. As highlighted by Bada, Sasse and Nurse 
(2019), the “‘provide information and they will use it’ approach does not appear to be 
effective in spreading the message fully or widely enough” in the context of cybersecurity 
(14). They note that people need to accept that the information is relevant to them and 
then understand how they should respond. They then need to want to respond 
accordingly given competing demands, rather than circumventing the security protocols. 
This illustrates that awareness campaigns, although good practice, may not be as 
effective as imagined if not designed in a way that is cognisant of its limitations.  
Furthermore, there is little understanding of the length of time people persist with secure 
behaviours. This is due to a lack of longitudinal data in this area. Yet, in the case of risk 
perceptions, it is known that these are time sensitive, which might suggest that security 
behaviours motivated by increased awareness may be a short term manifestation too. 
Therefore, research with a longitudinal element would be informative and useful.  
There is also a risk that the information provided can act to escalate fear without 
influencing a positive response (Coventry, Briggs, Blythe, & Tran, 2014). As a result,  
researchers have argued that such campaigns should be developed cognisant not to 
create a climate where victims become the blamed and the environment becomes hostile 
to them, lessening their ability to seek support or to report (Button and Cross, 2017; 
Horgan, 2019). Messages need to be designed to be sensitive and nurture a supportive 
security culture, rather than one that creates a sense of scapegoating and stigma. 
Horgan (2019) in his research notes that cybersecurity messages that focus on 
individuals, and fail to build communities of supportive local social networks who can 
share better knowledge and practices are likely to be limited. Rather they should be 




(Horgan) also purports that by promoting this kind of social context and culture of 
empathy, vulnerable users may be less put off or alienated by security messages they 
struggle to understand, citing older users for instance. 
Interestingly, it was noted in the interviews with the financial institutions that cybercrime 
and related cybersecurity measures are routinely framed with a technical focus, thereby 
alienating people from the discussion, potentially further victimising them. The financial 
institutions highlighted the importance of using simple and plain language when speaking 
about threats and risks to help people engage more with the issue. The representative 
from a corporate consultancy firm also highlighted the need to use language which 
people can relate to and understand (Interview, February, 2020). The merits of such an 
approach is reinforced in the research literature that calls for a non-technical approach to 
fighting cybercrime, and one that looks at the human factor in cybercrime and 
cybersecurity (Leukfeldt, 2017). While this agenda does not dismiss the role of the 
technical sciences in answering the research questions in this area, it rather looks to 
complement this approach by adding the perspective that cybercrime remains a human 
activity, and therefore warrants greater examination of this human element. 
Briggs, Blythe, & Tran (2014) state that “knowledge and awareness is a prerequisite to 
change but not necessarily sufficient and must be implemented in conjunction with other 
influencing strategies” (19). The UK’s Government Office for Science conducted research 
in this area, more specifically researching into ‘Using behavioural insights to improve the 
public’s use of cyber security best practices’ (Coventry, Briggs, Blythe, & Tran, 2014). 
Coventry, Briggs, Blythe, & Tran (2014) found that in this context “the vast majority of 
messages are general and do not target a particular behaviour or group but attempt to 
address all simultaneously” (14). They state that research suggests that the success of 
awareness campaigns are more likely if they are multifaceted and supplemented with (1) 
Concurrent community programmes; (2) Policy and law changes; (3) Readily available 
products and services to support the target behaviours; (4) Tailored messages for 
specific audiences; (5) Messages being built-in to many different delivery mechanisms; 
and (5) Role models and champions exhibiting the behaviour (14). 
The National Cyber Security Strategy (2019-2024) of Ireland does include a number of 
activities relating to information and awareness campaigns. It states that the Government 
will “develop a national cyber security information campaign which will use information 
provided by the NCSC and the Garda National Cyber Crime Bureau and be delivered by 
entities which are directly engaged in information provision” (Government of Ireland, 
2019; p. 48). The aim of the campaign is to improve societal awareness around common 
cyber risks and will also include more targeted awareness campaigns aimed at 




targeted campaigns is in line with Coventry, Briggs, Blythe, and Tran (2014) 
recommendation that messages should be tailored for specific audiences. Two specific 
actions to achieve this that have been highlighted within the new NCSS include (1) 
supporting the continued inclusion of cybersecurity elements in Webwise programmes 
and (2) developing a public awareness campaign to include information on cybersecurity 
and cybercrime prevention.  
This is likely to require a challenge of the status quo as general awareness campaigns 
have been commonly used in this space for some time. A representative from Europol 
explains that although Europol’s role relates largely to the support of investigations in the 
EU Member States, the agency does try to help in the areas of cybercrime prevention 
and awareness raising. They do this through awareness raising campaigns, and working 
in conjunction with their network of law enforcement and private sector partners to ensure 
the campaign reaches the widest possible audience (Europol Representative, interview, 
December 2019). These campaigns are also available in multiple languages, which is EU 
funded and promoted by private sector partners in order to further enhance the reach of 
such campaigns. The BPFI have been one of these contributors and supporters 
(Representative from BPFI, interview, January 2020). Europol awareness campaigns 
were cited in a positive light by other experts interviewed for this report. One specific 
campaign that was highlighted as a good example is the Europol ‘Say No’ campaign 
related to raising awareness on online sexual coercion and extortion affecting minors. An 
Garda Síochána noted that they contribute content into these campaigns and in turn use 
the materials to supplement their own material (Interview, 2020), as did the BPFI 
(Representative of BPFI, interview, January 2020). By way of further examples, the 
United Kingdom’s National Crime Agency also actively uses information campaigns. One 
very effective campaign has been their campaign to raise awareness of Sextortion.  
While such praise is welcomed, the important element of any campaign is that it 
resonates with the target audience and brings about change, as identified in the research 
above – even though there are challenges with reaching such audiences.  
The findings in the interviews very much echoed the academic literature in this area with 
respect to the need for targeted campaigns and challenges such campaigns can pose. 
While the benefits of general campaigns such as those conducted by EC3, at the 
national level, or through the BPFI’s own ‘Fraud Smart’ campaign, were acknowledged, 
there was agreement that more targeted campaigns are needed (Representative from 
the BPFI and An Garda Síochána, Interviews, January 2019). Money mules were 
highlighted as an example of a group who may benefit from a targeted campaign, as they 
are often found to use the excuse that they did not know that what they were doing was a 




interviewed representative from the National Crime Agency noted that while such 
campaigns should be public facing, unless conducted directly, he remarked that it is 
difficult to engage with the public, as they often do not see the relevance which can 
reduce campaigns’ impact. He noted that one important question that needs to be asked 
from the outset in making campaigns effective is ‘how to keep people engaged’? 
Furthermore, he noted that there needs to be a strategy of engagement and re-
engagement over time to ensure relevance is maintained, which can be hard to do. This 
may confirm that integrating longitudinal elements, as noted above, has been limited.  
4.2.1.1 Supporting Reporting 
Increased awareness should ideally result in less crime, but also in more reporting. 
However, people will only report when they feel safe to do so. Creating such an 
environment is a pivotal element in awareness raising. Despite the obstacles identified 
above, some campaigns have been successful. The representative from the NCA 
highlighted areas within the criminal justice system where campaigns have been effective 
and played a role in changing the culture around the topics in the campaign. For 
example, drink driving. He noted the need for a cultural change in how cybercrime is 
perceived, suggesting that being victimised by cybercrime is often blamed on the victim 
and not taken as seriously as other more traditional crime. This echoes the research of 
Horgan (2019) and Button and Cross (2017) about victim blaming. For these reasons, 
reviewing the campaigns that have had a last impacting, even if they are in another field, 
could provide learning and ideas for effective campaigns in this area of the fight against 
cybercrime. Furthermore, as awareness campaigns are an integral part of both Irish and 
EU cyber strategies and recommended good practice, behavioural change strategies 
should ideally be an integral part of any awareness campaign in order to increase the 
likelihood that individuals and businesses will in fact act on the advice. One emerging 
area that may indicate that there is also a shift in how messages are framed is illustrated 
by a move towards constructing or considering cybersecurity from a public health 
perspective, and drawing on insights from that domain to enhance public cybersecurity 
more generally.   
4 . 2 . 2  E D U C A T I O N ,  T R A I N I N G  A N D  U P S K I L L I N G   
As noted earlier in the report, education is a key element of best practice in this area and 
is also a mechanism for raising awareness. ENISA (2016) identifies investment in 
cybersecurity related education and more general education in information security 
threats as key to decreasing the risk for businesses and society at large. In this regard, 
under the framework of the Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice 
(CCPCJ), the UNODC launched a cybercrime repository in 2015. This repository is a 




electronic evidence (UNODC Website, 2020b). It acts to assist countries in their efforts to 
prevent and effectively prosecute cybercriminals. This is an excellent resource given that 
many countries are not producing enough trained personnel in this field to meet the 
markets’ demands (ENISA, 2016).  That said, this should not be mistaken for the 
absence of good programmes.  
There are examples of universities that offer programmes in this regard. For example, 
University College Dublin (UCD) has developed the Centre for Cybersecurity and 
Cybercrime Investigations which has a strong reputation for its work on training law 
enforcement from across Europe (rather than education for businesses and individuals).  
That said, it also provides training to non-law enforcement individuals, promoting the 
principles of good practice in forensic analysis in this area. Most non-police students 
comes from organisations that have a remit to enforce legislation, for example the NCSC, 
the Revenue Commissioners or the Central Bank. The centre also works with UNODC, 
OSCE, and Interpol in relation to building capacity across the globe (Representative from 
UCD, interview, January 2020). Not only does the centre provide training, but they also 
offer train the trainer programmes to ensure they leave people with the soft skills to 
develop and train others, in their absence (Representative from UCD, interview, January 
2020).   
Notably, the development of the Masters programme at UCD stemmed from a proactive 
approach from An Garda Síochána when they initially formed a cybercrime capacity in 
the 1990s. The programme initially started as a diploma course but grew into what it is 
today. In the early 2000s, An Garda Síochána with UCD, supported by EU Commission 
funding, conducted a study on the state of play of cybercrime across Europe. The report 
had three key findings, namely the need for increased training resources, formal 
qualifications and Continuous Professional Development, which influenced the evolution 
of the work of the Centre (Representative from UCD, interview, January 2020). The 
European Cyber Crime Training and Education group emerged from this review, with An 
Garda Síochána and UCD founding partners. An Garda Síochána speak very highly of 
the UCD centre, in terms of their training. The benefits in terms of skill and expertise 
development is clear but other benefits are also appreciated. For example, a practical 
benefit of having such formal qualifications helps present someone as an expert witness. 
Secondly, having a dedicated programme for law enforcement means that it is fit for 
purpose and in line with what is needed to investigate and bring a case to court 
(Representatives from An Garda Síochána, interview, January 2020). Whilst having a 
stream for non-law enforcement means the standards are similar across all graduates.  
The centre works to ensure strong relationships between law enforcement and industry, 




approach and the centre’s collaboration with NCSC is in line with ENISA’s (2016) guide 
which states that it is good practice to “establish cooperation with leading academic and 
R&D institutions on new digital forensic techniques” (33). It is believed to be a much 
needed element in developing “new tools for deterring, protecting, detecting, and 
adapting to and against new kinds of cyber attacks” (38).  A number of police forces are 
applying this recommendation to their own organisations, and developing internal R&D 
units, such as in Latvia. A representative from UCD noted that the introduction of an R&D 
component within An Garda Síochána would assist them in being more forward thinking, 
bring new ideas and expertise to the organisation, while also benefiting from researchers 
embedded within the organisation (Representative from UCD, interview, January 2020). 
The EU’s Horizon2020 programme offers opportunities to access funding to support such 
developments (Representative from UCD, interview, January 2020). 
Another example in the Irish context is the work by the Cork Institute of Technology 
(CIT), supported by the IDA, to develop a programme to establish and grow a Cyber 
Security Cluster in Ireland. The cluster aims to include “stakeholders from industry, 
academia and government and will seek to encourage cooperation, raise awareness of 
education and career opportunities, drive innovation and stimulate new business in the 
Cyber Security field” (Government of Ireland, 2019, 4). The NCSC has supported the CIT 
in building and managing the cluster from inception, resulting in the establishment of 
‘Cyber Ireland’ in 2018. Cyber Ireland brings together, industry, academia, and 
government to represent the needs of the cybersecurity ecosystem in Ireland, aiming “to 
enhance the innovation, growth and competitiveness of the companies and organisations 
which are part of the cluster” (Cyber Ireland, 2019).  
In terms of additional examples of training and education in Ireland, at the time of writing, 
Irish universities offer four undergraduate courses in cybersecurity, sixteen postgraduate 
courses with modules in cybersecurity, and eight postgraduate degree courses in 
cybersecurity. A more applied post-graduate education initiative is the ‘Cyber Security 
Skills Initiative’, which was launched by Skillnet Ireland in partnership with the NCSC, 
GNCCB, other agencies and third level institutions in October 2018. As set out in the 
NCSS Consultation document “the core aims of the initiative are to develop awareness, 
bridge the skills gap and to set standards for skills and competencies for Cyber Security 
roles. The three year plan will focus on building training and accreditation in the field to 
address skills gaps, attracting more young people, and in particular women into the 
sector and promoting Continuous Professional Development. Skillnet Ireland estimates 
that the initiative will deliver Cyber Security training to in excess of 5,000 people in the 
industry over the next three years” (Government of Ireland, 2019, 4). This is a good 




Prof. Wall highlighted that the relationship between academia and law enforcement 
should move beyond training to greater collaboration in regard to joint, mutually beneficial 
research. While there are some examples of this already, Wall noted that this has not 
fully happened yet. A number of challenges are evident that impact this area. For one, he 
suggests that such research has to fit into the strategic overview of the police force and 
be useful to them. However, they often have conflicting ideas about what may be useful 
and/or what should be prioritised. There is also the historical tension between academia 
and police research more generally that needs to be overcome.  
Secondly, he reported that from his experience, law enforcement and analysts can be 
fearful if their data is passed outside of their control, as if they are fearful of being caught 
out through external criticism. Thirdly, he also found from personal experience that 
demands for data usually mean additional work for the person tasked to retrieve it, which 
added to their normal workload and could make them reluctant to cooperate fully with the 
request. Finally, he highlighted that police data, often seen as the holy grail of data, is not 
usually fit for purpose for academic researchers. The data demands of practitioners do 
not always map onto the needs of social scientists, so it should not be seen as the key to 
answering all the questions (Prof. Wall, interview, December 2019). 
4 . 2 . 3  U P S K I L L I N G  A N D  T R A I N I N G  F O R  L A W  E N F O R C E M E N T  
Specifically in the context of law enforcement, raising awareness through training and 
upskilling, beyond formal education, is critical. This is hugely relevant in the Irish context 
where An Garda Síochána have a lead role in respect to preventing, investigating and 
prosecuting cybercrime. The first dedicated unit to cybercrime, the Computer Crime 
Investigation Unit was established in 1991 and re-developed in 2017 into the GNCCB. 
The GNCCB is a national unit and is “tasked with the forensic examination of computer 
media seized during the course of any criminal investigations” (An Garda Síochána 
website, 2020). The unit is also responsible for investigating cyber dependent crime. It is 
now made up of all sworn officers, supported by Higher Executives Officers (HEO) and 
Clerical Officers (COs) who coordinate the administrative element of the unit. These non-
sworn officers all have specialised training as they often take the first complaint if a victim 
contacts the unit (Representatives from An Garda Síochána, interview, January 2020). At 
the time of writing, approval has also been given, as part of the ongoing expansion plan 
to recruit four, of the six, approved civilian forensic analysts. The introduction of this skill 
set will be an asset to the unit (Representatives from An Garda Síochána, interview, 
January 2020). 
Over the last number of years, the unit has invested in developing capacity in the regions 
across Ireland. Two pilot regional cyber units were established in the Southern and 




units operate a triage model, which provide tiered response and capability for computer 
forensic services on a Regional basis. These units are staffed by locally-based and 
trained first-responders and cyber triage specialists. In 2019, the Garda Commissioner 
highlighted the additional roll out of satellite hubs across other regions. The organisation 
is now in the latter stages of the development of these satellite hubs. They will be 
centrally managed, and will be tasked and resourced by GNCCB, but will provide 
specialists services out in the regions. To start with, the units will work at a low base rate 
but skills and expertise will build and grow over time and experience (Representatives 
from An Garda Síochána, interview, January 2020). These hubs will triage cases, deal 
with cases they are capable of, and send the more difficult cases to the HQ. This is an 
interesting development as some interviews in the financial sector report that if incidents 
are reported at the local level, the expertise is not always present (Representatives from 
the financial sector, interview, January 2020). That said, training is provided to all 
members, through the Garda Training College, as all members need to be able to take a 
complaint in this area. However, despite this training not all members may feel competent 
to take such reports (Representatives from An Garda Síochána, interview, January 
2020). Holt and Bossler (2015) find that there is often some police cultural resistance, 
due to the fact that cybercrime in the UK and U.S. at least, may not fit easily into the 
image of policing, nor is it routine everyday police work. It would require further analysis 
to see if this is the case in An Garda Síochána. Online training is available to members 
within the organisation (Representatives from An Garda Síochána, interview, January 
2020).  
ENISA (2016) highlights the need for constant upskilling and training for law 
enforcement, especially for digital forensics. This need was echoed by Europol, where 
the interviewed representative noted that training is a main element in EC3 activities in 
close cooperation with CEPOL and the European Cybercrime Training and Education 
Group. Their partners provide some training opportunities which helps to upgrade skills 
and further develop relationships. In return, the existence of EC3 has helped enhance 
the capabilities and effectiveness of law enforcement across Europe (ENISA, 2016). 
However, their existence, does not replace the need for a dedicated capacity at the 
national level which applies to Irish stakeholders involved in this space. ENISA (2016) 
states that it is good practice to “create national cybercrime units (law enforcement and 
judicial authorities)” (33). The establishment of specialised law enforcement units for 
conducting cybercrime investigations/forensics was also highlighted at the Council of 
Europe (COE) Octopus Conference and Budapest Convention 10th anniversary meeting 




A EUROPOL and EUROJUST (2019) report also highlights that developing and 
maintaining specialised expertise across these different stakeholders must occur at the 
same rate. In addition to these units, “countries [should] develop official guidelines for the 
work of those agencies, especially regarding the collection, preservation, examination 
and presentation of digital evidence, in order to have standards and procedures 
compatible with the best practices recognized internationally” (COE, 2011, 109). 
Furthermore, it is good practice to “create a harmonised set of rules for police and judicial 
record-keeping and appropriate tools for statistical analysis of computer crime” (ENISA, 
2016, 33). The lack of such records is a major challenge and barrier to the organisation 
or redistribution of resources effectively. 
Notably, ENISA states the same need in respect to judicial authority staff. For example, 
the agency suggests that it would be beneficial to conduct comparative analysis of the 
requirements for digital evidence at the national level, identify “what mechanisms (digital 
signature) are present or used within each Member State to verify authenticity of 
evidence” (75). They further note that this type of information would be beneficial in 
establishing good practice mechanisms that ensure the usability of such information by 
CSIRTs in legal proceedings (ENISA, 2012). The agency also notes the need for training 
between law enforcement and CSIRTs, including modules on how these stakeholders 
could work better together, where enhanced cooperation between these parties can lead 
to improved outcomes for both agencies. The cooperation between GovCERT.nl and the 
High Tech Crime Unit on the Taurus Botnet Monitoring Project has been provided as an 
example, albeit from 2012 (ENISA, 2012b). The importance of these relationships is 
noted in the National Cyber Security Strategy 2019-2024. In particular, the NCSC and 
GNCCB currently share training and use a co-location model where Garda members are 
seconded to the NCSC. However, it should be noted such aspirations as set out in the 
strategy require resources and funding. Without these the impact will be limited (Yar and 
Steinmetz, 2019; Wall, 2007). As it is, the representatives from An Garda Síochána noted 
that it will be a significant resource burden on An Garda Síochána to second an officer to 
the NCSC (Representatives from An Garda Síochána, interview, January 2020). 
4 . 2 . 4  D i ve r s i o n   
Knowledge of alternative paths away from crime can be key to making the right choices. 
The UK’s National Crime Agency (NCA) reviewed pathways into and out of cybercrime 
based on their database of offenders, with the aim of diverting younger people to more 
productive avenues in which they can develop and explore their interest in computing.   
Although their sample was limited, as it could only use the data from those caught and 
available to them, they presented some interesting points and recommendations around 




piece of work and similar work.  Firstly, the NCA reportedly paid particular focus on 
autism, without a significant empirical basis for the claims they made about or the 
allusions to predispositions, which is potentially harmful in itself. This is likely to be linked 
to the lack of external scrutiny and/or academic oversight of the project. Secondly, it is 
framed around a prevent model that mimics the ideals of prevent proposed in the 
Counter terrorism strategy, which is a highly critiqued and controversial policy in the UK. 
This approach is often criticised for lack of objectivity or scrutiny.  Consideration of joint 
research between academics and operational organisations may have helped reduce the 
impact of such criticism. Academic insights can help in increasing rigour and objectivity. It 
might be beneficial in the case of Ireland to look to joint research projects to mitigate 
such criticism if research in this area is considered.  
4.3 Target Hardening 
In contrast to raising awareness, target hardening is largely about strengthening security 
to protect against a crime. In terms of cybercrime, target hardening is often referred to as 
cyber resilience. Such models include those which involve enhancing cybersecurity 
measures and raising cyber resilience. This section considers good practice 
cybersecurity efforts from the perspective of fighting cybercrime. As defined by Coventry, 
Briggs, Blythe & Tran (2012) cybersecurity is “the protection of globally connected 
electronic data or equipment against criminal, unauthorized or accidental use and the 
technology and processes required to achieve this protection prevent cybercrime” (p 4).  
4 . 3 . 1  E N H A N C I N G  C Y B E R S E C U R I T Y  A N D  C Y B E R  R E S I L I E N C E  T O  
C O M B A T  C Y B E R C R I M E  
At the individual level, much of the research in relation to good practice prevention 
measures relates to individual or organisational routine practices. By way of example, 
resilience building efforts of the NCSC also help to ensure cybercrimes are prevented 
and cybercrime actors are thwarted in their activities at a structural level in order to 
ensure a national level of resilience to mitigate against risk and enhance cyber resilience. 
Removing the opportunity for cyber criminals significantly inhibits their ability to operate 
effectively, thereby reducing the overall risk. 
In the context of individual and organisational measures, Coventry, Briggs, Blythe, & Tran 
(2014)  used behavioural insights to advise of ten best practices everyone should know 
and follow, namely (i) Use strong passwords and manage them securely; (ii) Use anti-
virus software and firewalls; (iii) Always run the latest version of software; (iv) Log out of 
sites after you have finished and shut down your computer; (v) Use only trusted and 
secure connections, computers and devices (including Wi-Fi); (vi) Use only trusted and 




provide the minimal amount of personal information needed for any online interaction and 
keep your identity protected; (ix) Be aware of your physical surroundings when online; 
and (x) Report cybercrimes and criminals to the authorities. These examples solely 
provide an indication of the types of cyber safety measures that individuals can often 
pursue to enhance their own personal cybersecurity, thus enhancing overall cyber 
resilience which can partially help to prevent cybercrime. Two-factor authentication is 
also another highly recommended practice that individuals can take to increase their 
resilience. 
Law enforcement and policy-makers in Ireland can thus continue their ongoing efforts to 
raise the level of cyber hygiene, as part of the response and mitigation efforts in the fight 
against cybercrime. However, as exemplified by more proactive steps taken by the UK 
Government, there is a shift in also moving the burden of responsibility towards Internet 
companies. For example, a recent Online Harms White Paper extends responsibilities for 
companies whose services are used for illegal activity. While this does not directly relate 
to cyber-dependent crimes, it shows that increased responsibility is likely to be expected 
of Internet companies.  
From an organisational perspective, Epps (2017) states that organisations must move 
beyond simple password protection to stronger authentication, such as using a 
combination of cards, tokens and biometrics. Epps (2017) suggests that organisations 
“take advantage of the improved convenience of a mobile strong authentication model” 
(14). He also recommends that organisations “employ a layered IT security strategy that 
ensures appropriate risk mitigation levels” (Epps, 2017, 14). Ross (2018) echoes similar 
advice, especially in the context of increased remote working, noting that in such an 
environment risks are inevitable.18 In that vein, Ross (2018) highlights as a good practice 
the need to educate to ensure people do not work around the security measures in place, 
but rather understand and adhere to them. Therefore, he contends that all employees 
should know and understand the potential threat they could be exposed to, and know 
what to do if they are exposed. Ross (2018) frames this good practice under the theme of 
developing a security culture within organisations. He suggests that organisations 
develop a strong security culture that defines how security influences the work conducted 
by the organisation, its products and services (Ross, 2018).   
                                                  
 
 




However, Stanton et al (2016) highlighted a recognised problem of security fatigue, 
where employee’s work lives are negatively impacted by enhanced security measures, 
resulting in reduced compliance, thereby increasing the risk. As a result, it is important to 
understand how staff members may perceive and interact with polices and processes in 
this area. A representative from a corporate consultancy firm, based on experience 
working directly with clients, noted that it was beneficial to make the content resonate 
personally with employees, as much of the same lessons they learn to protect 
themselves are transferable to their workplace. Furthermore, they added that it was 
important to offer awareness training and support, at the department level, not just the 
organisational level, as a department risk exposure can differ greatly from one to another 
even within the same company. Departments such as Human Resources and Finance, 
and Board Members are often more actively targeted (Representative from a corporate 
consultancy firm, interview, February, 2020). In having a multi-layered approach, 
employees can better understand the relevance of mitigation measures discussed, 
increasing the likelihood of compliance (Representative from a corporate consultancy 
firm, interview, February, 2020).  
Ross (2018) argues that education alone is not enough. He suggests the need for a 
technical component, to ensure a layered approach, which includes elements such as 
device authentication, data encryption and the ability to remotely wipe data from devices, 
if they are lost or stolen. Ross (2018) also highlights the importance of backing up data 
regularly.  That said, Shah, Jones, & Choudrie (2019) find that even though cybercrime is 
quickly evolving and increasing, businesses have been slow to implement such 
prevention strategies. This is echoed in an Irish context, where, for instance, research 
conducted on behalf of Microsoft finds that poor, inconsistent security polices, practices 
and procedures were reported by employees across large and medium organisations in 
the country (Amárach Research, 2019). This lack of implementation of good practice is 
occurring despite an increase in cybercrimes in Ireland. The National Cyber Strategy 
states that “despite an increased level of awareness, Cyber Crime incidents in Ireland are 
increasing with 61% of Irish organisations reported to have suffered cybercrime such as 
Fraud in the last two years with an estimated loss on average of €3.1m” (Government of 
Ireland, 2019, p 18) – note that fraud is not considered to be a cyber-dependent crime for 
the purposes of this report. Further research would be beneficial to determine why this is 
the case, and to what extent it cuts across the public, private and voluntary sectors.  
Nonetheless, many companies in Ireland do take prevention seriously, driven largely by 
two motivations. The first being compliance or regulatory related and the second 
prevention related. While many companies are mindful of audits by organisations such as 




Directive, they also go to extraordinary lengths to prevent against attacks to ensure they 
can maintain their services and protect their customers (Representative from a corporate 
consultancy firm, interview, February, 2020).   
Implementing such high standards of security from the bottom up level of individuals and 
organisations, right up to the state level, help in reducing the collective risk. The NIS 
Directive notes, for example, the inconsistencies across Member States’ level of security 
of network and information systems, and states that “an unequal level of protection of 
consumers and businesses…undermines the overall level of security of network and 
information systems within the Union”. Support is needed to ensure a minimum level of 
cybersecurity. One example of how Ireland is trying to increase the level of protection 
across Irish business, is evident in the NCSC’s document titled ‘12 Steps to Cyber 
Security - Guidance on Cyber Security for Irish Business’. This document sets out a 
suggested activity plan that business can implement on a month-by-month basis over a 
12 month period to improve their cyber resilience (NCSC, 2018).   
Two further examples of this are evident in the UK. The British Government has 
developed the Cyber Essentials and Cyber Essential Certification schemes to provide 
such support. These schemes are provided online by the UK’s National Cyber Security 
Centre. The Cyber Essentials scheme provides advice under five controls that can be 
immediately put in place to take the first steps to implement cybersecurity (UK NCSC 
Website). While the Cyber Essential Certification is the next step under this scheme, 
businesses are informed about the protections they need to have in place. Once these 
are in place, an independent body assesses the company’s cyber security systems and 
provides independent verification (UK NCSC Website). All organisations who want to be 
government contractors must have this certification. Furthermore, the companies who 
complete this scheme get public recognition for the standard of security they achieve. 
This complements the Cyber Growth Partnership, which is a joint industry and 
Government group, co-chaired by the Minister for Culture and The Digital Economy and 
the CEO of BT Group. The partnership was established to support the growth of the UK 
cybersecurity industry (Cyber Essentials Website, 2020).  
The ENISA’s report on ‘NCSS Good Practice Guide, Designing and Implementing 
National Cyber Security Strategies’ (2016) also analyses good practice in the area of 
prevention at these levels. For instance, good practice recommendations that specifically 
relate to providing “incentives for the private sector to invest in security measures” (39). 
In addition to legislative solutions such as the GDPR that mandates businesses to 
maintain certain standards in relation to data protection, ENISA (2016) notes that 
countries can also apply softer approaches to incentivise industry to invest in security 




for Voluntary Organisations (SCVO), with support from the Government, provides a small 
grant scheme to enable third sector organisations to achieve the Cyber Essentials 
accreditation, discussed above. While Innovate UK, with equal funding from the 
Department for Culture, Media and Sport, provide businesses with Cyber Security 
Innovation Vouchers worth up to £5,000 to implement the required cybersecurity and 
resilience measures. Other schemes may come in the form of tax breaks or financial 
subsidies. ENISA highlights Finnish solutions as examples of good practice in this area, 
where direct action by industry against computer-related crime is encouraged. However, 
such approaches also have to be managed and well thought through given the potential 
risks associated with promoting vigilantism.  
Other good practices suggested by ENISA include risk assessments, which should 
ideally be included under national cybersecurity strategies and conducted at the national 
state level (ENISA, 2016). ENISA (2016) states that “risk assessments can provide 
valuable information for developing, executing and evaluating a strategy. The 
assessment can be conducted on different levels. Risks assessment on a national level 
allows gaining a holistic understanding about risks to the nation as a whole” (15). The EU 
agency identifies models in Switzerland and Spain which exemplify good practice in this 
area. ENISA suggests that typical tasks to consider when conducting risk assessments 
include: 
 Agree on a risk assessment methodology to use; if this is not possible, tailor an 
existing one to the specific needs of national and to specific sector risks. 
 Task a national authority or sector-specific authorities with conducting risk 
assessment. 
 Design and follow an approach to risk identification and assessment (e.g. all-
hazard approach). 
 Develop a method for the identification of critical (information) infrastructure 
(ENISA, 2016, 16). 
The results of such assessments provide insights into key areas that need to be targeted 
to reduce the level of risk exposure, thereby prioritising areas where preventative 
activities may be worthwhile. A higher level response is then required to respond to the 




4.4 Situational Prevention 
Situational crime prevention aims to reduce the harms caused by crime by changing 
situational factors in the environments where such crime occurs. In the context of 
cybercrime, this involves creating an environment less conducive to cybercrime. Good 
practices in this context that are considered in this report include the introduction of 
dedicated strategies, investment and improvement in detection and related forensics, and 
cross collaborative effort. These will be discussed in detail below.  
4 . 4 . 1  N A T I O N A L  C Y B E R C R I M E  S T R A T E G Y  
In broad terms, the existence of a national cybersecurity strategy alone may not be 
enough in the context of cybercrime specifically, including the Irish National Cyber 
Security Strategy of 2019. A national cybersecurity strategy does not necessarily replace 
the need for a cybercrime strategy.  As asserted by Seger (2012), cybercrime strategies 
can instead outline activities to directly and indirectly deal with cybercrime, such as crime 
prevention and criminal justice policies, programmes, and practices.  
The United Kingdom’s Home Office Cybercrime Strategy (2010) is an example of this 
approach. The cybercrime strategy was published in 2010 - the year after the first UK 
Cyber Security Strategy was published. As the lead government department in the United 
Kingdom responsible for developing policies to counter cybercrime, the Home Office 
developed the Cyber Crime Strategy, which sets out the Department’s plan for 
coordinating and delivering that policy (Home Office Cybercrime Strategy, 2010).  The 
logic of having a strategy or plan is recognised good practice for governments and 
organisations as they provide a roadmap for activities that help achieve the goals set by 
them. They guide discussions and decision making, as well as help to establish the 
resources and budgets that may be required. Having such a structured approach to 
cybercrime is hugely important, where, for instance, Prof. Wall notes that a good practice 
in and of itself is to have a clear methodological approach that could be laid out in a 
strategy. He highlights the ‘4Ps’ approach used in the UK Counter Terrorism Strategy, 
namely, ‘Prevent, Pursue, Protect and Prepare’ as a good example of a methodological 
approach which specifically highlights different approaches to a problem. While this 
strategy has been highly criticised, it is the strategy’s methodological approach that Prof. 
Wall suggests  could have value if applied to cybercrime because it targets multiple 
phases (before, during and after the crime happens) and also helps to mitigate 
cybercrime in the first place.  
A contrasting approach is evident in Scotland. The Scottish Government opted to 
develop strategies across different areas of cybersecurity to address different sectors 




foster a successful cybersecurity ecosystem and promote business. At the heart of these 
strategies is the ideal of creating a safe and prosperous digital economy. The 
representatives from An Garda Síochána highlighted the benefits of having a dedicated 
strategy in this area, but noted the importance of having a whole of government 
approach to the activities contained within. Notably, while the UK has published a 
number of cybersecurity strategies, the 2010 cybercrime strategy has been since 
updated. 
4 . 4 . 2  I N C R E A S E  D E T E C T I O N  A N D  F O R E N S I C  C A P A B I L I T I E S   
Creating an environment less conducive to cybercrime requires the capabilities to 
respond if and when such crimes occur. In the context of responding to and prosecuting 
cybercrime strong capabilities in the area of digital forensics are important. However, 
cases may not even get this far, due to the nature of cybercrime. For example, IoT and 
other new technologies and tactics that often offer anonymity to users, are very 
advantageous for criminals, and a significant challenge for prosecution. As noted by 
Clough (2015), offenders may deliberately conceal their identity online by the use of 
proxy servers, spoofed email or Internet protocol (IP) addresses. Simply opening an 
email account which does not require identity verification provides a false identity. 
Confidentiality may be protected by the use of readily available encryption technology, 
while traces of digital evidence may be removed using commercially available software. 
The networked nature of modern communications means that data will routinely be 
routed through a number of jurisdictions before reaching its destination, making tracing of 
communications extremely difficult and time sensitive. Accessing wireless networks, with 
or without authorisation, may conceal the identity of the actual user even if the location 
can be identified. Data may be stored deliberately in jurisdictions where regulation and 
oversight is lax.  
The 2017 EU Cyber Strategy notes this ongoing challenge, raising the concern that in 
order to increase the chances of bringing perpetrators to justice, there is an urgent need 
to improve capacity to identify those responsible for cyber attacks. Finding useful 
information for cybercrime investigations, mostly in the form of digital traces, is a major 
challenge for law enforcement authorities. The strategy therefore recommends increasing 
technological capability to investigate effectively including by reinforcing Europol's 
cybercrime unit with cyber experts. All those interviewed highlighted the exceptional work 
carried out by Europol, more specifically EC3, in this area. (Interviews, December 2019 
and January 2020). 
Europe has become a key actor in supporting Member States' multi-jurisdictional 
investigations. The strategy calls for EC3 to become a centre of expertise for Member 




practice of placing multiple of users – sometimes thousands of them – behind one IP 
address makes it technically very difficult to investigate malicious online behaviour. It also 
makes it sometimes necessary, for example for serious crime such as child sexual 
abuse, to investigate large number of users in order to identify one malicious actor. The 
EU will therefore encourage the uptake of the new protocol (IPv6) as it allows the 
allocation of a single user per IP address, thus bringing clear benefits to law enforcement 
and cybersecurity investigations. As a first step to encourage uptake, the Commission 
will mainstream the requirement to move to IPv6 throughout its policies, including 
requirements in procurement, project and research funding as well as supporting the 
necessary training materials. In addition, it advises that Member States should consider 
voluntary agreements with Internet Service Providers to drive the take up of IPv6. 
The Commission also included the results of reflections on the role of encryption in 
criminal investigations in October 2017 in the ‘Eleventh progress report towards an 
effective and genuine Security Union’. This set out actions to support both law 
enforcement and judicial authorities when encryption is encountered in criminal 
investigations. Lastly, the NIS Directive notes that “[u]niversities and research centres 
have a decisive role to play in spurring research, development and innovation in those 
areas” (Directive (EU) 2016/1148, 194/2). 
4 . 4 . 3  C R O S S  C O L L A B O R A T I O N  
The development of collaborative partnerships between many actors and communities 
both nationally and internationally is key to developing resilience against cybercrime 
(ENISA, 2016). As a result, they can plan a significant role in situational prevention. EU 
law enforcement equally highlight how such partnerships are important especially in the 
context of cybercrime (EUROPOL & EUROJUST, 2019). Beyond owning the 
infrastructure as is the case in the Irish context, EUROPOL & EUROJUST (2019) specify 
that these entities also hold much of the evidence that may be required in prosecutions.  
Given the range of actors this may involve, ENISA (2012) notes that it is good practice to 
build a common consensus as to what constitutes a cyber-incident given the range of 
stakeholders involved. Furthermore, ENISA documents state that it is good practice to 
“establish cooperation between public and private sector stakeholders to quickly identify 
and respond to cybercrime related issues” (33).  To develop this further, ENISA (2012) 
states that countries should establish “core competencies and indications of each 
stakeholder’s competencies, capabilities and procedures” (3). This assists in 
understanding the range of competencies and capabilities available within stakeholder 
groups. This resonates with the suggestion of the representative from the corporate 
consultancy firm who, as discussed above, made the suggestion of building a reserve 




(Interview, February 2020)  ENISA further highlights in respect to cybercrime specifically, 
the need for stakeholders to “develop knowledge and expertise on emerging cybercrime-
related threats and vulnerabilities but also attack methods through information sharing at 
national and international levels” (ENISA, 2016, 33). This clearly illustrates that in order 
to be able to respond to cybercrime effectively, a high degree of knowledge about the 
broader cybersecurity environment is required.  Two keys areas of collaboration 
discussed below include: (1) Law Enforcement Collaboration with Government 
Stakeholders; and (2) International cooperation between law enforcement agencies. 
4.4.3.1 Law enforcement collaboration with non-governmental stakeholders  
Europol, through the EC3, works very hard in this area, and the EU law enforcement 
agency has actively created a multifaceted approach, built around public and private 
resources. Despite the fact that much of their work deals with investigations, they are 
cognisant of the need to look beyond this in relation to their connections and network 
(Europol representative, interview, December 2019). Through their public private 
partnerships, Europol is setting standards, in the context of best practices, as evident in 
their three Advisory Groups for Internet Security, Financial Services, and Communication 
Providers. 
EC3 hosts the Joint Cybercrime Action Taskforce (J-CAT)19. Its mission is to proactively 
drive intelligence-led, coordinated action against key cybercrime threats and top targets 
through cross-border investigations and operations by its partners. J-CAT facilitates the 
joint identification, prioritisation, preparation, initiation and execution of cross-border 
investigations by its partners. While such groups and networks help on a day to day 
basis, they also help in ensuring a more hostile environment for cybercriminals. The 
establishment of such networks is also in line with ENISA’s (2016) advice that there is a 
need develop such forums, to improve and enhance cooperation between various 
stakeholders dealing with cybercrime, that goes beyond official stakeholders. 
Much effort has gone into making these groups effective and efficient by Europol and 
partners. In an interview, a Europol representative suggested that the success of these 
groups is probably on account of Europol acting as the coordinating body within the 
established framework both legally and in terms of secure infrastructure and partnership 
networks but also due to the effectiveness of the joint approach which is clearly evident 
to all involved. Interestingly, some of the representatives of financial institutions noted 








that they believed their lack of brand strength, in this area, limited their ability to gain 
traction on some of their own campaign material thereby reducing their reach 
(Representatives from financial institutions, interview, January 2020).  
The strength of the partnership between EC3 and stakeholders is not by chance. All 
partners within the Europol advisory groups have clearly defined roles, work plans are 
agreed and collectively set, which require input by all. The majority of partners are 
reportedly very active, which is welcomed by Europol. Cooperation is also based around 
a high degree of trust between partners which is paramount in areas of security and 
crime that are traditionally dealt with in a more closed and secretive manner given 
sensitivities and security concerns. One example of a worthwhile campaign illustrating 
the value of this partnership is the ‘No More Ransom’ campaign. This is a collaboration 
between Dutch police, Europol and private security companies, which provides 
information on how mitigate the risk of being targeted and how to report such cases, if 
they occur. Where possible, they also provide victims who have been targeted with 
decryption keys for ransomware. A competent, speedy response to ransomware 
demands is critical for businesses, as an attack can be detrimental to their business 
(Representative from a corporate consultancy firm, interview, February 2020). 
Building a high level of trust has provided an environment where partners are willing to talk 
about important issues as they feel comfortable to exchange relevant information (Europol 
representative, interview, December 2019). The importance of trust was also highlighted 
in all the interviews in Ireland, in relation to such partnerships (Interviews, December- 
February 2020). Establishing confidentiality for businesses has also been a key activity for 
the UK NCSC, which views this as a method of bringing business on board in relation to 
their work. Interestingly, the representative from Europol highlighted that while for many 
companies the relationships may start out due to corporate social responsibility and the 
positive PR, the majority of these stakeholders quickly see greater benefits in sharing 
experience, training and expertise.The experience of enhanced benefits of such 
partnerships is in line with the literature. For example, IPerez-Gonzalez, Trigueros 
Preciado and Solana-Gonzalez (2014) interestingly in their research that information 
security knowledge sharing has a positive impact on management performance.  
Another beneficial aspect of these relationships, while not good practice itself but could 
help to enable good practice, is that such networks provide quick access to skills and 
expertise that may not be available to an organisation. This was confirmed by 
representatives from An Garda Síochána, the NCA and the financial institutions in the 
interviews. It was suggested that investigators while experts in their own right, are rarely 
as proficient as dedicated IT experts, which means that building relationships and 




2019). This observation was also highlighted by a representative from the United 
Kingdom’s National Crime Agency, who noted that training - while important - dates 
quickly, and therefore the most important thing for investigators is to have access to a 
network of people that they can reach out to when needed (Interview, 2019).  
Nonetheless, there is much literature on the difficulties associated with developing public 
private partnerships in this space. For example, Carr (2016) noted that despite the 
central positioning of public–private partnership in both UK and USA strategies, such 
agreement are often nebulous. Carr’s (2016) research found that there is often a serious 
disjuncture in expectations from governments and the private sector. She (Carr) noted 
that governments often view privately owned and operated critical infrastructure as a key 
element of national security, while at the same time can be reluctant to exert a mandate 
to ensure and oversee network security. In contrast, the private sector often does not 
want to see or accept their potential role or liability for national cybersecurity. Therefore, 
there is a real need to manage expectations, balance public versus private interests and 
navigate different understandings of the same threat.  The representatives from BPFI, the 
financial institutions and An Garda Síochána all noted that this was a problem they had, 
on occasion, encountered. When such crimes happen the priority for businesses is 
largely remediation and recovery, then compliance. It is only afterwards that investigation 
for the purpose of criminal investigation becomes important. This illustrates some of the 
competing interests that can occur during and after such a crime such as concerns about 
getting a business back up and running, or a fear of fines where regulations are not 
complied with. Competing obligations are also evident in relation to reporting. For 
example, the need to report certain incidents both to the NCSC and An Garda Síochána. 
The former to ensure corrective action can be taken and to reduce the risk, and the latter 
to ensure the incident is criminally investigated.  
Unlike traditional crime where the majority of crimes are investigated solely by law 
enforcement agencies, cybercrime is slightly different. Investigations are often conducted 
by private sector bodies initially to assess whether a crime has happened at all, prior to 
reporting to law enforcement. For example, the representative from a corporate 
consultancy firm noted that when they are doing incident response for a client, or where a 
client may be unsure as to whether an attack has occurred, they are often called in to 
investigate (Interview, February 2020). In doing so, they look to see what type of incident 
it might be, a simple, non-issue, or criminal, to name a few. At this point, their 
investigation is largely focused on the source of attack, stopping it, and getting business 
back up and running and protected. If, during this process, a potential crime is detected, 




continue with their investigation, so they can protect their client from further attack 
(Representative from the corporate consultancy firm, Interview 2020).  
Furthermore, developing relationships with Internet service providers, as currently 
undertaken by An Garda Síochána, may be beneficial, as law enforcement are often 
hugely dependent on ISPs for their work. Such relationships have proved effective for 
Europol in the investigation into Imminent Monitor Remote Access Trojan (IM-RAT) as 
noted above. That said, as noted in the interviews this would be most beneficial if 
enhanced by the development of a clear legal framework within which all parties can 
work with and cooperate around. Having this in place would be essential for ensuring 
investigative success, and clear boundaries for all involved. The importance of these 
relationships is highlighted in the research by Boes & Leukfeldt (2017). Their work 
explores the need for such partnerships in the context of overcoming the difficulties the 
police have in fighting cybercrime. Therefore, greater cooperation and collaboration 
between the ISPs and other private organisations should also be encouraged in the Irish 
context. That said, and as highlighted by the financial institutions, BPFI, and An Garda 
Síochána representative, relationships with the ISPs in Ireland are improving (Interviews, 
December 2019 and January 2020). One example of this is evident in the bi-annual 
meeting between BPFI and the Irish Telecommunications Security Fraud Forum 
(Representative from BPFI, interview, January 2020). It was highlighted in some of the 
interviews that such relationships were much more robust in the UK (Representatives 
from the Financial Institutions, interviews, January 2020). It might be worth exploring 
further why this is the case, for potential lessons to be learned for further development of 
these relationships in Ireland. The importance of public private partnerships and 
relationship building will be discussed in more detail later in this section.   
In short, the representatives from An Garda Síochána (from the perspective of law 
enforcement tasked to counter cybercrime) noted that more formal and coordinated 
approaches to cyber in Ireland are badly needed, as there are currently none in place, 
while at the same time stating that people are just doing their best. In this regard, they 
(An Garda Síochána) highlighted the need for a whole of government approach, one that 
is fully resourced and has a multi-agency approach, between government departments 
and key stakeholders.  
4.4.3.2 International cooperation between law enforcement agencies  
In terms of international cooperation among LEAs, Europol’s structure is such that it 
includes representatives from all EU Member States, which makes cooperation at this 
level more accessible. However, this is further enhanced by the co-location of 
representatives from third-party countries that have an operational or strategic agreement 




Europol’s HQ (Europol representative, interview, December 2019). Responses should be 
coordinated between relevant stakeholders (ENISA, 2016). An example of this 
recommendation in practice is EC3, which was established in 2013 to strengthen the law 
enforcement responses to cybercrime in the EU. EC3 has two forensic teams, namely 
digital forensics and document forensics. Each provides operational support as well as 
research and development. The unit also includes two strategic teams. The forensics 
team conducts outreach and provides support, “which establishes partnerships and 
coordinates prevention and awareness measures” and the second conducts “strategy 
and development, which is responsible for: strategic analysis; the formulation of policy 
and legislative measures; [and] the development of standardised training” (European 
Cyber Crime Centre, 2019).  
The UK’s NCA is also highlighted as a very good model of law enforcement collaboration 
which links broader national policing investigations (such as with cybercrime) with local 
forces via a Regional Organised Crime Unit (ROCU) (Prof. Wall, interview, December 
2019). The agency not only works closely with UK police and regional organised crime 
units, but it also works with international law enforcement such as Europol and the FBI, 
both in sharing intelligence and coordinated action. (NCA, 2020). This was also 
confirmed by An Garda Síochána in the interviews. The agency also actively works to 
develop effective partnerships and work closely with private industry to share information 
and technical expertise. The representative from the NCA also noted the very good 
relationships between law enforcement within the EU. Responses are quick and 
competent for the most part, especially where there are lives at stake. For example, a 
number of cases of suicide have been associated with cybercrime, and there has been 
good cooperation in these instances.  
However, the NCA representative noted that cooperation can be difficult outside the EU. 
As a result, the NCA takes on an active role to educate lead officers that the 
infrastructure they have at their disposal may not be the same elsewhere, and they 
therefore need to manage expectation. In short, responses can differ access jurisdictions, 
resources can differ, and even issues of concern that are pertinent in one jurisdiction may 
not be the same in another (NCA representative, interview, December 2019). For these 
reasons, cyber capacity building on different measures in the fight against cybercrime is 
important for national and collective cyber resilience in relation to growing cybercrime 
levels. In the context of Ireland, the National Cyber Security Strategy released in 2019 
states that Government goals now include “engaging in sustainable capacity building in 
third countries”. With specific reference to cybercrime, the Irish government will “support 
international cooperation to combat cybercrime and promote formal and informal 




countries” (p.4). While this is a step in the right direction as well as in Ireland’s national 
interest to reduce the impact of cybercrime in the country, government stakeholders must 
either establish or support programmes that will certainly have impact by drawing on past 
lessons and good practice for effective cyber capacity building related to cybercrime 
questions. A number of global initiatives are already making progress on cyber capacity 
building questions specifically related to cybercrime such as the Global Forum on Cyber 
Expertise (GFCE).    
In an interview in Eolas Magazine in 2017, Detective Superintendent Gubbins (then head 
of the GNCCB), noted that An Garda Síochána follow these practices of collaboration 
with international law enforcement. He then explained that “EC3, for us as a small 
country, is a valuable entity. We send them a lot of information and intelligence which 
they then analyse for us within a bigger picture”, thus acknowledging the value that 
international cooperation provides for the Irish cybercrime unit and An Garda Síochána. 
He also noted in the same interview that, in line with good practices mentioned above, 
senior Gardaí engage with a wide range of stakeholders in this area. In particular, “our 
main business partner would be Banking and Payments Federation Ireland (BPFI) and 
once a month we meet under what’s known as the High-Tech Crime Forum. We meet 
with all the banks, our colleagues in the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI), the 
Internet Service Providers Association of Ireland and others from the UCD Centre for 
Cybersecurity and Cybercrime Investigation and exchange information about what trends 
we observe in the cybercrime sphere. It’s been quite successful” (Eolas, 2017). He also 
noted that through “the European Cybercrime Centre, the Garda also have relationships 
with Europol, Interpol and other law enforcement partners across the world. The 
Modernisation and Renewal Programme outlined that “specialist units will be set up to 
liaise with international partners on current and emerging threats, and to provide cyber 
and forensic tools to support frontline policing and State security” (Eolas, 2017). 
4 . 4 . 4  C O N D U C T I N G  E X E R C I S E S   
Another good practice referenced within the NIS Directive that can help strengthen the 
capacity of those involved in the fight against cybercrime relates to exercises. The 
Directive states that “exercises which simulate real-time incident scenarios are essential 
for testing Member States' preparedness and cooperation regarding the security of 
network and information systems. The CyberEurope cycle of exercises coordinated by 
ENISA with the participation of the Member States is a useful tool for testing and drawing 
up recommendations on how incident-handling at Union level should improve over time”  
(194/7). ENISA’s (2016) states that such “exercises enable competent authorities to test 




different sectors, identify inter-dependents, stimulate improvements in continuity 
planning” (25).  
4 . 4 . 5  P R E V E N T I O N  B Y  D E S I G N  
Implementation of a code of ‘security by design’ has been implemented by some 
technology companies in their design and innovation strategies to ensure products come 
to market with a basic standard of in-built security. The UK government's Code of 
Practice for Consumer Internet of Things (IoT) Security for manufacturers, with guidance 
for consumers on smart devices at home is a good example of what this could look like. It 
also supports increasing the responsibility of tech and Internet companies for building 
security into their products.  
4.5 The ‘balance’ between tackling cybercrime and 
protecting individual rights 
The Budapest Convention acknowledges that achieving the right balance between 
tackling cybercrime and protecting individual rights is an important factor (Preamble). It 
further recognises the need to be mindful of ensuring a proper balance between the 
interests of law enforcement and respect for fundamental human rights.  These rights are 
important given that they include, but are not limited to, the right of everyone to hold 
opinions without interference, as well as the right to freedom of expression, including the 
freedom to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of 
frontiers, as well as rights concerning the respect for privacy and the right to the 
protection of personal data. The NIS Directive similarly includes reference to rights, 
stating that it “respects the fundamental rights, and observes the principles, recognised 
by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, in particular the right to 
respect for private life and communications, the protection of personal data, the freedom 
to conduct a business, the right to property, the right to an effective remedy before a 
court and the right to be heard” (Directive (EU) 2016/1148, 194/11). It further notes that 
the Directive should be implemented at national level in accordance with those rights and 
principles.  
Despite inclusion of safeguards provided under national and international laws, early 
critics of the Budapest Convention stated that it was not properly balanced between the 
fight against cybercrime vis-à-vis respecting fundamental rights (Taylor, 2001). In fact, 
Taylor purports that the Convention is fundamentally imbalanced, providing considerable 
detail on powers of search and surveillance, with no detailed description of how countries 
should go about protecting rights and restricting government authority. A suggestion of 
how this could have been overcome was the inclusion of limitations on the use of certain 




specific example of where the Convention illustrates imbalance, as Taylor suggests, 
relates to encryption. Taylor notes that countries like Singapore, Malaysia, India and the 
UK transposed Clause 4 of Article 19, Search and Seizure of stored computer data, into 
law - this provides for the power to force users to provide encryption keys (in some 
cases, with the power to fine or imprison those who do not). Taylor (2001) highlights one 
specific concern in this regard, contending that this application raises issues about the 
right against self-incrimination in certain jurisdictions.  
While many of Taylor’s criticisms remain, some additional protections have been 
implemented since the Convention was agreed, especially in the EU. For example, the 
overturning of the Data Retention Directive (DRD) by the European Court of Justice 
clearly demonstrated that the EU was not afraid to step in to ensure balance, albeit 
knowing that in doing so it would make it difficult for law enforcement and prosecutors to 
obtain data from private companies (EUROPOL & EUROJUST, 2019). Secondly, GDPR 
has provided much needed protection relating to personal data.  
Drewer and Ellermann (2012) note that full compliance with data protection regulations 
and principles is an asset in regard to preventing and responding to cybercrime. A 
tangible example of how the EU is trying to implement this and move beyond safeguards 
in the Convention to operational activities is illustrated by the work of EC3. The approach 
of Europol includes protocols for independent data protection supervision, secure 
information exchange capabilities, data protection, compliant outreach to the private 
sector and clearly defined purpose specifications for processing personal data on their 
data sets (Drewer & Ellermann, 2012). This allows EC3 to support EU Member States in 
tackling cybercrime, while protecting individuals’ rights. This approach has been 
implemented in the Europol Platform for Experts, which was launched to facilitate the 
exchange of best practice and to share tools, tactics and techniques. The success of this 
approach is demonstrated regularly. For example, in November 2017, where EC3, the 
FBI, Joint Cybercrime Action Taskforce (J-CAT), EUROJUST and private sector partners 
dismantled one of the longest running botnets, the Andremeda botnet. While, more 
recently, in November 2019, an international investigation into Imminent Monitor Remote 
Access Trojan (IM-RAT) spyware took place, led by the Australian Federal Police (AFP), 
with international activity coordinated by Europol and Eurojust. This operation involved 
numerous judicial and law enforcement agencies in Europe, Colombia and Australia. The 
cross-border interaction was supported on law enforcement level through the J-CAT and 
on judicial level through the European Judicial Cybercrime Network (EJCN).The 





There is a perception that perfect privacy may provide offenders with the ability to commit 
crime undetected as it will not allow law enforcement fully investigate cases. However, 
providing backdoors in encryption for law enforcement may push offenders to services 
without such backdoors, making them harder to reach, whilst potentially weakening the 
security on systems that do have the backdoors. Raab et al (2015), although writing in 
the context of surveillance, claim that if introduced in the name of greater security, 
surveillance may have the opposite effect, and in fact erode social freedoms and public 
goods such as privacy. Therefore, it is important to have these discussions when new 
legislation is being proposed in order to work towards an appropriate balance between 
privacy, security and safety discussions (Europol Representative, interview, December 
2019). 
Supported by the literature, Hildebrant (2013) contends that balancing these two complex 
issues does not have to involve a sacrifice of liberties for the sake of increased security. 
He notes that where security measures are implemented that violate our liberties and 
rights, extra safeguards must be put in place to ensure balance. This requires specificity, 
not just a statement of intent, as is the criticism of Taylor (2001) on the Convention. To 
further address the need for balance, Hildebrant (2013) claims that a more generic 
understanding of the right to privacy is required. He presents Rothenberg’s definition as a 
step in the right direction. Rothenberg defines the right to privacy as ‘the freedom from 
unreasonable constraints on the construction of ones identities” (Taylor, 2012, 377). In 
this context, Hildebrant (2012) suggests that it is not a question of a trade-off between 
security and privacy, although this notion along with balance are integrated into the 
Convention, rather he contends that there can be “no trade off without balance” (357). 
Moreover, Drewer and Ellermann (2012) argue that “high data protection standards lead 
to high quality of data which itself is a precondition for high quality crime analysis” (394). 
Therefore, better adherence to protection of rights can only help in tackling cybercrime. 
ENISA (2016) echoes such sentiments that it is good practice to balance security with 
privacy and data protection. It notes that any national cybersecurity strategy should try to 
achieve a good balance between these two goals, identifying a number of specific tasks 
to consider, such as: 
 “Take into account national legal requirements for data protection when drafting 
cyber security relevant regulatory texts.  
 Take the advice of the data protection authority(ies) on regulatory texts related to 




 Consider data protection law compliance measures when consulting the 
minimum security measures 
 Make data protection supervisory authority(ies) part of information security 
compliance audits to the most critical stakeholders.  
 Support and brand, together with the national data protection authority(ies), the 
European Data Protection Day (January 28).  
 Involve national data protection authority(ies) in national cyber exercises, if the 
scenario is relevant to data protection issues” (ENISA, 2016, 36-37).  
The Irish national cybersecurity strategy includes the need to achieve such a balance 
and sets out in its Vision the need to “[p]rotect the State, its people and critical national 
infrastructure from threats in the cyber security realm in a dynamic and flexible manner, 
and in a way that fully respects the rights of individuals and proportionately balances 
risks and costs” (p.11). The first Irish cyber strategy notes the need for “open, free and 
safe access to cyberspace, and confidence that their personal data will be processed in 
accordance with data protection principles enshrined in law, notably national legislation, 
the European Union Treaties and the European Convention on Human Rights” 
(Department of Communication, Energy & Natural Resources, p.4).   
An Garda Síochána also are mindful of the need to balance tackling cybercrime and 
protecting individual rights. This starts at the top of the organisation, set out in 
organisational HQ circulars, which set out the organisation policy, coupled with the 
organisational ethics code (Representative from An Garda Síochána, Interview, January 
2020). Moreover, the GNCCB actively strive to protect privacy, especially as it pertains to 





CONCLUSION: Key findings and reflections 
for policy and practice 
This study examined the existing research literature on cybercrime (focusing in particular 
on cyber-dependent crime) including current and emerging threats, the Irish anti-
cybercrime landscape and models of best practice for combatting cybercrime in order to 
inform both policy and practice across the criminal justice system in Ireland.  
 
The report finds that there is no consensus for the term ‘cybercrime’. Rather, it is largely 
used to encompass a range of criminal activities that use ICTs. The lack of an agreed 
definition is not solely an academic disagreement or debate. In fact, many now concede 
that a definition is less important given the saturation of Internet-connected technologies 
in everyday life, and that as a result, much of all crime exists on a technological 
spectrum. Many nations do not adopt a statutory or case law definition of cybercrime, 
because requirements of definitions change depending on the purpose in which the 
definition is used. That said, given the EU’s desire to harmonise legislation, responses 
and standards in this area across Member States, any government policies should be 
mindful of using, at the very least, a shared understanding of terms within particular use 
cases. 
 
Section Two notes that while contemporary cybercrime threats present new challenges, 
the perception that cybercrime activities are an entirely new problem is misplaced. 
Nonetheless, the threat landscape continues to evolve requiring a constant revision of 
responses at national and international level. The prevalence of cybercrime activity will 
likely often correlate with opportunities for these crimes to be conducted – and these 
opportunities are growing because of an increasing attack surface brought about by the 
growth of ICTs and new technologies. Wealthier nations with more Internet users per 
capita are also traditionally found to be subject to higher cybercrime activity, and in 
Ireland’s case, it is among the leading ranks of EU Member States in terms of the use of 
digital technologies.  
 
Another factor for developed countries like Ireland is the impact of cross-border 
cybercrime activity from other countries that often account for more of the variation in 
cybercrime activity than others. UN experts note that different levels of capacity for ICT 
security among States can increase vulnerability in an interconnected world, especially 
where a lack of capacity can make the citizens and CI of a State vulnerable or make it an 
unwitting haven for malicious actors. This is one of the reasons why sustainable capacity 




security strategy) are essential to reduce cybercrime activity in Ireland. This is particularly 
important for Ireland given that it may not only suffer the direct consequences of 
cybercrime, but because of its status as a location of choice for many global technology 
companies and other multinationals. This means that the country must have top-tier 
advanced cyber readiness capabilities and avoid the indirect consequences of 
cybercrime such as loss of confidence from outside investors.  
Yet, it is difficult to measure both the direct and indirect consequences of cybercrime. 
And while cybercrime-related activities occur daily, they are often not reported to law 
enforcement for several reasons including broad uncertainty about the actual nature of 
cybercrime. Such under-reporting will likely limit the ability to create effective policy 
solutions, which means that efforts to increase the level of reporting in Ireland are likely 
needed as a first step. Of the few reports on cybercrime in Ireland, it is found that the 
numbers of those companies experiencing cybercrime has apparently grown in Ireland 
and it is double global levels despite increased levels of awareness and more resources 
being allocated to address risks. These increases in crime are explained to not only be a 
reflection of better detection methods, but also because more cybercrime is in fact being 
conducted.  
The most significant cybercrime trends and threats in Europe currently include: (1) 
Ransomware; (2) Other malware threats; (3) Data breaches and network attacks; (4) 
Spearphishing; and (5) Attacks against critical infrastructure. In particular, the fallout from 
both the WannaCry and NotPetya ransomware attacks showed the ability of ransomware 
to spread globally at great speed, affecting targets indiscriminately. A second growing 
threat is mobile malware aided by the growing use of mobile phones and tablets. While 
mobile malware has not so far been extensively reported in Europe, there seems to be 
an ongoing lack of awareness in the general population about how to deal with mobile 
phone cyber incidents. Victims of mobile malware in Europe are more inclined to 
approach their provider rather than make police reports, and few will report to the police 
at all. This means that already low levels of reporting of cybercrime in Ireland is likely to 
be exacerbated by under-reporting in relation to mobile malware incidents. 
Cryptomining presents new challenges because it is not illegal in some cases but it is still 
creating additional revenue and thus motivation for criminals to attack legitimate 
websites. It seems that damages to victims are broadly speaking difficult to quantify and 
investigate. This is a gap that should ideally be addressed in Ireland. Other trends that 
should ideally be considered by law enforcement and policy-makers involved in the fight 
against cybercrime include the growing connections between cybercrime and malevolent 
state activity; IoT/future cities and smart meters; cloud security; emerging technologies; 




of tools and techniques as well as “Darknet” concerns; poor security cultures; the 
terrorist-cybercrime nexus; and pervasive anonymisation tools. From a criminal justice 
perspective, for example, countries like the United States are increasingly using criminal 
indictments for cases that involve state actors or state proxies as a deterrent for the 
perpetration of cybercrimes by state actors. Irish authorities may also need to assess the 
applicability and effectiveness of the domestic legal framework for state-sponsored 
cybercrime. In addition, there are concerns about the growing availability and use of 
publicly and commercially available cyber tools, exacerbated by the leaking and release 
of states’ tools and techniques. The entry barrier for criminals has apparently never been 
so low where many criminals are using legitimate and off-the-shelf tools or techniques. 
Anonymity provided through legitimate tools such as Bitcoin and cryptocurrencies that 
allow untraceable payments as well as Tor-like networks allowing communication and 
trade of both information and technologies is also described as one of the most important 
developments behind the recent “tectonic shift” in the threat landscape.  
Lastly, cybercriminals will use simplistic methods, including targeting victims and 
countries with poor cybersecurity protections. This is why cybersecurity agencies like the 
NCSC in Ireland, through their advisories, and the NCSC in the United Kingdom are 
publicly communicating the risks so that there is a better level of security awareness and 
basic protections on an individual and entity level, thus enabling individuals to be better 
empowered to act on the information they are given in ways that they could not 
previously. This signals a shift in how cybercrime is approached in the United Kingdom 
through a culture of increasing openness – the extent of public advisories provided by the 
NCSC in the UK has been relatively more than most countries so far. The UK’s NCSC is 
releasing unprecedented levels of information and it has ambitions to continue 
declassifying much more information in a well-managed way to help the general public to 
be better prepared. These are the types of steps that could be considered in Ireland in 
order to more effectively combat modern cybercrime. 
The third section of the report identifies key legislation including an assessment on its 
effectiveness. The key piece of Irish legislation is the Criminal Justice (Offences relating 
to Information Systems) Act of 2017 which amends previous Acts and gives effect to EU 
Directive 2013/40/EU on attacks against information systems. However, the codification 
of cybercrime still remains scattered across many Acts. Statutory Instrument No. 360 of 
2018 signed the EU NIS Directive into Irish law and it represents a significant shift in 
approach towards a more formal type of regulatory relationship in certain key industries. 
The transposition into Irish law of regulatory instruments like the NIS Directive and GDPR 
means that Irish individuals and entities will now be accountable for not meeting 




be introduced by organisations, thus driving better resilience in the wake of cybercrime - 
even though it may be too soon to gauge their effectiveness on crime prevention. While 
these measures primarily apply to OES and DSP, the 2017 EU cybersecurity strategy 
considers that a similar approach by all stakeholders hit by cyberattacks would be 
necessary to have a systematic assessment of vulnerabilities and entry points for cyber 
attackers. There is no specific criminal offence in Ireland for failing to implement 
cybersecurity measures within an organisation or as an individual. 
Many countries, including Ireland, use a combination of old legislation (or at least not 
specifically developed to target cyber activities) and specific legislation. Irish policy-
makers should ideally address gaps that arise in relation to new cybercrimes where non-
specific legislation is sometimes limited. The 2017 EU Cyber strategy notes that today's 
procedural framework is not fit for purpose where, for instance, the speed of cyber 
attacks can overwhelm our procedures, as well as creating particular needs for swift 
cooperation across borders. For example, the EU Directive has limited definitions for the 
treatment and storage of investigation data which can result in a lack of consistency on 
the standards of storage between jurisdictions and this can result in the inadmissibility of 
evidence in investigations. To this end, the European Commission published draft 
legislation to facilitate cross-border access to electronic evidence in 2018 and proposed 
international negotiations on cross-border access to electronic evidence. It is also 
implementing practical measures to improve cross-border access to electronic evidence 
for criminal investigations, including funding for training on cross-border cooperation, the 
development of an electronic platform to exchange information within the EU, and the 
standardisation of judicial cooperation forms used between Member States.  
While the majority of the Budapest Convention is already integrated within Irish 
legislation, a new cybercrime Bill is due to address the remainder of the provisions of the 
Convention, which is due to be formally ratified in the near future. The Convention 
continues to provide a global legal framework for combatting cybercrime, and a possible 
addition of a protocol has been under exploration to address cross-border access to 
electronic evidence in an international context. Rather than the creation of new 
international legal instruments for cybercrime issues, the EU calls for the designing of 
appropriate national legislation and for Member States to pursue cooperation within this 
existing international framework. However, a proposal for a cybercrime treaty was 
submitted by Russia to the Third Committee of the United Nations in 2019 and Irish 
policy-makers working in criminal justice and foreign affairs should ideally analyse the 
implications of this proposal for Irish and EU interests in terms of cybercrime and broader 




The report finds that while effective legislation is desirable, it is not always feasible to 
have legislation in place to meet the pace of technological change. Legislative change 
can be a lengthy process for good reason, and this report finds that input provided by law 
enforcement at an early stage of the legislative process can help to surmount 
fundamental issues that may hamper investigations after implementation. For example, 
Europol works with the private sector to establish agreed practices and non-binding 
agreements to improve consistency prior to the implementation of legislation. The report 
further highlights the issue of resourcing for An Garda Síochána in relation to cybercrime. 
While the Future of Policing in Ireland report (2018) notes this challenge and some 
progress has been made, there is still a constant demand on small investigative teams 
given that cases increasingly have an IT component. Investigation and prosecution of 
cybercrimes require well-trained and knowledgeable personnel in the investigation 
phase, during prosecution, and in courts, coupled with effective legislation. Another 
challenge relates to staff and skills retention and it may be timely to consider how officers 
can be retained or whether there is value in the use of volunteers or partnerships with the 
private sector to support skills gaps within the police.  
In addition, there is limited research on the effectiveness of these legal instruments, but 
research in the area of crime prevention more generally is better researched. These 
learnings on traditional crime prevention and criminology could be transferable to the 
area of cybercrime. Moreover, prevention measures are often achieved through 
education, training and awareness raising rather than through legislation.  
Another aspect that negatively impacts the effectiveness of legislation relates to under-
reporting which means prosecutions are less likely. Improving citizens’ and SMEs’ 
awareness that they have been a victim of crime is found again in the report to be a key 
first step. While organisations are encouraged to report cybercrime incidents, reporting is 
found to be difficult and burdensome. Creating an easier process would likely improve 
reporting, which in turn would improve national statistics and provide better insights. In 
terms of statistical data, it can also be difficult to harmonise data across jurisdictions and 
to meet the reporting requirements of EU Directives and other bodies because no one 
organisation can supply all the figures. The UK has started to introduce questions that 
measure cybercrime rates on the Crime Survey for England and Wales and this could be 
a good practice to consider in Ireland given that crime surveys have long replaced police 
recorded crime as the most accurate measure of crime rates.   
Other examples of non-legislative good practice are discussed in Section Four. A key 
finding is the lack of systematic reviews of practices responding to the threat of 
cybercrime, both from an academic and operational perspective. That said, this research 




effective in this area. This may result in improved mechanisms to measure success in the 
near future. The impact of a lack of systematic reviews means that the findings contained 
within this report provide food for thought in regard to policy consideration for Ireland and 
the Department of Justice and Equality. Greater analysis will be required to substantiate 
many of the aforementioned policy suggestions and good practices. Nonetheless, the 
approach taken in the report has been to identify perceived good practice in academic 
writings and through interviews with key stakeholders to better inform the direction of 
further analysis and policy development in Ireland. For the most part, many of these 
findings align closely. 
 
A large number of areas were discussed in section four of the report, all of which offer 
areas for further analysis and research. Firstly, local and contextual conditions should be 
assessed and researched before importing a model into a new area. Secondly, any new 
policy practice should include mechanisms for evaluating success or lack thereof. 
However, this requires reliable and consistent statistics, which has been shown to be a 
challenge. In this regard, it would be prudent, in an Irish context, to explore mechanisms 
to ensure the availability and accessibility of more reliable and relevant statistics.  Thirdly, 
any policy should be risk assessed to ensure a balance between human rights and 
privacy. This should be conducted cognisant of the need to have both a short and long 
term perspective of positive and unintended consequences. Fourthly, the findings 
suggest that any course of action should take on a methodological approach when 
defining a roadmap for activities, and where possible include a whole of government 
approach, and also incorporate non-governmental stakeholders.  
Such collaborative partnerships are often a central part of crime strategies and essential 
to the work of EC3 at Europol, and while not beyond challenges as shown in the report, 
they have the potential to be very effective if developed correctly. As a result, an area 
worth further analysis is how Ireland can enhance its existing, highly prized, partnerships 
in this area. Improvements could place Ireland in a good position to develop a systematic 
means of establishing best practice, and build on the rich eco-systems of universities, 
tech companies, law enforcement and other relevant stakeholders. One area that would 
benefit from further enhancement is to explore the development of a more formal 
mechanism of collaboration. This may require a review of the interpretation of regulations 
and legislation such as GDPR, to see if there are opportunities for greater exchange of 
data, without infringing on privacy. Interestingly, Europol in the interest of moving forward 
and maximising existing relationships, while not breaching any law or regulations on data 




Another area that often takes a central part of such strategies is the use of awareness 
raising campaigns. The research shows a shift from general campaigns is needed. 
Therefore, more precise efforts to bring about change that will help to raise cybersecurity 
levels and resilience in the wake of cybercrime should ideally be considered, mindful also 
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Appendix B List of Interviewees 
Interviews were conducted with representatives from the following organisations. Their time, 
insights and opinions are greatly appreciated. 
Professor David Wall, University of Leeds 
Representatives from An Garda Síochána 
Representative from an Irish Academic Institute  
Representatives from Banking & Payments Federation Ireland (BPFI) 
Representative from the Central Statistics Office (CSO) 
Representative from a Corporate Consultancy Firm 
Representative from EUROPOL 
Representative from the UK’s National Crime Agency (NCA) 
Representatives from two financial institutions. 
